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Corporate governance and 
institutionalization 
Abstract 
This thesis concerns corporate governance, a field that has attracted attention from 
a wide range of academic disciplines and evoking the often competing interests of 
corporations and investors. Interest in the field grew over the past three decades in 
response to recurrent corporate and market failures, through which it became a focal 
point of public policy debate as well. The complexity makes analysis both difficult and 
deeply rewarding. Scholars approach it from a wide variety of often conflicting 
theoretical perspectives, which ironically results in a field that can seem under-
theorized. Studies of the field take a number of directions, presenting a challenge to all 
those who study it. This thesis addresses that challenge by adopting three different 
stances and then bringing them together under a framework based in institutional 
theory. An introductory chapter outlines the work, while the concluding chapter then 
articulates the links further and points towards an agenda for further research. 
 
Note: In accordance the guidelines of the University of Liverpool for a "PhD by 
published papers" (see Figure 1, page viii), it includes five published papers, an 
unpublished chapter and a paper currently under review at a journal.  
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Part 1: Institutions and corporate governance 
This part provides an introduction to the themes of corporate 
governance and institutional theory. It also describes the shape of the 
thesis and in outline how the topics of the individual papers discuss 
may be viewed as part of a larger whole.  

 Page 3    
1. The problems of corporate governance 
Introduction 
Corporate governance is a complex field of study, one with few clear boundaries. 
Its practice involves a wide range of actors: directors and their advisers, investors and 
their advisers, regulators, public policymakers and all the interest groups that seek to 
advise them. Boards of directors sit at the apex of corporations, where all the strands of 
the organization come together. As a result, academic attention to corporate 
governance has come from a correspondingly wide variety of academic disciplines: 
accounting, finance, economics, financial economics, law, organizational studies and 
strategic management. The breadth of interest has fostered a literature in each and 
increasingly in studies seeking to create links between the differing perspectives.  
Corporate governance is also a topical field of study, with impact on both public 
and business policy. Though it was little discussed before the mid-1970s, since then 
corporate governance has rarely been out of the public discourse. Early attention 
focused on US corporations and in particular on the linked issues of the escalation of 
executive pay (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Crystal, 1992; Monks & Minow, 1991), the 
power of social elites (Schmidt, 1977; Useem, 1979a) and shareholders' loss of influence 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). More 
recently, other controversies have gained prominence in the public debate. Corporate 
failures have had an impact on the investment community as a whole but also directly 
on the pension savings of individuals – recall the collapses of the Maxwell enterprises 
in the early 1990s and Enron a decade later. Moreover, corporate governance failings 
have been identified as at least in part to blame in the recent threat to the stability of 
the financial system as a whole (M. Conyon, Judge, & Useem, 2011; Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
Corporate governance is not just topical; it is important. 
This thesis is in part a response to both the complexity of the field and its 
significance. This introductory chapter describes the literature in outline, identifying 
within it several recurrent themes concerning the source of the problems in corporate 
governance and the proposed solutions to them. These diagnoses and remedies point 
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to three underlying ways of conceptualizing the field, which form the structure 
underpinning the individual studies. 
Diagnoses in corporate governance 
Because interest in the field arose in large part from important corporate failures, 
much of the literature involves the search for causes and solutions. Empirical studies 
seek out diagnoses, normative ones advocate remedies, and sometimes the two are 
linked. The problems can be grouped in at least three broad categories, a) the work of 
boards and their relations with managers, b) the relationship between corporations and 
investors, and c) the interaction of corporations with the wider society.  
Boards and management 
While corporate governance involves a wide range of actors, much emphasis is 
placed on the role of boards. Corporate boards have been described as social elites, 
who meet only episodically and in the setting of fairly large groups, complicating the 
processes of decision-making (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). In contrast to the high levels of 
remuneration associated with senior executives of listed companies, directors – in their 
roles a board members – work for relatively low pay (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010). Among 
outside, "non-executive" directors, many are already powerful, highly paid executives 
at other corporations or have retired from executive life with comfortable finances. 
They are motivated less by money than by their personal reputations, a benefit, in 
theory, to investors who expect these directors to look after shareholder interests, but  a 
condition that may have also a "dark side" (Fahlenbrach, Low, & Stulz, 2010) for the 
organizations they serve, when outside directors leave just when their services are 
most in need. These characteristics suggest that board members are probably strong 
willed and therefore reluctant to take instructions easily without good reason or 
without the force of legal sanctions. Indeed, theorists argue that the role of directors is 
in part to be professionally in disagreement (Amason, 1996; Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  
The experience of corporate governance has proved somewhat different. Interest in 
the field of corporate governance started with concerns over managerial hegemony, a 
result of the development of what Berle and Means (1932/1991) called the modern 
corporation, in which remote owners ceded power to the managers of the business. 
The managerialism identified by Chandler (1977) can run to excess, development of the 
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agency problem (Fama, 1980), often focused on the escalation of executive pay 
(Bebchuk, Grinstein, & Peyer, 2009; Crystal, 1992). Some studies suggest that boards 
may be characterized by cronyism (Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2006), and much of the 
corporate governance literature has examined potential remedies for these effects in 
market-based approaches on incentives aligned to shareholder interests (Gomez-Mejia, 
Tosi, & Hinkin, 1987) and the potential for perverse effects (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Lee, 
2002).  
In this view, corporate governance is a matter of social groups interacting in an 
economic field. The problems arise from the isolation of boards and the close 
interaction of boards and managers, which create the risk of expropriation of the 
company's resources to the private benefit of those in charge. This agency problem 
may be solved through a combination of economic incentives to give rational actors a 
reason to work in the shareholders' interests, using a combination of transparency, 
board structure and director independence as a way to reduce the impact of isolation. 
However, it may be argued that the remedies lie not in structures and transparency, 
but in character, behaviour and the relationships between the directors (McNulty, 
Roberts, & Stiles, 2005). These aspects of corporate governance remain relatively 
underexplored, in part because of the difficulty in studying the practical work of 
boards.  
Corporations and shareholders 
Because the agency problem arises from the separation of ownership and control, 
the relationship of corporations and shareholders has become an important focus of 
inquiry. The concentration on shareholder value (Rappaport, 1986) that developed in 
response to the first wave of interest in the field in the 1970s had at its roots the 
assumption that the interests of investors comes first, that is, the idea of shareholder 
primacy (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004). Empirical studies have explored the impact 
of shareholders on corporate performance, seeking to determine, for example, whether 
family control (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006), blockholders (Laeven & Levine, 
2008), dispersed shareholders (Fox & Hamilton, 1994), or other configurations of 
ownership affect performance or strategic decisions (Daily, Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 
2003). While the literature of corporate governance may be dominated by US practice, 
with its presumption of wide share ownership identified by Berle and Means 
(1932/1991), questions have arisen whether that depiction is accurate (Holderness, 
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2009) and how the growth of institutional investment has altered the assumptions of 
the disempowered shareholder (Edmans, 2009). 
Underlying these concerns is a theme of the balance of power between 
shareholders on the one hand and boards and management on the other, as much as 
how power is shared between executive and non-executive directors. Rather less 
attention has been given to another aspect of the problem, the differences between 
shareholders and how those affect the ability of boards to identify what shareholder 
interests are, even if they accept the notion of shareholder primacy.  
Corporations and society 
The claims of shareholders to primacy are often based not so much on ownership 
rights as on the notion of residual claims. This approach argues that shareholders are 
last in line for payment if the corporation fails, so the legitimate focus of boards is to 
protect shareholder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). This notion has been challenged 
from a variety of directions, not least from the claim that employees might have based 
on their firm-specific investments (Brink, 2010), but also paradoxically that primacy 
might not be in shareholders' interests (Stout, 2011). This line of thinking is in line with 
considerations of boards as mediating hierarchies (Blair & Stout, 1999), which 
recognize the claim of other stakeholders and therefore the role of the corporation in 
society. Extensions of this approach see corporate governance as linked to the social 
licence to operate (Graafland, 2002) and a broader social contract (Sacconi, 2006, 2007).  
While the literature on corporate social responsibility is in many ways distinct 
from that on corporate governance, there are overlaps, as when normative approaches 
based on duty- or rights-based ethics clash with the claims of shareholder primacy. 
Less well explored are how these interests may be viewed as part of the political 
contest over corporate resources and how that contest comes to inform the ways in 
which directors view their roles and choose which course of action to adopt.  
Remedies in corporate governance 
A brief overview of an extensive literature can provide only a glimpse into the 
range of ideas advanced to diagnose the problems in the field. The range of possible 
remedies is large as well, and they arise from various perspectives: the character and 
characteristics of individual actors and the dynamics of their interactions; the legal and 
Donald Nordberg  Page 7 
regulatory frameworks in which they operate, and the processes or political 
contestation through which they are formed; the conventions and practices, in 
particular the codes of practice that guide the decisions of directors. These perspectives 
have each developed a sizeable literature, drawing upon three interrelated themes.  
Ethics: Some writers (e.g. du Plessis, 2008; Evan & Freeman, 1993; O'Neill, 
Saunders, & McCarthy, 1989; Orin, 2008) view corporate governance as a matter of 
ethics: The decisions of the directors of corporations that affect the lives of all those 
with whom it has contact. This approach draws upon themes in leadership, corporate 
social responsibility, and broader approaches to ethics. But ethical choices of 
individuals cannot be enacted in a straightforward fashion. Directors work together in 
a group – the board of directors – creating a need for negotiation of ethical claims, and 
opening issues of wider negotiation, creating a second avenue of exploration.  
Politics: Writers on this theme see corporate governance as a political contest over 
the resources of the corporation, played out in relationships of power (e.g. Charny, 
2004; Gourevitch & Shinn, 2005; Pagano & Volpin, 2005). Indeed, much of the literature 
examining mechanisms of corporate governance is based on the premise that the 
solution to the problem lies in changing relationships of power through law or in 
demonstrating (or not) how such mechanisms improve firm performance (e.g. Daily, 
Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 2003; Elsayed, 2007; C. Holm & Schøler, 2010; McKnight & 
Weir, 2009). Those contests often involve the struggle between managers, seeking to 
secure the greatest possible discretion over decisions, and investors, seeking to limit 
that discretion and keep managers focused on the production of shareholder value. 
Other actors also play roles in the contest, and all these parities appeal to public 
policymakers to adjudicate if not the specific claims then at least the rules of the game. 
The rules provide a third vantage point. 
Institutions: The practice of boards is informed by both the formal institutions of 
law and regulation and the informal ones of custom and practice (Judge, Douglas, & 
Kutan, 2008; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005; Westphal & Zajac, 1997). Much of the early 
literature, in particular that written from legal or accountancy perspectives, uses 
approaches focused on compliance and disclosure regulations, for example, and some 
of the political literature – in particularly those writers working from a path-
dependency perspective (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999; Roe, 2003) – see formal institutions as 
central. Important in the field of corporate governance is an intermediate level of 
institutional arrangements: voluntary codes of conduct, which have emerged over the 
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last 20 years (del Brio, Maia-Ramires, & Perote, 2006; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). They 
came to prominence first in the UK and became the benchmark of "good" governance 
in many jurisdictions around the world.  
These three perspectives raise a series of research questions, which the chapters of 
this thesis address.  
• On what ethical bases do directors decide on a course of action, and how do they 
relate to the theoretical approaches in the corporate governance literature? 
• In view of the central role of investors in corporate governance, what is the 
shape of investor forces contesting for influence in corporate boardrooms?  
• What political and social imperatives give rise to regulative action, and how can 
actors in the field – including investors – influence the outcome?  
• In the specific case of codes of corporate governance, what processes give rise to 
their prescriptions, and how do the actors in the field give shape to their 
content?  
• How do codes project the role of boards, and how does that understanding 
develop with time and experience? 
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis seeks answers to these questions in roughly the reverse order. As 
discrete papers, the chapters examine different cases and employ separate theoretical 
perspectives, providing specific insights. The final chapter, however, develops these 
sketches into an integrated picture, linking perspectives that point to a larger 
theoretical view and towards avenues of further research. The structure of the thesis is 
as follows:  
Part 2 involves two long essays concerning codification viewed as an institutional 
phenomenon.  The first examines the texts of the three main versions of the UK code, 
each written in response to concerns over corporate failures, drawing on theories of 
institutional logics to explain how perceptions of good governance has shifted over the 
years.1 The second then uses the contributions of various actors from corporations, 
investors and other interested parties to explore how they sought to influence the 
codes' provisions over the same period, drawing on work in institutional logics and 
                                                     
1 This paper, written with Professor Terry McNulty of the University of Liverpool (who 
supervised my studies), is currently under review at Business History. A fuller note on our 
collaboration appears as a preface to that section.  
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institutional work.2 Together they examine the phenomenon of codification from an 
institutional perspective. The two chapters suggest a multi-level approach (D. R. 
Dalton & Dalton, 2011; A. J. Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2011), as a 
regulatory process (codification) seeks to influence the structure and behaviour of 
corporate boards, and how actors in the field seek to influence the development of that 
process. To study these questions, the analysis applies some of the relatively 
underexploited aspects of institutional theory (Suddaby, 2010) to show how the text of 
codes and the way actors use language to create and revise codes to give meaning to 
certain practices of boards. By working across two decades of codes and focuses on the 
major versions written in response to crisis, we see how the code adapted to the 
changing context, and how embedded institutional agency permitted those changes 
and prevented others. The studies  involves the role language and rhetoric (Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005) in establishing and giving legitimacy to institutional arrangements. 
The second also raises questions concerning the nature of institutional work (Battilana 
& D'Aunno, 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).  
Part 3 contains two published works that examine corporate governance as a 
contest of political will. The papers here – one a case analysis, the other conceptual – 
were not written from the perspective of institutional theory, though both can be 
interpreted in that light. The chapter "Waste makes haste" examines the regulatory 
response to the collapse of Enron Corp. in the US and how the gaps in that response 
suggest a public policy blind-spot that may have contributed to the subprime crisis that 
became evident in 2007.3 That is, it involves what we can view as a radical change in 
formal institutional arrangements – the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US in 
2002. The chapter "The politics of shareholder activism" develops a topology of 
investor-actors, showing how their interests may vary across three dimensions, 
creating a model it terms the "shareholder stance".4 Much of the literature uses the 
perspective of shareholder value as the basis for evaluating mechanisms of corporate 
governance as a route to improved firm performance. But this paper raises conceptual 
                                                     
2 This chapter is new to the thesis; a long analysis, it is the basis for two papers under review for 
the 2012 Academy of Management conference and the colloquium of the European Group for 
Organizational Studies; journals submissions will follow.  
3 Nordberg, D. (2008). Waste Makes Haste: Sarbanes-Oxley, Competitiveness and the Subprime 
Crisis. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 16(4), 365-383. 
4 This chapter appeared in a collection of essays: Baker, H. K., & Anderson, R. (2010). Corporate 
Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice, part of the Robert W. Kolb Series on 
Finance. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
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and practical issues with using shareholder value as an organizing principle for board 
decision-making. Implicit in this is that the institutionalization of shareholder value is a 
problematic concept (Jensen, 2001; Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000), as evidenced in 
empirical studies of investor communication (e.g. Roberts, Sanderson, Barker, & 
Hendry, 2006). It thus lends support to work questioning shareholder primacy 
(Armour, Deakin, & Konzelmann, 2003; Sharfman, 2010; Stout, 2011).  
Part 4 contains three papers that look at ethical issues in corporate governance. The 
first of these interprets the core theoretical perspectives in the field in the light of the 
divide in ethics between consequentialist and deontological approaches.5 The second 
draws upon it to examine the case where the board of directors, in effect, dismissed the 
owners, an ironic reversal of roles that exposes the ethical basis for decision-making in 
a case where law and informal institutional norms gave little guidance.6 The third 
paper examines two cases of takeover bids in the same industry, where conventional 
understandings of "good" governance – specifically, shareholders' presumed interest in 
having a free market for corporate control – were undermined by arrangements 
designed to protect the companies from predators that might endanger values only 
loosely connected to shareholder value.7 These papers again do not invoke institutional 
theory directly, but a preface to each suggests links.  
The single chapter in Part 5 then summarizes the contributions of the chapters and 
the thesis as a whole and then provides a reflective commentary on the field and the 
process of studying it in these papers. It also suggests avenue for further research, 
including what the analyses presented suggest may be overlapping institutional logics 
that may conflict or compete, with the promise of further evolution if not more radical 
change in the face of the MacAvoy and Millstein (2003) term the recurrent crisis in 
corporate governance.  
The studies' contributions to the literature of corporate governance concern the 
role of codes and the process of codification, the tradeoffs and balances struck in policy 
formation and in boardrooms facing difficult decisions. Contributions to theory are 
particular to each paper, but together they suggest a mode of thinking about the field 
of corporate governance that integrates its ethical, political and institutional 
                                                     
5 Nordberg, D. (2008). The Ethics of Corporate Governance. Journal of General Management, 33(6), 
35-52. 
6 Nordberg, D. (accepted 2011). Rules of the Game: Whose value is served when the board fires 
the owners? Business Ethics: A European Review. 
7 Nordberg, D. (2007). News and Corporate Governance: What Dow Jones and Reuters Teach 
Us About Stewardship. Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism, 8(6), 718-735. 
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dimensions. The avenues of further research in the concluding chapter point to ways to 
develop that approach empirically and theoretically. 
 
A note on the scripts: The papers in this collection were written and (where 
applicable) published during my research studies at the University of Liverpool, under 
the supervision of Professors Terry McNulty and Robin Holt. With the exception of one 
chapter, the work represented here is entirely my own. The chapter "Creating Better 
Boards" was written in close collaboration with Professor McNulty. For the 
convenience of the reader, a note preceding that section explains more fully how we 
worked on it. 
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Part 2: Institutionalization and codification 
This part is made up of two related empirical studies, the first under 
review and the second original to this thesis.  
The first, "Creating better boards", concerns issues of content of the 
three main versions of the UK code of corporate governance between 
1992 and 2010. The second, "Writing the code", analyses the debates 
preceding those three versions. 
  
A note on methods 
Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis were developed in parallel, using similar processes 
of data sources and analysis. While each chapter contains a section concerning the 
methodology, this note provides greater elaboration and comments on research 
philosophy.  
Sources 
The two chapters examine events in three time periods, 1992, 2003 and 2009-10, 
when the major versions of the UK code of corporate governance were formulated, but 
other changes to the code were excluded. The chapters examine the codes and the 
processes that led to their drafting for what they say about board effectiveness.  The 
Greenbury Code of 1995, and both the Hampel Code and the first version of the so-
called Combined Code in 1998 did not directly address that topic. Greenbury dealt 
with remuneration and disclosure without altering the core elements on boards in 
Cadbury (1992). Hampel concerned the relationship between boards and investors, and 
the first Combined Code combined the three individual ones. Revisions in 2006 and 
2008 were excluded as well; while they altered the substance concerning boards in the 
2003 version of the Combined Code, they did so only at the margins. Moreover, and 
importantly, none of these revisions arose against the backdrop of widespread 
dissatisfaction with current arrangements, let alone a "precipitating jolt", in the terms of 
Greenwood and colleagues (2002), which might have cast doubt on the legitimacy of 
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the code. The efforts in 1992, 2003 and 2009-10 were different. As Chapter 2 explains, 
these versions came in response to corporate collapses that led to widespread concern 
among policy-makers and the general public about the legitimacy of corporate 
governance, in 1992 as practiced in the UK and in both 2003 and 2009-10 on a global 
scale.  
The volume and complexity of the data as well as differences in theoretical 
perspectives led to the decision to break the project into discrete parts. I might have 
structured the work chronologically, looking and processes and texts together, and 
each period separately. In consultation with Professor McNulty, I concluded that a split 
between code texts and processes provided a more promising analytic approach and 
one with practical significance. The code texts inform governance structures and 
activities at all listed companies, in many non-listed companies and organizations in 
the UK, and even the code development in other jurisdictions (see Chapter 2 for a 
summary). As such, and following Fairclough (1992), the discourse those texts create 
alters the social practice of boards. The texts, therefore, contain essential insights into 
the understanding of board effectiveness, which became the substance of Chapter 2. In 
institutional terms, they articulate the logic of corporate governance, presenting the 
argument and rhetoric that gives the code its cognitive and moral legitimacy, which 
then diffuses and becomes institutionalized (Greenwood et al., 2002).  
The processes of code development, by contrast, concern episodes where 
institutional change may arise, when competing and conflicting logics get a public 
airing (Purdy & Gray, 2009) and institutional entrepreneurs and defenders can engage 
in what Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) call institutional work. These are the periods of 
political contestation (Zilber, 2007), when we can hear the new discourse taking shape, 
as proffered texts emerge and submerge and a new or modified language of corporate 
governance develops, which then does, or does not, affect practice. This, too, has 
practical significance for policy-making considering code development in fields other 
than corporate governance. 
In all the consultations analysed in Chapter 3, each instance involved more than a 
hundred texts, often ones that were mutually supportive or just repetitious. The 
methodology section of that chapter explains the approach to sampling in some detail, 
which I will not repeat here. While the core samples for each period are listed in an 
appendix, it is worth noting the reasons why some of the analysis involved texts 
outside the samples. The core samples provided detailed comments on a wide variety 
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of points from the differing perspectives of their authors and organizations. But other 
contributors made salient comments on individual points, often in quite vivid 
language, occasionally in quite terse and concise documents. The force of these 
documents, on these narrow points, might well have resonated with the code's authors. 
Widening the sample to include them suited the theoretical sampling criterion of 
salience.  
Analysis 
Chapters 2 and 3 give outline-level introductions to the data analysis techniques. 
Here, I elaborate upon them before reflecting on the processes of qualitative research in 
generating narratives like these. 
The discourse analyses were developed with the assistance of Nvivo software, a 
package designed for qualitative research and based on the principles of grounded 
theory development. In keeping with those principles, I approached the texts for both 
chapters with a fairly open mind, though as Glaser and Strauss (1967), and especially 
as Strauss (1987) accepted, one cannot have a completely open mind about a subject 
one has dealt with before. Chapter 9, in the reflections on my career as a journalist, 
reconsiders this issue in different terms.  
In developing the paper that makes up Chapter 2, Professor McNulty and I each 
read the text of the 2010 code and saw in it changes in tone that signalled a departure 
from the past. That prompted us to look for certain categories of meaning in the prior 
texts as well as in the 2010 one. That is, the open coding was not entirely open, even at 
the outset. I would argue, I believe with Strauss's support, that it was ever thus. The 
initial categories of accountability, independence, structure and behaviour were soon 
joined about a hundred others, "nodes" in Nvivo's language, many of which became 
only lightly populated in the software as I analysed the texts in succession. But others 
became heavily populated, and some came to be articulated into trees of meaning, as 
the coding became more granular and complete.  
In keeping with grounded theory and the way in which the software assists its 
users, the next phase involved identifying relationships between nodes, what 
grounded theorists describe as axial coding, in particular between the more abstract, 
second-level codes, including accountability, independence, structure and behaviour. 
For example, Cadbury's evocative metaphor of the "buttress", discussed in Chapter 2, 
became an example of how structure supports accountability, and one particular 
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understanding of it. The analysis then suggested how independence grew in its 
supporting role in 2003 and then in 2010 receded in terms of emphasis – in terms of 
force if not content (Fairclough, 1992).   
The analysis for Chapter 3 started with considerably more analytic structure in 
place. The concepts identified in working on the code texts were already in the front of 
my mind, and no attempt to impose a veil of ignorance could eliminate that.8 
Moreover, the starting point for the analysis in Chapter 3 was a copy of the Nvivo 
database from Chapter 2 with all its nodes and relationships but empty of any data. 
Nonetheless the data suggested new categories in each time period studied, suggesting 
ideas that may have been discarded between consultation and code.  
This discussion is, so far, very much according to standard qualitative research 
methods and the seminal texts in grounded theory. But what happened next in the 
analysis for both chapters – and what I believe happens next more generally – is that 
another method of understanding took over. In practical terms, the nodes in the 
software came to serve as buckets of phrases with handy links to the context in which 
the coded elements sat. At first the coding helped to group together all the things I had 
seen as, say, "structure" in one place. The nodes then became signposts pointing to a 
quick path to the texts in their contexts. As I came to know the texts better through 
iterative reading, I often bypassed the coding and went directly to the texts. Moreover, 
and importantly I believe, the meaning of texts emerged increasingly through the 
process of writing, that is, of explicating the texts, in much the form that they are 
presented in those two chapters. It is worth noting that the original drafts of the 
empirical sections of these two, long chapters were each originally more than twice as 
long. That is, understanding developed as much through the process of writing and 
reflecting as the process of coding.   
Reflection 
This experience reminded me of both literary criticism and the creative writing 
process that novelists and playwrights often discuss, in which the characters seem to 
take over and organize the action. The story unfolds and the meaning emerges more 
through the telling and less from formal plot development. It happens to actors in the 
theatre as well, when the performance one night reveals different meanings than the 
                                                     
8 We return to the veil of ignorance, and Rawls, briefly in the reflections in Chapter 9 
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night before; the telling itself changes, not just the hearing. That meaning should thus 
unfold is well known in the field of business and management. We learned how to talk 
about this experience as "emergent strategy" through the work of Mintzberg (1987) or 
as "sensemaking" from Weick (1989) and their respective followers. The qualitative 
management studies literature embraces the use of narrative approaches for data 
collection (e.g. Maguire & Phillips, 2008). The themes of storytelling (Jørgensen & Boje, 
2010; Ng & De Cock, 2002) and even fiction (Rhodes & Brown, 2005) as a mechanism 
for the creating of meaning are also important in organization studies. De Cock (2000, 
p. 591) even questions the distinction between narrative and scientific knowledge, 
stating: "The boundaries between narrative knowledge (in the form of myths and 
stories) and scientific knowledge (the 'facts') are artificial because scientific knowledge 
can only be represented through narrative knowledge". If we accept this view, even in 
part, it is not that great a leap to envisage that researchers themselves, whether writing 
on organizations, economics, literature or history, would discover meaning through 
telling the story of their data. Such a view is in sympathy with the view of Rorty (1989) 
on the ironist's constant urge to discover a new vocabulary in which to discuss her 
ideas and hopes. 
Code-writing – as the following two chapters depict it – concerns the search of a 
new vocabulary of corporate governance, a vocabulary that is at once clear and then, in 
another circumstance, ambiguous, creating structure and then flexibility to inform the 
work of corporate boards. That is to say, the evolution of the code (Chapter 2) and the 
processes of code-writing (Chapter 3) are mirrored in the processes I went through in 
the data analysis and then the writing of the two chapters. The codes then demand 
from directors a narrative account of their approach to governance. As the next chapter 
details, in 2010 that demand comes with a plea for personal communication, in the 
hope perhaps that such telling will prove more revealing and provide more meaning.  
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2. Creating better boards (under review) 
Status: Under review at Business History (2012) 
The essay below, written with Professor Terry McNulty, arose from 
discussions we had around the time the Financial Reporting Council 
published the new UK Corporate Governance Code in May 2010. We 
independently came to the view that the code marked an interesting 
shift in direction and decided to analyse it paying close attention to 
the texts. In reflections on his work on the Higgs Review (in 
particular, McNulty et al., 2005) Professor McNulty had seen in that 
review a recognition of the importance of behaviour and 
relationships between directors, which concurred with my view from 
having met Higgs following its publication. We agreed these 
sentiments did not come across in the implementation of his review. 
We decided to examine the idea whether the shift in 2010 could be 
attributed to a tempering of the structural focus of Cadbury and the 
emphasis on formal definitions independence in post-Higgs version 
of the code, reflecting greater recognition that behaviour lies at the 
heart of board effectiveness.  
Professor McNulty thus contributed to the formulation of the 
research question, wrote the initial draft of the section of the 
literature review on board effectiveness, and pointed to the issues in 
institutional theory raised in a recently published essay (Suddaby, 
2010). I provided the rest of the literature review on corporate 
governance and institutional theory and chose the methodology. I 
conducted the data analysis, consulting with Professor McNulty over 
definitions of coding, and wrote a first draft. We then collaborated 
through several drafts, for which I took the lead in writing. 
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Creating better boards through codification: 
Possibilities and limitations in UK corporate 
governance 1992-2010  
(2012) 
Abstract: Since the beginnings of the global debate over corporate 
governance in the early 1990s, academics, practitioners and 
policymakers have focused on changing boards of directors to 
improve corporate governance. The financial crisis of 2007-09 arose 
despite two decades of codification of corporation governance, a 
process that continues in the light of concern about corporate 
performance and accountability: Codes have not eliminated the 
problems they set out to address. Analysing the three main versions 
of the UK code of corporate governance, we see a shifting discourse 
of "structures" in Cadbury (1992) to "independence" under the 
reforms in 2003, and then in the 2010 iteration towards "behaviour", 
as the code seeks to improve boards as mechanisms of corporate 
governance. The evolution in the language and recommendations of 
the code reveals growing understanding both of the practical 
challenge of board effectiveness and of the limitations to codification.  
Keywords: Codification, corporate governance, discourse, 
institutional theory, board of directors.   
Introduction 
Codes of corporate governance have become an important worldwide 
phenomenon, affecting both how businesses set policy and governments weigh the 
need for regulation (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009).  A first wave started with 
the UK Cadbury Code (1992), a response to prominent corporate failures. A second 
wave, following the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in the US but also Parmalat and 
Ahold in Europe in the early 2000s, included the Higgs Review (2003) of non-executive 
directors, which led to changes to the UK Combined Code and new governance 
regulation elsewhere. But the financial crisis in 2007-09 demonstrated that problems of 
poor conduct and corporate collapse persist, prompting further reconsideration of 
what constitutes good corporate governance – around the world, and also in the UK.  
Codes are studied by directors, memorised by their support staff, and shape parts 
of annual corporate reporting. They prescribe "good" or even "best" practices within the 
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boardroom – structures of board design, the shape of board leadership, balance 
between executives and outside directors and their independence. They do so despite 
inconclusive evidence that their key tenets lead to better performance (Bhagat & 
Bolton, 2008; D. R. Dalton & Dalton, 2011), and despite concern that the theory on 
which they are in part based may have perverse effects (Ghoshal, 2005). There is some 
evidence that compliance is rewarded by stock markets (Goncharov, Werner, & 
Zimmermann, 2006) and that good governance standards benefits whole markets 
(Newell & Wilson, 2002). Whatever their impact, as codes gain acceptance, they 
become institutionalised, placing constraints on action and providing legitimacy for 
corporations and directors who adhere to them. Yet the goal of better boards remains 
elusive.  
This paper traces the development of the UK code from its inception in 1992 to the 
revision undertaken in 2010, showing how it reflects an evolving conception of board 
effectiveness. Codes set mechanisms to introduce structure to the unstructured work of 
boards and define characteristics that might make directors independent of 
management. But over time, the language of the codes evolves, revealing a growing 
recognition that codes are unable to prescribe all the elements of good governance and 
that board effectiveness depends on the behaviour of boards. 
While the analysis is specific to the UK, it has wider implications: Corporate 
governance has become a global concern for corporations, investors, auditors, 
policymakers and the wider public. Early on the UK code became a model for other 
countries, informing the principles articulated by multilateral organisations, and 
providing the basis for codes in developed and emerging economies (Daily, Dalton, & 
Cannella, 2003).  
The rest of this article is structured as follows: We examine corporate governance 
in the UK, focusing on the three main iterations of the code, the Cadbury Code in 1992, 
the 2003 version of the Combined Code, and the UK Corporate Governance Code 
issued in 2010. We then consider theory and empirical studies that seek to identify 
characteristics of board effectiveness. Against this theoretical and conceptual 
background, the paper analyses the development of the texts of the code over the past 
two decades, identifying how their understanding of board effectiveness has shifted, 
and how their content seeks to alter practices of boards and institutionalise them. This 
evolution, we argue, points to both a growing understanding of board effectiveness 
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and recognition of the limits to prescribing and institutionalising such board conditions 
and practices through codes.  
Literature review 
The oft-quoted phrase from the Cadbury Code (1992, Paragraph 2.5)  defines 
corporate governance as the "the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies." 
Boards give a human face to the largely undefined legal person of the corporation; 
directors are the people within corporations to be held accountable.  
As a key mechanism of corporate governance boards occupy a central place in the 
research literature. Berle and Means (1932/1991) described the risks of separating 
ownership of corporate assets in the modern corporation from their control by 
professional managers, the self-interested and self-serving agents in day-to-day control 
of the company's resources, which led to a type of managerial capitalism (Chandler, 
1977). This agency problem (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) gave rise 
to emphasis on creating shareholder value (Rappaport, 1986) as the nature of corporate 
purpose. The board's role was mediating between management (the "agent") and 
shareholders (the "principals"), and monitoring and enforcing good governance 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Making a link to institutional theory in the context of US 
corporate governance, Westphal and Graebner (2010, p. 18) write that this "agency 
logic now dominates the financial community's view of corporate governance". At its 
heart is the belief that with the right incentives and controls, companies can align 
interests of managers with those of shareholders. A vast literature, particularly in the 
US, has developed on how remuneration links to shareholder returns (Bebchuk et al., 
2009; Brick et al., 2006; M. J. Conyon, 1994; del Brio et al., 2006; Keasey, 2006; Kumar & 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2008).  
Outside America, a different and significant approach took hold: codification, a 
new phenomenon within the history of corporate governance (cf. J. F. Wilson & 
Thomson, 2006). A handful of codes of practice for boards pre-date those in the UK. 
For example, a lobbying firm representing large US companies issued guidelines on the 
role of boards and their composition (Business Roundtable, 1978), but they lacked both 
monitoring and enforcement or standing beyond the organisation's membership. But 
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following the Cadbury Code in 1992 came a wave of official and semi-official codes 
around the world (see Appendix 1).  
The literature on the codification of corporate governance can be grouped broadly 
in four categories. A first concerns the diffusion of codes globally (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Collier & Zaman, 2005; Haxhi & van Ees, 2010). Second is a related 
theme tracking similarities and differences between countries (Hermes, Postma, & 
Zivkov, 2006; Weil Gotshal & Manges, 2002), while a third assesses compliance in 
individual regimes (Akkermans et al., 2007; Pass, 2006; von Werder & Talaulicar, 2009). 
The fourth seeks to assess the relationship of codes to corporate performance (MacNeil 
& Li, 2006; Shabbir, 2008) or reporting (Nowland, 2008). A few studies have pointed to 
the limitations of standardising such mechanisms, say, by type of company 
(Filatotchev, Toms, & Wright, 2006), and others have questioned whether "one size" 
can "fit all"  (Arcot & Bruno, 2007). In a study that points towards issues arising from 
such standard approaches, Popp, Toms and Wilson (2003) link governance needs to a 
combination of individual companies' resource bases and resource dependency. But 
few if any studies have analysed how codes shape and then re-shape their 
understanding of good governance and specifically board effectiveness over time in 
light of questions about their efficacy.  
Codification of UK corporate governance  
Quail (2000) says that the UK had been marked by proprietorial capitalism, where 
founding families retained control even as their ownership became diluted. It gave 
way over time, however, as financial institutions grew to become the main source of 
capital. At first these investors enjoyed little voice; as large investors they had little 
practical chance to exit. But gradually the scales tipped. As the market for corporate 
control developed in the 1970s and 1980s (Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2005), managers 
started to pay greater attention to the demands of institutional investors on strategic 
decisions (Steve Toms & Wright, 2002). Some companies retained a managerial-
proprietorial control and focus, however, notably when a dominant shareholder 
operated the reins of power. Then in rapid succession in the 1990 and 1991, a series of 
corporate failures brought different questions about the nature of corporate 
governance to the fore. The failure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
resulted from weak oversight of a complex, multinational organisation whose business 
structures played one regulator off against others. Other cases, Coloroll, Polly Peck and 
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the listed enterprises controlled by Robert Maxwell, involved audit failure and 
allegations of fraud conducted by people who were both major shareholders and 
managers.  
The impact of these cases, in particular on the pension savings of employees at 
Maxwell's companies, raised questions of the social legitimacy of corporations. One 
outcome was an effort that straddled private sector institution-building and public 
policy. Originally asked to devise remedies for the failings of accountancy and audit, 
Sir Adrian Cadbury went beyond his brief and, prompted in part by the Maxwell 
collapse, which occurred during his investigations, focused on the board of directors. 
Working with a panel of senior figures from accountancy, regulators (that is, the Bank 
of England and the London Stock Exchange) and the corporate world, Cadbury took 
evidence from more than 200 individuals and organisations in a variety of formal and 
informal settings. The result was the Cadbury Report and Code (1992), whose 
recommendations included separating the roles of chairman and chief executive 
officer, so no one person had "unfettered power" in the boardroom. It also urged 
boards to have committees for audit and other key functions and to engage outside, 
"non-executive" directors in sufficient numbers to have a strong voice on the board and 
in the committees. Over succeeding years the code would add other provisions but 
retaining a clause making it voluntary: Companies could choose not to comply, 
provided they published an explanation of their thinking. It called on the external 
authority of the Financial Reporting Council and the London Stock Exchange's UK 
Listing Authority, both at the time industry self-regulatory bodies, for monitoring and 
enforcement.  
In 2001-02 with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom and other large US corporations 
came renewed global concern about corporate governance. New institutional 
arrangements came as well, some legislative, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Library of 
Congress, 2002) in the US, others regulatory, like new listing rules from the New York 
Stock Exchange (2003) and Nasdaq (2002), as well as new or revised codes of conduct 
other countries. The UK revised its code after a review by Derek Higgs (2003), working 
on a mandate from government, recommended a wide range of measures to enhance 
the effectiveness of non-executive directors. Higgs concentrated more board functions 
in the hands of independent non-executives, a challenge to the authority and power of 
executive directors, of the chairman, and of any non-executives with other affiliations 
to the company. He urged regular evaluations of the performance of the board, its 
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members and the committees. Many of the recommendations of his review were 
incorporated into an extensive revision of the Combined Code, so called because it 
combined Cadbury with other reviews of executive pay (Greenbury, 1995) and 
institutional investment (Hampel, 1998). The FRC and UK Listing Authority were 
again involved as monitors, but now reconstituted as governmental entities.  
The global financial crisis of 2007-09 demonstrated to many observers the 
continuing inadequacies of corporate governance, whether of the legislative type in the 
US or code-based versions. In the UK, the FRC ordered a fresh revision of the 
Combined Code in 2009, a year earlier than scheduled. In parallel, government 
commissioned a study of governance arrangements in financial services (Walker, 
2009b). One outcome was an updated version of the code for all listed companies, with 
a new name: the UK Corporate Governance Code. Although many of its provisions are 
close or identical to the Higgs-inspired version, the new code is explicit in seeking to 
alter the "tone" (Financial Reporting Council, 2010, p. 3).  
As we examine below, the "tone" signals important shifts in direction and 
emphasis in the quest for board effectiveness, revealing perceived limitations and as 
well as possibilities in codification. To analyse the continuities and changes in the UK 
code it is useful to explore the meaning of effectiveness found in theoretical and 
empirical studies of boards.  
Board effectiveness 
Boards are a crucial mechanism of corporate governance (Adams, Hermalin, & 
Weisbach, 2010; C. M. Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Nadler, 2004; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). But 
empirical studies suggest boards often lack the ability to exercise influence 
management and may be weak, minimalist and ineffectual (Pettigrew & McNulty, 
1995). Other scholars point to the limited rationality of boards due to  "pluralistic 
ignorance" (Westphal & Bednar, 2005), groupthink (Janis, 1972; Maharaj, 2008; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003), and attention failures (Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 
2010). Boards appear to be influential when outside, non-executive directors create 
accountability through individual and collective behaviour that both challenges and 
encourages the executives. Effective behaviour requires that non-executives be 
"engaged but non-executive", "challenging but supportive" and "independent but 
involved" (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005, p. S6). These modes of behaviour recall the 
two dimensions of accountability that Roberts (1991, 2001) calls "individualising" (the 
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conventional view of accountability creating hierarchical relationships) and 
"socialising" (involving a sense of duties to others that links people together in 
common purpose). Roberts (2001, p. 1554) describes "socialising" accountability as 
arising "where there is relatively frequent face-to-face contact between people and, 
secondly, where there is a relative absence of formal power differentials".  
A key proposition that emerges is that while board structure and composition 
condition how boards operate, effectiveness depends on behavioural dynamics, 
including between non-executives and the executives (Roberts et al., 2005).  These 
empirical findings resonate with an earlier theoretical model (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) 
emphasising the importance of group processes to board effectiveness. 
Forbes and Milliken  (1999) view boards as relatively large, elite workgroups of 
seasoned, high-level executives. They meet episodically but boards otherwise have 
minimal involvement with the organisation; yet they make significant, interdependent 
strategic decisions, working by consensus and using the collective wisdom, skills and 
experience of the group. Consequently, Forbes and Milliken suggest that effectiveness 
must also embrace the ability to keep working together ("cohesiveness") as the board 
conducts the competing tasks of "control" and "service". They suggest three processes 
of importance: "effort norms", "cognitive conflict", and "the use of knowledge and 
skills". Effort norms concern how directors prepare for board sessions and give 
attention to board tasks. Cognitive conflict refers to issue-related disagreement, a view 
supported by Amason (1996). The use of directors' knowledge and skills refers to how 
relevant expertise is coordinated and deployed (Zona & Zattoni, 2007).  
Institutions, language and methodology 
Codes provide the texts of corporate governance, and their language frames the 
perception of the work of boards. As Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004) suggest, the 
language in which an institution is established influences and even controls how that 
institution will be accepted and evolve. Fairclough (1992) calls attention to the 
importance of texts, which set the language and intellectual parameters (or "discourse") 
in which discussions take place, which in turn shapes the social context and behaviour. 
Once established as social practice, these ideas provide legitimacy to the discourse and 
influence creation of future texts and how we think about issues. Clegg and his 
colleagues (2006, p. 303) endorse this view, saying that this "deceptively simple 
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framework" provides scope for analysis in linking texts to social practices. Fairclough 
(1992) argues that diction shapes what we can and may not think about. It frames the 
debate, focusing our attention on a part of the landscape, helping us to concentrate on 
certain aspects while eliminating others from view. Language thus gives shape to the 
discussion and sets boundaries. Seminal texts set terms of the debate, the logic.  
Because the purpose of the paper is to understand what the code texts recommend 
as appropriate and legitimate ways for boards to operate, we have studied a mix of 
features in language – metaphor, diction, positioning, word order, among others – to 
determine how the texts set category boundaries. It is an interpretative study, 
involving analytical iterations that led to the identification of the elements reviewed in 
our discussion below.  
We have sought to ground the analysis as firmly as possible in the texts, rather 
than preconceived or even normative ideas about them. We each read the 2010 code 
very soon after it was published and came independently to the view that its language 
contained a fascinating mix of continuities and breaks with the past, and an 
understanding and emphasis that was different to that reported in the press upon 
release of the code (e.g. Sanderson & Burgess, 2010; H. Wilson, 2010). Thereafter our 
analysis, assisted by Nvivo software, involved several iterations of coding and multiple 
readings of the texts in full and as coded. We started with a view that structure, 
independence and behaviour would feature as elements of the discourse within the 
texts, and that the concepts of compliance and accountability – a core principle in 
Cadbury – would be important. The coding process helped to identify relationships 
between them and to them from concepts including types of directors, board 
composition and director tenure. We then coded that data against the model and 
related concepts of board effectiveness in Forbes and Milliken (1999).  
Cadbury started with a blank slate; successive authors did not. Terms and 
meanings legitimated by the code would carry forward their meanings unless 
noticeably changed in subsequent versions. Identification of change was made by 
analysing how the diction shifts between versions of the code or how the same 
expressions had different meanings based on their linguistic and, to some extent, their 
social context.  
Although the language often demonstrated continuity and persistence, we made 
particular note of cases that make a strong use of rhetoric (Suddaby & Greenwood, 
2005). We paid greater attention to introductory passages towards the start of the latter 
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two documents, where our experiences as researchers suggest that the codes' authors 
seek most to signal changes and to persuade.  
Analysis 
While corporate governance contains many potential units of analysis, we see three 
as having particular significance for the theory and practice of board effectiveness: the 
overarching logic of the codes, we examine categories of a) form, through board 
design; b) actors, through types of director roles; and c) activities, through that iconic 
element of UK corporate governance, the statement of compliance. We begin by 
examining the core logic of the codes: accountability. 
Logic: accountability 
The concept of a better board might have been defined in terms of financial 
performance (McDonald & Westphal, 2003). We see this in much of the US-based 
literature using agency theory, based on shareholder rights and what Westphal and 
Graebner (2010, p. 21) disparagingly call "the critical importance of control … to 
organizational effectiveness" which "reduces the complexity of governance to a single 
dimension – board control of management". It permits a simple view of a complex 
problem and leads to mechanisms like executive incentives presumed – wrongly, 
according to Bebchuk and Fried (2003) – to work in an automatic way to control 
management.  
The UK code has roots in and resonance with agency theory, as we will see, but its 
logic arises and evolves through a broader concept of accountability. The codes, and in 
particular their use of forceful language (Fairclough, 1992), point to an evolution over 
the period 1992-2010 in how accountability is projected. In Cadbury (1992),  the code's 
logic is articulated at the very start:  
The country's economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its 
companies. Thus the effectiveness with which their boards discharge 
their responsibilities determines Britain's competitive position. They 
must be free to drive their companies forward, but exercise that 
freedom within a framework of effective accountability. This is the 
essence of any system of good corporate governance (Paragraph 1.1).  
The effective board requires freedom of action its drive and efficiency and the good 
of the national economy, but constrained by a "framework of effective accountability". 
The purpose of the Cadbury Code is, therefore, to impose a framework on the invisible 
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and previously unstructured work of corporate boards. From the outset, the UK codes 
of corporate governance have sought to achieve twin challenges of securing external 
confidence and ensuring business enterprise. Early in the Cadbury Report, for 
example, we hear that  
By adhering to the Code, listed companies will strengthen both their 
control over their businesses and their public accountability. In so 
doing, they will be striking the right balance between meeting the 
standards of corporate governance now expected of them and 
retaining the essential spirit of enterprise (Paragraph 1.5). 
Bringing greater clarity to the respective responsibilities of directors, 
shareholders and auditors will also strengthen trust in the corporate 
system. Companies whose standards of corporate governance are 
high are the more likely to gain the confidence of investors and 
support for the development of their businesses (Paragraph 1.6). 
In these sentences, the "essential spirit of enterprise" and "support for the 
development" work in parallel with better governance. Yet the weight of the language 
in these consecutive passages is on strengthening control by adherence to the 
"standards … expected of them". External confidence and "trust in the corporate 
system" arise from clear job definitions and adherence, again, to standards. The 
"public" to whom accountability is addressed are primarily shareholders. All three 
codes situate corporate governance mainly as a duty of boards to shareholders.  
In language echoing the agency problem (Berle & Means, 1932/1991; Fama, 1980; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983b), Cadbury goes beyond statutory requirements: 
Given the separation of ownership from management, the directors 
are required to report on their stewardship by means of the annual 
report and financial statements sent to the shareholders…. The most 
direct method of ensuring that companies are accountable for their 
actions is through open disclosure by boards and through audits 
carried out against strict accounting standards…. Shareholders look 
to the audit committee to ensure that the relationship between the 
auditors and management remains objective (Paragraphs 5.1-5.2; 5.9). 
The emphasis here is on a procedure – formal disclosures – as the starting point of 
accountability, and a board structure – the audit committee – as the channel for the 
board's oversight of management and the source of assurance to shareholders. At the 
distance of two decades, it is perhaps easy to forget that before Cadbury having an 
audit committee of solely independent non-executive directors was far from 
commonplace.  
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With this principle established, the Higgs-inspired 2003 code makes little direct 
reference to "accountability" in the section dealing with boards. But it brings a fresh 
emphasis on board and board-member independence, which supports the logic of 
accountability by widening the circle of directors to whom shareholders can turn:  
Whilst recognising that most shareholder contact is with the chief 
executive and finance director, the chairman (and the senior 
independent director and other directors as appropriate) should 
maintain sufficient contact with major shareholders to understand 
their issues and concerns. The board should keep in touch with 
shareholder opinion in whatever ways are most practical and efficient 
(Principle D.1). 
Independence of the non-executives and the expanded role of the senior 
independent director enhance upwards accountability to shareholders. This form of 
accountability remains prominent in the 2010 code as well, but with two additional 
elements. First, there are fresh references to accountability within the board itself, 
between directors, to the chairman, from the chairman to others. For example, in the 
2010 code the senior independent director becomes a "sounding board" for the 
chairman, a supportive role to the board itself and not just an alternative, even 
competing channel for shareholder concerns. Second, the 2010 code suggests in 
stronger terms than the earlier versions that shareholders need to be responsive to 
boards. In the Cadbury Report, shareholders have a part to play, but a largely 
unspecified one:  
Boards of directors are accountable to their shareholders and both 
have to play their part in making that accountability effective. Boards 
of directors need to do so through the quality of the information 
which they provide to shareholders, and shareholders through their 
willingness to exercise their responsibilities as owners (Paragraph 
3.4). 
Here, shareholders' primary role is to appoint directors; otherwise they are the 
point of accountability. In the 2003 code comes stronger emphasis on the need for 
shareholders to consider the explanations of non-compliance: 
Whilst shareholders have every right to challenge companies' 
explanations if they are unconvincing, they should not be evaluated 
in a mechanistic way and departures from the Code should not be 
automatically treated as breaches. Institutional shareholders and their 
agents should be careful to respond to the statements from 
companies in a manner that supports the "comply or explain" 
principle ("Preamble," Paragraph 7).  
In the 2010 code directors still account to shareholders, but the code also states that  
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… shareholders should pay due regard to companies' individual 
circumstances … Shareholders should be careful to respond to the 
statements from companies in a manner that supports the "comply or 
explain" process and bearing in mind the purpose of good corporate 
governance. They should put their views to the company and both 
parties should be prepared to discuss the position (Section "Comply 
or Explain," Paragraph 4). 
Although these three passages are similar in content, their force is different 
(Fairclough, 1992). Gone in 2010 is the language of compliance with its "breaches" and 
"unconvincing" explanations; in their stead come words expressing personal 
characteristics and actions: "both parties", "discuss" and "bearing in mind". Moreover, 
the 2010 code states that "certainly there is also scope for an increase in trust which 
could generate a virtuous upward spiral in attitudes to the Code and in its constructive 
use" (Section "Comply or Explain," Paragraph 6). All three codes expect boards to be 
accountable to shareholders, but the 2010 language signals a greater need for dialogue, 
conversation and discussion.  
All three versions stress the importance of good relationships between directors, 
but in 2010 there is a shift in emphasis. While the 2003 and 2010 versions use the 
expression "constructive challenge", the 2010 code adds another strand: "frankness and 
openness" within the boardroom. Cadbury uses the word "openness" in a very 
different sense:  
The principles on which the Code is based are those of openness, 
integrity and accountability. They go together. Openness on the part 
of companies, within the limits set by their competitive position, is 
the basis for the confidence which needs to exist between business 
and all those who have a stake in its success (Paragraph 3.2). 
This "openness" is to shareholders and others through the transparency of its 
reporting, a form of upwards accountability. By contrast, the 2003 code did not use the 
word "openness" in the main body of the report. It appears twice in appendices, 
however: in both cases suggesting that managers should be open towards non-
executives, signalling unidirectional and upward accountability. This is not the same 
"openness" we see in the 2010 code, with its emphasis of mutuality among directors 
and dialogue between the board and shareholders. The logic of accountability includes 
control, but unlike the agency logic described in Westphal and Graebner (2010), it also 
seeks knowledge and cooperation.  
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Form: board design 
Often depicted as the apex of the corporation, boards are a distinctive feature of 
the corporate form. Boards are often populated by directors of other corporations. 
While they may develop through mimesis inspired by interlocking directors (Caswell, 
1984; Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 2010), they can be constituted, in size, shape and 
composition, in a wide variety of ways. In absence of legal prescriptions, codes seek to 
describe which categories of board designs are legitimate.  
Boards might be unitary (as in the UK or US) or dual (as in Germany and some 
other continental European countries). Boards can act as a collective or work through 
committees with a different mandates. Unitary boards can have a majority of executive 
directors or non-executives, a separate chairman or a dual chairman-CEO.  
The UK codes either establish or give strong support to core elements of board 
design: structures like the balance between executives and non-executive directors; the 
separation of chairman and CEO; board committees and their composition; and the 
routines boards follow for reviewing accounts, nominating new directors, setting pay 
policy or evaluating the work of the board. Cadbury (1992) writes in occasionally vivid 
language about the importance of "structure" to corporate governance:  
Our proposals aim to strengthen the unitary board system and 
increase its effectiveness, not to replace it. (Paragraph 1.8). 
The effectiveness of a board is buttressed by its structure and 
procedures. One aspect of structure is the appointment of committees 
of the board, such as the audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees (Paragraph 4.21). 
Raising standards of corporate governance cannot be achieved by 
structures and rules alone. They are important because they provide 
a framework which will encourage and support good governance 
(Paragraph 3.13).  
Cadbury goes on to say that "what counts is the way in which they are put to use," 
(also Paragraph 3.13) but this is in the context of the section labelled "Compliance", 
which then speaks of the role financial institutions and the media have in monitoring 
corporate performance and governance issues. With quiet symbolism, the use of 
"buttressed" links the proposed architecture of board design with normative 
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prescriptions.9 The positioning and weight of the language here falls on companies 
adopting the structures and following the rules, and not just on saying they do. 
The Cadbury Report did not invent board committees, but following its 
publication they became the rule rather than the exception on UK boards (M. J. 
Conyon, 1994; Stiles & Taylor, 1993). The text emphasises their importance as a means 
of challenging the power of the executive. It speaks of the frequency of board meetings, 
the need to provide information to non-executives in good time and other procedural 
matters. Committees should be "formally constituted" with specified terms of 
reference. The nomination committee should have a majority of non-executive 
directors and be chaired by either the chairman or a non-executive. The audit 
committee should have a minimum of three members, a majority of whom should be 
independent, and it should meet at least twice a year. Remuneration committees 
should consist "wholly or mainly" of non-executives, and executives should "play no 
part" in decisions on their own pay. Cadbury details who should attend committee 
meetings and states that committee chairmen should take questions at the annual 
shareholders meeting.  
Selecting non-executives is important because of their "distinctive contribution" to 
the board, so there "should be a formal selection process" to "make it evident" they 
were not selected "through any form of patronage" (Paragraph 4.15). In the context of 
present board practices, these may seem far from revolutionary recommendations. But 
after the collapse of the Maxwell companies and Polly Peck, these were strong words 
of warning and rebuke. The importance of non-executives is also evident in Cadbury's 
recommendation that it is "highly desirable" that directors undertake training and 
"especially important" for new directors. Moreover they are "entitled to expect a proper 
process of induction" (Paragraph 4.19). Use of "entitlement" chastises even as it 
recommends. The 2003 code articulates these recommendations further, with greater 
emphasis on the role of independent non-executives on committees.  
With the 2010 code, although these aspects of design remain largely intact, the 
language of the preface makes clearer than before that boards should not rely on them 
alone.  
The Code, however, is of necessity limited to being a guide only in 
general terms to principles, structure and processes. It cannot 
                                                     
9 The normative quality of the symbol will be apparent to directors familiar with architecture, 
with the solid buttresses on Norman churches or flying buttresses on Gothic ones, or indeed 
those that support the walls of the UK Houses of Parliament. 
Donald Nordberg  Page 35 
guarantee effective board behaviour because the range of situations 
in which it is applicable is much too great for it to attempt to mandate 
behaviour more specifically than it does. Boards therefore have a lot 
of room within the framework of the Code to decide for themselves 
how they should act (Preface, Paragraph 3). 
That the "range of situations" is "too great" is an admission that codes and the 
committees that write them cannot anticipate what complexities companies will face. 
Implicit is that board design is an insufficient remedy. Boards "have a lot of room" 
because they need it.  
Over time the codes endorse certain categories of board design: unitary not dual; 
separation of chair and CEO, rather than unified leadership, even though the empirical 
evidence is less than convincing (Carapeto, Lasfer, & Machera, 2005; Dahya & Travlos, 
2000; Elsayed, 2007). More significantly, they endorse boards that are independent of 
management and denigrate boards with ties to management or major shareholders. But 
the understanding of what independence means and how it is to be judged has shifted 
in a subtle way, from structures as a proxy measure, to definitions of independence, 
and latterly towards the elusive notion of independence of mind evident in director 
and board behaviour that the code recognises it cannot witness or fully prescribe. 
Actors: Types of directors 
UK law draws no such distinctions between the types of directors: Boards have 
collective responsibility. The code, however, has developed quite clear distinctions 
between the role and work of directors: the chairman, executive directors (including 
the CEO), independent non-executives, and those non-executives deemed not to be 
independent, either of management or of a major shareholder, and two sometimes 
conflicting categories: independence and industry expertise. Central in all three versions 
is the chairman, though with a shifting emphasis.  
Chairman: The chairman's role is to run the board rather than the day-to-day 
business. Cadbury says the chairman's role is "fundamental" (Paragraph 4.2) and 
"crucial" (Paragraph 4.7), justifying his principle that the chairman should not also be 
CEO, so that, in what became an iconic phrase in corporate governance, "no one 
individual has unfettered powers of decision" (Paragraph 4.9). While still important, 
the chairman's role dims somewhat in the Higgs-inspired version, with its detailed 
prescriptions for the work of committees and the dominant role on them of 
independent non-executives. Higgs added provisions that retiring CEOs should not 
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normally go on to become chairmen and that chairmen should meet the independence 
criteria at the time of appointment. In 2010 the chairman swells in prominence. An 
example comes in the preface, linking the chairman's role to the implementation of the 
code itself and effectiveness. 
To follow the spirit of the Code to good effect, boards must think 
deeply, thoroughly and on a continuing basis, about their overall 
tasks and the implications of these for the roles of their individual 
members. Absolutely key in this endeavour are the leadership of the 
chairman of a board, the support given to and by the CEO, and the 
frankness and openness of mind with which issues are discussed and 
tackled by all directors (Preface, Paragraph 4). 
The 2010 preface then encourages chairmen to "report personally" on how the code 
has been applied, making the corporate governance section of the annual report the 
chair's personal responsibility, and not one of the task of, say, the company secretary. 
Such personal reporting should help companies "attack the fungus of 'boiler-plate'" 
(Paragraph 7), a powerfully mixed metaphor with diction previously unused in official 
documents on the subject. These words link the chairman even more tightly to external 
accountability. 
Executive directors: These directors work every day in the business, though in law 
they are meant to set these roles aside in the boardroom. In contrast to the US, where 
commonly only the CEO and CFO sit on the board, UK practice has long involved 
widespread use of executive directors. All three codes recognise the value in the 
expertise executives bring to the board. But executive directors face curbs in all three 
versions. Cadbury requires at least three non-executives to review the work of the 
executives and to debate issues like takeovers where the executives' interest may 
diverge from those of the company: board composition and structure contribute to 
effectiveness. Higgs restricts the ability on executives to serve on committees, so 
independence contributes to accountability. In the 2010 code, however, the language 
shifts somewhat towards recognising the contribution of executives:  
Constraints on time and knowledge combine with the need to 
maintain mutual respect and openness between a cast of strong, able 
and busy directors dealing with each other across the different 
demands of executive and non-executive roles (Preface, Paragraph 5). 
This passage, with its emphasis on mutuality and its recognition of "different 
demands", gives somewhat more weight to the contribution that executive directors 
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can make to the board than we see in the earlier versions, when the emphasis was on 
finding ways to constrain those with "unfettered" power.  
Non-executive directors: Coming from outside the company and with no 
operational role, these directors are often seen as a check on the power of managers. In 
seeking to achieve Sir Adrian Cadbury's desired independence of mind in the 
boardroom, the Cadbury Code gives some special weight to those without personal or 
business relationships with executives and without links to specific shareholders. It 
suggests these independent non-executives should make up a majority of the non-
executive contingent, a controversial recommendation at the time. Higgs, too, wanted 
independent judgement to prevail in the boardroom, and the version of the code he 
inspired articulated further criteria of independence and saw "affiliated" non-
executives nearly vanish from view. Independent non-executives now should make up 
at least half of the board; affiliated non-executives lose permission to sit on audit and 
remuneration committees; their presence on nomination committees is not prohibited, 
but it is not mentioned, either. The detailed language of the 2010 code largely repeats 
the wording from 2003 and its scant reference to non-executives who are not 
independent. The 2010 code, however, draws inspiration from a government-
sponsored review (Walker, 2009b) of corporate governance in banks, which explicitly 
endorses the category of expertise over independence on the boards of complex financial 
institutions, and with it a variety of measures that play down the letter of the Higgs-
inspired Combined Code, if perhaps not its spirit. While not going as far as Walker 
does in stressing the importance of expertise, the 2010 code questions the emphasis on 
independence and thus somewhat reopens the question of which categories of 
directors are legitimate. Moreover, it does so in quite forceful language, as we discuss 
next, by urging boards to take greater advantage of the code's flexibility. 
Activities: compliance and explanation 
A legacy of the Cadbury Report is how its language has come to define corporate 
governance. Perhaps the phrase with the greatest impact, in the UK code and abroad, is 
"comply or explain", ironically an expression Cadbury did not use. The text instead 
places upon companies  
a continuing obligation of listing, to state whether they are complying 
with the Code and to give reasons for any areas of non-compliance 
(Cadbury, 1992, Paragraph 1.3).  
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Here the weight is on "complying"; the use of the word "and" before "to give 
reasons" places emphasis on the obligation of reporting, rather than on the opportunity 
to choose a different path. Consider an alternative wording in which Cadbury might 
have written "or" instead of "and": the imperative is diminished. These are grammatical 
forms with the same content but a different force (Fairclough, 1992). Later on, Cadbury 
states:  
The accountability of boards to shareholders will, therefore, be 
strengthened if shareholders require their companies to comply with 
the Code (Paragraph 6.6). 
While "giving reasons" for "non-compliance" is nominally a form of compliance, 
these sentences suggests that such "non-compliance" should be the exception; practice 
under code suggests that many people understood it that way, too.  
The Higgs-inspired version of the code reiterates the content of Cadbury's 
provision in its fourth paragraph, using different words but the same force. While it 
begins with an expression of choice ("companies should have a free hand to explain 
their governance policies"), the next paragraph makes clear that compliance takes 
precedence: "it is expected that listed companies will comply with the Code's 
provisions most of the time" (Financial Reporting Council, 2003, p. 1). Use of the 
passive voice, "it is expected that", deprives boards of a point of appeal. As both the 
code custodian (the FRC) and its enforcement agency (the UK Listing Authority) are at 
this point governmental bodies, not industry self-regulators, these words carry greater 
force.  
In the 2010 revision, the Financial Reporting Council rejected suggestions that 
"apply or explain", as used, for example, in the 2003 Dutch code of corporate 
governance, would better capture the sentiment that Cadbury had voiced. Altering 
such an iconic reference would send too strong a signal, changing the symbolic 
meaning of the code. However, the 2010 UK amplifies the "spirit" of the code in a new 
section near the start called "Comply or Explain":  
The "comply or explain" approach is the trademark of corporate 
governance in the UK. It has been in operation since the Code's 
beginnings and is the foundation of the Code's flexibility. It is 
strongly supported by both companies and shareholders and has 
been widely admired and imitated internationally.  
The Code is not a rigid set of rules.… ("Comply or Explain," 
Paragraphs 1-2).  
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One alliteration, "foundation of the Code's flexibility", prepares the way for the 
next: this is "not a rigid set of rules". The roughly equivalent section in Cadbury is 
simply called "Compliance":  
Raising standards of corporate governance cannot be achieved by 
structures and rules alone. They are important because they provide 
a framework which will encourage and support good governance, 
but what counts is the way in which they are put to use (Paragraph 
3.13). 
While the content is similar, the emphasis in Cadbury falls on "standards", 
"structures", "rules" and a "framework": The rhetoric places its weight on compliance. 
Cadbury may not have intended that investors or the monitoring agencies they came to 
employ would adopt a rigid approach. Those that did, however, could find support in 
the text. The 2010 code explicitly seeks to change that impression with self-deprecating 
irony:  
Nearly two decades of constructive usage have enhanced the prestige 
of the Code. Indeed, it seems that there is almost a belief that 
complying with the Code in itself constitutes good governance 
(Preface, Paragraph 3). 
The changes in the 2010 code are not exclusively about flexibility. The final 
paragraph of its preface adds a new constraint on boards: the annual election of 
directors for the top 350 companies, instead of every three years. However, it 
continues: "As with all other provisions of the Code, companies are free to explain 
rather than comply" (Paragraph 8). Both the tone in "free to explain" and the position of 
the phrase before "comply" bring a different emphasis from that of the opening section 
in Cadbury, with its "obligation" to comply and to "give reasons" for "non-compliance". 
The rhetorical effect comes with some irony: With increased force in 2010, the code 
legitimates non-compliance as a category of compliance.  
Logic, discourse and better boards 
Our analysis points towards three distinct if inter-related discourses on board 
effectiveness, reflected in the legitimated categories of board design, director roles and 
compliance, which adjust the understanding of the logic of accountability. Cadbury 
frames board effectiveness in terms of "structure" through its endorsement of 
externally verifiable configurations concerning the composition of boards, the 
organisation of work through committees and crucially the separation of roles on 
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chairman and CEO. With the Higgs-inspired code comes an additional layer of 
discourse concerning "independence". Most recently, in the 2010 version, which 
changes few of the norms of the code, comes an explicit and strongly verbalised change 
in tone, which shift the discourse towards "behaviour" characterised by "mutuality". 
Over the last two decades the shifts between versions of the code alter the meaning of 
accountability and how it may be achieved. Adopting Roberts' (1991, 2001) view, the 
focus of accountability has evolved to encourage socialising accountability as well as 
individualising accountability. The texts, discourses and logic are summarised in Table 
1. 
 
Table 1 – Logic, discourse and social context of UK corporate governance 
 








Institutional change to 
restore legitimacy 
following crises in UK 
listed companies  
Corporations separated 
roles of chairman and 
CEO, created board 
committees 
Institutional change to 
reinforce legitimacy 




number and roles of 
independent non-
executives 
Institutional change to 
enhance boardroom 
effectiveness following 
crisis in knowledge and 
skills in banking sector. 
Response remains to be 
seen 
Logic Accountability as path to effectiveness 
Discourse Structure and procedures 
Relationships of 
independence 




The effectiveness of a 
board is buttressed by its 
structure and procedures 
We are encouraged by the 
degree to which boards 
are already reviewing 
their structures and 
systems in the light of 
our draft 
recommendations  
[Chairman's role] should 
in principle be separate 
from that of the chief 
executive 
… all boards will require a 
minimum of three non-
executive directors, one 
of whom may be the 
A chief executive should 
not go on to be chairman 
of the same company 
The chairman should on 
appointment meet the 
independence criteria 
 … at least half the board, 
excluding the chairman, 
should comprise non-
executive directors 
determined by the board 
to be independent 
Non-executive directors 
should scrutinise the 
performance of 
management … They 
should satisfy 
themselves on the 
Chairmen are encouraged 
to report personally in 
their annual statements 
how the principles 
relating to the role and 
effectiveness of the 
board 
The Code is not a rigid 
set of rules 
Shareholders should be 
careful to respond to the 
statements from 
companies in a manner 
that supports the 
"comply or explain" 
process and bearing in 
mind the purpose of 
good corporate 
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chairman of the 
company provided he or 
she is not also its 
executive head. 
Additionally, two of the 
three should be 
independent  
… the majority of 
nonexecutives on a 
board should be 
independent 
… boards should have a 
formal schedule of 
matters specifically 
reserved to them for 
their collective decision, 
to ensure that the 
direction and control of 
the company remains 
firmly in their hands and 
as a safeguard against 
misjudgements and 
possible illegal practices 
One aspect of structure is 
the appointment of 
committees of the board, 
such as the audit, 
remuneration and 
nomination committees 
… formal selection 
process  
Boards should lay down 
rules to determine 
materiality for any 
transaction 
integrity of financial 
information…. They are 
responsible for 
determining appropriate 
levels of remuneration 
of executive directors 
and have a prime role in 
appointing, and where 
necessary removing, 
executive directors, and 
in succession planning 
[Shareholders should 
speak to senior 
independent director] if 
they have concerns 
which contact through 
the normal channels of 
chairman, chief 
executive or finance 
director has failed to 
resolve or for which 
such contact is 
inappropriate 
governance 
Nearly two decades of 
constructive usage have 
enhanced the prestige of 
the Code. Indeed, it 
seems that there is 
almost a belief that 
complying with the 
Code in itself constitutes 
good governance 
 To follow the spirit of the 
Code to good effect, 
boards must think 
deeply, thoroughly and 
on a continuing basis 
… personal reporting on 
governance by chairmen 
as the leaders of boards 
might be a turning point 
in attacking the fungus 
of "boiler-plate" 
… frankness and 
openness of mind with 
which issues are 
discussed and tackled 
by all directors 
 
In Cadbury, structures and procedures provide a foundation and framework upon 
which boards develop effectiveness. In UK corporate governance, the Enron crisis 
provided occasion to move beyond structure and focus on independence. In the Higgs-
inspired 2003 code the definition of independence becomes more elaborate, with clear, 
externally verifiable norms. These are, however, only proxy measures for the internally 
important independence of mind that both Cadbury and the Higgs Review (2003) 
sought. In moving towards the inner workings of boards, the 2003 code gives weight to 
processes Forbes and Milliken (1999) call cognitive conflict and effort norms. 
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Independence brings potential for greater challenge. Articulation of committee 
procedures, board evaluation and other operations in the 2003 code defines the effort 
that board members should undertake to create effectiveness. The danger in a 
relationship focused on independence comes in the risks of either detachment from the 
work or a threat to board cohesiveness (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  
Mitigating those risks becomes the focus of the shift in the 2010 code, where board 
effectiveness more clearly depends on behaviour. This version loses none of the Higgs 
emphasis on independence. Indeed, one of its few formal changes – urging annual 
election of all directors – adds new structure and procedure to enhance independence 
through external, hierarchical accountability. But the definition of independence, 
especially of non-executive directors, is toned down in the 2010 code. The 2003 version 
links the intangible independence to the tangible tenure: "Serving more than nine years 
could be relevant to the determination of a non-executive director's independence" 
(Section A.7.2). Though the content of this prescription remains in the new version, it 
comes in much less forceful language in a section on process deep in the text. The 
stronger sentence quoted above, often disparagingly called the "nine-year rule", 
disappears from the 2010 code.  
Another signal of change concerns "openness". In the 2010 code the concept is used 
to address the tense relationship Forbes and Milliken (1999) describe between cognitive 
conflict and board cohesiveness. The latter is needed for the long-term good of the 
company, but too cohesive a board, a board of yes-men and cronies, can damage 
performance. As discussed above, "openness" in the early versions was within a 
structure of upwards accountability to shareholders governed increasingly through 
independence. In the 2010 code, "openness" is signalled through behaviour between 
the directors operating in and around the board that is at once supportive and 
challenging. Accountability to shareholders is still hierarchical but with greater weight 
on dialogue; within the board, the shift towards mutuality is pronounced. The 
emphasis has evolved from what Roberts (1991, 2001) calls "individualising" 
accountability alone to include "socialising" accountability as well.  
This logic of accountability, particularly as the thrust of the discourse shifts from 
structure to independence to behaviour, paints a different picture of corporate 
governance than that in agency theory. Remedies devised from an agency approach 
put weight on disclosure; its logic becomes one where the right incentives, backed by 
publicly available data, create an automatic response from directors to align the 
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interests of agents and principals. In the UK code, the logic of accountability starts with 
similar aspirations, as structure, and then formal definitions of independence create an 
expectation of better boards. But from the beginning and with increasing vigour over 
time, the UK codes become more engaged with behavioural and relational nuances of 
boards as collective decision-making entities. Such change may also be seen as 
recognition that there are practical limits to codification in respect of determining the 
attitudes and actions of corporate directors. 
Possibilities and limitations  
The codification of UK corporate governance has been of considerable practical 
significance, not "just" an exercise in language and rhetoric; this case supports the view 
of Suddaby (2010) and Green (2004; S. E. Green, Jr., Li, & Nohria, 2009) that language 
and rhetoric are central to processes of institutionalisation. The 1992 and 2003 versions 
of the code effected substantive change in board structure and composition (Arcot, 
Bruno, & Faure-Grimaud, 2010; Doble, 1997; MacNeil & Li, 2006; Pass, 2006; Seidl & 
Sanderson, 2009), demonstrating that texts set the terms of discourse and then shape 
the social context (Fairclough, 1992). The 2010 version makes clear its hope for major 
changes in practice by asserting that "much more attention need[s] to be paid to 
following the spirit of the Code as well as its letter" (Financial Reporting Council, 2010, 
p. 2).  
Concerning board effectiveness, this article shows how the language of the UK 
codes has defined key concepts in corporate governance and then redefined them, 
adjusting the understanding of board effectiveness. By legitimating certain categories 
of board design and director roles to create accountability, the code texts seek to 
institutionalise aspects of board practice. Moreover, that memorable expression, 
"comply or explain", itself calls attention to the view that codification alone is not the 
answer. There are limits to what can come from institutionalising practices of what 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) call these elite workgroups and their informal, egalitarian 
leadership. This point gains emphasis in the 2010 code, which makes explicit its 
concern at what empirical studies (e.g. Arcot & Bruno, 2006; MacNeil & Li, 2006; Pass, 
2006) had suggested: that explanations of non-compliance have been less than 
informative. In its most forceful phrase, the 2010 code seeks to end the "fungus" of 
"boiler-plate" of such explanations. The code now declares explicitly: Complying with 
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the code is not enough, the appearance of good governance should not triumph over 
substance (McNulty et al., 2005), and substance is locally determined within the context 
of behaviour in and around boards.  
Following the failures of Maxwell and Polly Peck, Cadbury's externally imposed 
structures and procedures became a helpful first step towards identifying effort norms 
for boards. Following the failures of Enron and many others, however, such norms 
needed more support, through relationships of cognitive conflict between 
independently minded individuals with the right knowledge and skills for the job. In 
Higgs, though, we see a continuing and even increased emphasis on externally 
verifiable characteristics of directors by which to judge that independence, with the 
effect of taking the emphasis off the characteristics of "mind".  
This solution, too, proves less than complete: The financial crisis engulfed three 
major UK banks, Royal Bank of Scotland, HBOS and Northern Rock, each of which had 
nominally complied with the Higgs-inspired version of the code. While maintaining 
the structure and procedures introduced by Cadbury and the independence 
emphasised in Higgs, the 2010 code looks more deeply inside the boardroom for the 
source of board effectiveness. It seeks to change the discourse to one in which the "use" 
of the knowledge and skills becomes more important than the "presence" the codes had 
previously prescribed. This development, therefore, covers much of the ground 
surveyed by Forbes and Milliken (1999) in their model of board effectiveness, though 
with greater roles for structures and external verification to re-establish the legitimacy 
of boards. The 2010 code applies stronger language to a prescription for corporate 
governance that all three versions contain: that directors, not codes, are the only real 
guarantors of board effectiveness, and that their choices, not the prescriptions of 
institutionalised arrangements, make the difference.  
Conclusions 
With time, experience and disappointment have come gradual adjustments and 
refinements to the code through a nuanced shift in the discourse. The 2010 version puts 
it this way: "The Code has been enduring, but it is not immutable. Its fitness for 
purpose in a permanently changing economic and social business environment 
requires its evaluation at appropriate intervals" (Paragraph 5 of the introduction). This 
paper has shown that codes define and then redefine the terms. Those redefinitions 
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seek to incorporate the learning from the practice of directors, an evolution, therefore, 
effected through language and discourse, through the use of rhetoric to persuade and 
ambiguity to create flexibility, in the knowledge that change will need to come again.  
The understanding of board effectiveness projected by the codes has evolved to 
emphasise supporting enterprise and controlling the use of resources through a fuller 
sense of accountability achieved by informed and engaged behaviour of directors and 
shareholders. Such evolution also suggests a growing recognition that the prescriptions 
of all such texts have limitations. Codes of corporate governance may identify 
structures, define independence and allude to key relationships, but they can only take 
a board so far along the path to effectiveness. In the end, it's a local matter. 
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Appendix 1  
Codification in UK corporate governance 
Year Events and code development (key non-UK events in italics) 
1990 BCCI, Coloroll, Polly Peck failures 
1991 Maxwell failures 
1992 Cadbury Code recommends board design, roles of directors, introduces "comply-or-
explain" 
1993  
1994 King Review (South Africa) modeled on UK 
1995 Greenbury Report recommends procedure for disclosure of director pay; Vienot Code 
(France) modeled in part on UK 
1996  
1997  
1998 Hampel Report recommends procedures to deal with institutional investors; 
"Combined Code" joins Cadbury, Greenbury, Hampel 
1999 Turnbull Report recommends board procedures on risk management; OECD 
Principles published, incorporating lessons from UK; codes of corporate governance begin to 
proliferate in other countries 
2000 End of dot-com and technology boom 
2001 Collapse of Enron 
2002 Collapse of WorldCom; US passes Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Nasdaq listing rules emphasise board 
independence 
2003 Higgs Review of non-executive directors; Smith Review of audit; Tyson Review of 
board composition; major revision to Combined Code incorporates Higgs 
recommendation on independence; New York Stock Exchange listing rules emphasise 
role of independent directors 
2004 Turnbull guidance revised to expand disclosure of risk judgments; OECD Principles 
revised to emphasise disclosure, board independence 
2005  
2006 Minor revision to Combined Code reduces constraints on chairman 
2007 Difficulties at German banks, others signal start to subprime crisis 
2008 Minor revision to Combined Code; collapse of Lehman Brothers triggers global financial 
crisis  
2009 Nationalisation of Northern Rock in UK and government rescue of Royal Bank of 
Scotland, Lloyds Banking Group, and parts of other UK banks; Walker Review of 
governance in financial firms 
2010 UK Corporate Governance Code focuses on internal board relationships and 
behaviour; Stewardship Code links corporate and investor codes 
2011 Financial Reporting Council publishes Guidance for Board Effectiveness, updating 
the recommendation of the Higgs Review 
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3. Writing the code (new) 
Status: Original to this thesis.  
This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the debates that led to 
the three main versions of the UK Corporate Governance Code, and it 
builds on the analysis of the content of those codes examined in the 
previous chapter ("Creating Better Boards"), examining the 
arguments that contributed to development of the three discourses 
identified as structure and procedures, independence and board 
behaviour. It explores the language used in the text of contributions 
across the spectrum of actors with interest in the field of corporate 
governance and board effectiveness. 
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Writing the code: Developing the UK corporate 
governance codes, 1992-2010 
(2012) 
Abstract: Codes of conduct seek to institutionalize certain practices 
and govern the actions of those who accept the regime. As they arise 
and seek to displace establish ways of life in organizations, they 
provide examples institutional change in motion. This paper 
examines the processes through which the UK code of corporate 
governance arose and then developed over time and the actors who 
contributed to them. Through a close reading of the texts of responses 
to the consultations that informed the 1992, 2003 and 2010 versions of 
the code, it sheds light on the actors and the arguments they raised or 
raised only in part, revealing assumptions about what constitutes 
board effectiveness and "good" corporate governance. The paper also 
uncovers evidence of the institutional work underway during the 
process, raising new questions about how ideas enter and re-enter a 
field in flux.  
Keywords: corporate governance, institutional work, codes of 
conduct, UK 
Introduction 
Codes of conduct exist within companies and industries and across countries and 
multilateral groupings of countries, with increasingly widespread use (Paine, 
Deshpandé, Margolis, & Bettcher, 2005). They produce guidance for the actions of 
individuals and organizations, without the force or the inflexibility of law but also 
without the political cost (O'Rourke, 2003). They seek to gain followers through 
demonstrating the legitimacy of their recommendations, and gain legitimacy by the 
followers they collect. Codes have institutional characteristics, but they do not 
automatically become institutions. This paper explores the processes through which 
one such proto-institution (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Zietsma & McKnight, 
2009), the UK code of corporate governance, gains adherents and confers legitimacy on 
those who adopt its provisions. 
Over two decades, the content of the various versions of the UK's code of corporate 
governance have shown considerable continuity, despite recurring shocks to the 
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system. But they have seen a shift in emphasis, projecting an evolving understanding 
about the nature of board effectiveness. The previous paper in this collection ("Creating 
Better Boards") showed that the weight of the discourse on board effectiveness in the 
main versions of the UK code of corporate governance has moved from a focus on 
structure in Cadbury, to independence in the Higgs-inspired 2003 version, to 
recognition in 2010 of the importance of behaviour, and in particular supportive yet 
challenging relationships between directors.  
This paper seeks to answer two related questions: First, in the search for board 
effectiveness, through what processes – involving which actors, arguments and actions 
– did this change of discourse arise? Second, what do those processes tell us about how 
codes of conduct can come to be institutionalized while remaining flexible concerning 
the types of actors and the activities and organizational forms they endorse?  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. To set the context, we describe the 
steps taken in writing the first code in 1992 and those involved in the major revisions of 
2003 and 2010. Then we examine institutional theory and in particular ideas concerning 
institutional work. After a description of methodological considerations, the paper 
presents key findings from the analysis, which suggests a model for the analysis of 
codification as institutionalization. The chapter concludes with implications for the 
understanding of codification in corporate governance and suggestions for further 
research into the role of authors in codes, institutional logics, organizational and 
institutional fields, and power.   
Process steps in code development 
The drafting of the three main codes involved somewhat different processes with 
the same aim: forging a consensus on how to a) improve the relationship between 
corporations and investors and b) achieve greater effectiveness of corporate boards.  
Process in 1991-92 
The Cadbury Code emerged after 18 months of public and private discussion and 
debate. The Financial Reporting Council and the London Stock Exchange asked Sir 
Adrian Cadbury, scion of a Quaker family of industrialists, to lead an inquiry starting 
in May 1991. Both organizations were, at the time, industry self-regulatory bodies 
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overseeing the accounting and audit professions (FRC) and the equity markets (LSE 
and its UK Listing Authority), so the initiative was largely a private-sector affair.  
The work had public backing as well. With support of staff seconded by the Bank 
of England and the Department of Trade and Industry, Sir Adrian empanelled a 
committee drawn from industry, the financial community and the accounting 
profession. They interviewed dozens of people, received contributions by post and fax, 
and attended public meetings.  In May 1992 the committee produced a draft code and 
discussion paper and then undertook a formal consultation before publishing the code 
in December 1992. Many of the documents from that inquiry are digitized and 
available online (Cadbury Archive, 2010),10 drawn from more 200 from before the 
committee's draft text was issued in May 1992 and almost as many in response to the 
July draft.  
Process in 2002-03 
The crisis at Enron, other US companies and a number of continental European 
companies led the UK government to commission three studies relating to corporate 
governance. The Higgs Review (2003) looked into the effectiveness of non-executive 
directors and was published on the same January day as the Smith Review (2003) on 
audit. The third, the Tyson Report (2003) on widening the pool of directors, was 
published six months later. The centrality of Higgs to the revision of the Combined 
Code11 that July means we will focus here on the responses to its contributions.  
Higgs, working on a mandate from the Department of Trade and Industry, 
commissioned three research studies: a statistical analysis of board composition; a 
survey profiling more than 600 directors (MORI, 2002); and qualitative research 
involving in-depth interviews with 40 corporate chairmen and directors (McNulty, 
Roberts, & Stiles, 2003). The review proved controversial. The FRC chairman later 
recalled the "media noise level and the hostility … by company Chairmen" (Nicholson, 
2008, p. 110). What the FRC, now a government-directed agency, had intended as a 
quick, "fatal flaws only" review received more than 180 responses (Financial Reporting 
                                                     
10 References below with the notation "CAD-" and a digit refer to documents in the Cadbury 
Archive at the University of Cambridge.  
11 The "Combined Code" is the 1998 consolidation of the Cadbury Code with the Greenbury 
Report (1995) on executive pay and the Hampel Report (1998) on institutional investment.  
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Council, 2004).12 In addition, numerous public and private gatherings discussed the 
implications for companies, and institutional shareholders. 
Process in 2009-10 
Despite the controversy surrounding the Higgs Review, the recommended 
practices took hold and further revisions in 2006 and 2008 made only modest changes. 
But the financial crisis led to the collapse of one UK bank in 2007; the near-global 
meltdown forced part-nationalization of two more large British banks in 2008. As a 
consequence came a two-fold response: First, the UK government commissioned an 
inquiry into the corporate governance at financial institutions (Walker, 2009a, 2009b).  
Second and roughly in parallel, the FRC pulled forward a planned review of the 
Combined Code by one year. For the former, the investment banker Sir David Walker 
undertook a two-stage consultation. His draft appeared in July and the final report in 
November.  
While Walker focused only on financial firms,13 the Combined Code had broader 
application, affecting all listed enterprises. The FRC conducted a three-stage 
consultation coordinated by its chairman, Sir Christopher Hogg.14 First came an open 
consultation, about what had worked well and less well in the Combined Code. The 
second sought views on the extent to which the July draft of the Walker 
recommendations for financial institutions applied to the wider field of corporations. 
The third sought comments on a new draft text, published a week after the final 
Walker Review. Each phase also prompted public and private meetings to discuss the 
issues, some of which were attended by those tasked drafting the new code.  
The FRC received more than 100 written submissions to each consultation. As we 
will see, the contributions in 2009-10 had many echoes from the debate two decades 
earlier. Some individuals and groups felt that corporate governance had taken the 
wrong turn – in one direction or another – and wanted to steer the code towards a 
different goal. For others, the code had become symbolic of what they valued in 
                                                     
12 Documents retrieved for this study from non-indexed pages on the FRC website numbered 
64; in addition, the FRC made available for this study a further 44 documents in hard copy. 
Some confidential documents were withheld; others have gone missing. Citations from these 
documents are by organization or author and date.  
13 Initially asked to look at banking, Walker widened the remit to include insurance companies 
and other important financial institutions.  
14 Personal communication with the researcher. Sir Christopher had been CEO and then 
chairman of Courtaulds and chairman of Reuters Holdings; he had served as an adviser to the 
Cadbury commission in 1992. 
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corporate governance, something to be defended against those who would dilute its 
aims or tighten its constraints.  
 
The contributions to consultations concerning all three versions of the code shared 
a purpose: the development of a common understanding of good corporate 
governance. For many, though not all, participants, they involved another aim: the 
avoidance of legislative or regulatory action that would constrain more forcibly the 
freedom of action enjoyed by boards and the ability of shareholders to influence how 
corporate affairs were organized. The crisis that led to the Cadbury Report probably 
meant that change was inevitable. New institutional arrangements would supplant 
largely undefined, informal arrangements, mimetic isomorphism giving way to a 
normative variety (P. J. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Some participants wanted to go 
further, enacting binding rules and coercing compliance. These voices, as well as the 
actions of the authors of the code version, may be viewed as engaging in what scholars 
know as institutional work.  
Institutions and work 
Institutions are such because they persist over time, and yet institutions change. 
This paradox of embedded agency (P. Holm, 1995; Seo & Creed, 2002) has stimulated 
much recent work in institutional theory as it seeks to overcome objections that it is 
only a partial theory (Clegg, 2010; Kraatz, 2011). In seeking to understand how this 
paradox is resolved, theorists have turned to a variety of explanations. 
DiMaggio (1988) introduced the term institutional entrepreneurship to explain 
how actors use ideas from outside to dislodge incumbent practices and create 
opportunities for change. Oliver (1992, p. 564) argues that deinstitutionalization 
represents "the delegitimation of an established organizational practice or procedure" 
in response to challenges facing the organization of or the failure of organization to 
perform as expected. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) see dissatisfaction with a 
changing market context and discrepancies between the values of actors and 
institutional arrangements as antecedents for institutional change. But what starts the 
process? Greenwood and colleagues (2002) theorize that a "precipitating jolt" from 
changes in the environment would make embedded actors perceive the inadequacy of 
current arrangements. Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) see institutional change as 
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coming from elites who recognize the contradictions in the institutional field and 
initiate change. But Rao and Giorgi (2006) contend that actors on the periphery of a 
social system can effect change as well. These depictions suggest that change arises 
from the choices initiated by actors but largely in response to environmental issues that 
undermine the institution's legitimacy.  
Extending the concept of institutional entrepreneurship for more general 
explanation, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 215) introduce the term institutional 
work to encompass "purposive action of individuals or organizations aimed at 
creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions". Work is therefore intentional, not 
simply routinized behaviour, the effort of agency rather than the product of structure, 
even when undertaken to maintain an institution in its current form. Lawrence, 
Suddaby and Leca (2011, p. 56) argue that concept of institutional work provides a 
"bridge" between critical and institutional views of organization by focusing attention 
on actors, their intentions and the "emphasis on disorder and hidden voices" in critical 
theory.15  
Institutional work depends on agency. Emirbayer and Mische (1998) introduce a 
temporal dimension and thus a dynamic quality into the concept of agency. Building 
on structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), which sees structure and agency as 
inextricably linked, and Bourdieu's (1990) notion of the centrality of practice, they 
assert that actors "are always living simultaneously in the past, future, and present". 
They adjust to one another and their circumstances continually "in more or less 
imaginative or reflective ways" (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 1012). 
Emirbayer and Mische draw a distinction between three types of agency: a 
backward-oriented approach they call iterative; the present-oriented, practical-
evaluative type; and a forward-looking form they call projective. Iterative action 
involves "selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and action", which 
incorporated into practical action helps to sustain identities and interactions and thus 
institutions. The practical-evaluative type involves the "capacity of actors to make 
judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the 
emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities". Projective agency involves 
                                                     
15 Lawrence et al. (2011) attribute this quote to Cooper et al. (2008) without page reference. I 
could not locate that quote, but it may come from a draft version. The chapter starts by 
promising a discussion of the "emphasis on power, domination and emancipation" (Cooper et 
al., 2008, p. 673). Nonetheless it is fair to attribute phrase to Lawrence et al., as they endorse the 
evocative diction, whatever its source. 
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"imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action", in which 
actors creatively reconfigure thought and action to reflect hopes, fears and desires 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 971, emphases removed),  
Battilana and D'Aunno (2009) use these categories to elaborate the understanding 
of institutional work, setting them against categories of actions in Lawrence and 
Suddaby (2006) involved in creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions. Iterative 
agency involves repeated steps to emphasize persistence; the practical-evaluative type 
demonstrates the (in)efficacy of the logics they support or wish to disrupt; projective 
agency involves imagining a different future state. Battilana and D'Aunno (2009) 
speculate that, owing to the actor's backward-oriented temporal orientation, iterative 
agency is less likely to be seen in creating or disrupting institutions than projective-
evaluative or projective types would be. Projective agency, because of its future 
orientation, is more likely to appear in work to create new institutions. The 20 types of 
institutional work they articulate overlaps with the 18 in Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006). It also offers some new forms of work, including two they see as work involved 
in creating institutions in present-oriented, practical-evaluative agency. Actors 
interpret institutional arrangements (translation) or assemble elements from different 
mechanisms (bricolage) to fit their particular settings. As we shall see, both have 
resonances in the way individual companies respond to corporate governance 
arrangements under a comply-or-explain regime, particularly in face of growing 
internationalization of capital markets. Moreover, translation suggests that ideas often 
do not diffuse intact through a field but instead are interpreted as they pass from one 
actor to another (Czarniawska, 2007; Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996). 
Institutional work can take the form of individuals identifying with the institution 
or with alternative arrangements. Creed and colleagues (2010, p. 1337) describe the 
"identity work" of marginalized actors who reinvigorate "institutionally available 
narratives and meanings in identity constructions" through a process that can be both 
"conservative and disruptive". This depiction suggests that institutional work need not 
sit firmly within the categories of "creating", "maintaining" or "disrupting" identified by 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006). In a study closely related to the present paper, Lok 
(2010) found that both investors and corporate managers invoked conflicting logics, 
differing identities and contrasting associated practices in their approach to corporate 
governance, and suggested that these contradictions can persist over long periods. He 
notes that "self-identity can continue to be fractured and inconsistent, invoking 
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different contradictory practices under different circumstances and at different times" 
(Lok, 2010, p. 1326). We will use these views of institutional work in analysing the 
process of codification in UK corporate governance. With this background in mind we 
look at what sort of institutional work happened during those consultations, following 
a description of the methodology in use.  
Methodology 
The analysis presented here involved an iterative reading of texts of submissions to 
the debates concerned the three code versions, paying close attention to the features in 
the language and argument. Discourse analysis has developed over the last few 
decades from a more general study of themes that arise from texts into specialized 
disciplines using techniques drawn from fields as disparate as linguistics, literary 
theory, critical theory in politics, sociology and psychology (Alvesson & Kärreman, 
2000; Chia, 2000). While some studies explore these approaches in isolation to 
determine their methodological significance, this paper seeks to interpret texts. It 
requires, therefore, that we look at a variety of aspects of language, including diction, 
word order, metaphor, stated and unstated allusions, as well as the use of forceful 
rhetoric to identify meanings and assumptions.  
The documents come from the consultations that took place during the drafting of 
the three key versions of the code. While they necessarily present an incomplete view 
of events, they provide the opportunity to explore the arguments and rhetoric of 
officials of listed companies, financial institutions, their advisers and the general 
public. Formal responses to consultation papers may lack the spontaneity and vibrant 
language of face-to-face communications. Nonetheless, the submissions represent a 
considered distillation of views, ones that a committee or a thoughtful author would 
give weight to in setting policy. There is evidence of this in the data, in particular in the 
summaries in the Cadbury Archive, which interpret those submissions to guide 
committee members' thinking.  
Work began by reading a large proportion of the available documents. Because of 
the volume of the data, detailed analysis was undertaken on a sample of papers and a 
subset of the issues. This study used theoretical sampling based on two criteria: First, 
following Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) and Rao and Giorgi (2006), was the position 
of actors in the field, in this case the investment supply chain. Details of the samples for 
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each time period are included in Appendix 1, at the end of this chapter. Second, was 
the salience of issues for the actors (R. K. Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), which led to 
consideration of topics based on the controversy they aroused.  
Documents were coded in Nvivo software to categories including first-order 
concepts like chairman, institutional investors, second-order ones like compliance, 
board design, independence and behaviour. As new ideas came to the fore, additional 
open codes were added for emerging categories, and then the papers were read again 
to identify axial dimensions (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). As an illustration, 
consider "board design", a core category in the discussion of structure. While there are 
many types of boards across organization-types, two featured prominently in the 
debate: unitary and two-tier boards. They are then valourized or demonized in 
different ways by different actors as "our" or "alien", "flexible" or "rigid", "service-
oriented" or "controlling", "effective" or "weak", by the different actors seeking to 
influence policy recommendations in the code. The texts were then read against 
categories of institutional work developed from perspectives in Lawrence and 
Suddaby (2006) and Battilana and D'Aunno (2009). The data-coding presented 
numerous opportunities to read and re-read the source material, in their entirety and 
as coded.  
Although the initial reading for this study ranged widely, data analysis 
concentrated on contributions made during public consultations: 1) after the Cadbury 
Committee had issued its draft in May 1992 and before the final code in December; 2) 
after publication of the Higgs Review in January 2003 and before the July publication 
of the Combined Code; and 3) all three consultation phases concerning the 2010 code.  
The work proceeded in a non-chronological order. The reason was in part a matter 
of convenience, in part inescapable. The 2009-10 data were immediately available from 
the FRC website, while only parts of the Cadbury Archive had been digitized, 
requiring a visit to Cambridge for a full view, and the 2003 documentation has been 
removed from public view to the archive of the FRC. Moreover, my own engagement 
with the debate during 2009-10 meant that the arguments raised then were fresh in my 
mind, which might have distorted any attempt I might make to build or assess theory 
chronologically. Through iterative reading, of whole documents and as coded pieces, 
distortion arising from the sequencing was reduced. 
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Findings 
The three versions of the code show concern about issues that may be 
characterized as affecting mainly structure, independence, and behaviour. But 
contributors from across the spectrum viewed these themes as interlocking: For 
example, structures like board committees serve the purpose of empowering the non-
executive directors at the expense of the executives, thus contributing to board 
independence and potentially influencing behaviour.  
The three rounds of consultations considered issues including separation of the 
roles of chairman and CEO (1992 only; taken for granted in subsequent revisions); 
creating a senior independent director (1992) and giving that person a specific role 
with investors (2003); the creation of committees (1992), then placed under the control 
of independent directors (2003); limiting the tenure of non-executives' deemed 
independence (2003 and 2010); frequency of director elections (all three versions); 
giving non-executive directors the right to hire external professional advice (1992 only). 
In both 2003 and 2010 controversy arose about whether, when and how to conduct 
board evaluation. In all three periods, contributors, particularly from the corporate 
side, raised concerns on a more elusive subject: relationships between directors.  
The arguments on one side of these largely structural or procedural disputes 
focused on the need to strengthen board independence to induce behaviour of 
challenge, expanding the board's ability to exercise its "control" function. The 
arguments on the other side focused on how these measures would prove divisive, 
pitting directors against each other and splitting the board between its executive and 
non-executive members.  
Contributors in each time period invoked a similar emblem, rich in symbolic as 
well as practical significance: the dispute over which is better, a unitary or a two-tier 
board. Many of the same disputes over structures and procedures and the definition of 
independence at the granular level evoked a related theme concerning the nature of 
accountability. On one side was the need for boardroom challenge, constraining 
corporate excess and managerial discretion; on the other for collegiality and 
contributions to strategic direction. Taken together they concern the ethos of the 
boardroom. We examine each of this in detail in the following sections. 
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Shape of the board 
The unitary board has been a feature of British corporate governance for as long as 
anyone involved in the consultations could remember. Nonetheless, a debate emerged 
in all three periods: Should the UK retain its unitary boards or move towards a two-tier 
board arising in a particular form in Germany and favoured by the European 
Commission? Germany's superior economic performance lent legitimacy to the claim 
that two-tier boards are a "better" instrument of corporate governance. The argument 
for a two-tier approach was that supervisory boards increase independence and that 
challenge to the executives might prevent the next shock. 16  The argument against, 
often subtextual in this debate, concerns Germany's use of Mitbestimmung, or co-
determination, which involves labour unions in corporate policy.17 The German system 
is often viewed as the principal contrast to Anglo-American approach (Charkham, 
1994, 2005; Franks et al., 2005; Goergen, Manjon, & Renneboog, 2008; C. Lane, 2003). 
 Board design in the Cadbury debate 
One reason for the sensitivity on this issue was a longstanding dispute over the 
European Commission's campaign for a Fifth Company Law Directive. The fight lasted 
for nearly two decades and was resolved only by a decision not to decide (Winter, 
2002). The third attempt to pass it, starting in 1988, was opposed strongly by UK 
business people and the Conservative Party government of Margaret Thatcher 
(Montgomery, 1989). It sought two politically charged measures, the use of two-tier 
corporate boards, and some degree of worker co-determination.  
A general election was due by the spring of 1992, however, and the opposition 
Labour party might well have taken a different stance. In a meeting with Sir Adrian 
Cadbury in September 1991, Marjorie Mowlam, the opposition Labour Party's 
spokesman on "City" affairs, made clear the party's intention to legislate unless the 
Cadbury Committee made substantive changes, though without mentioned directly 
the issue of board design (CAD-01239). Other Labour party members, however, saw 
value in two-tier boards in submissions to the committee's early deliberations (CAD-
                                                     
16 The failures of Herstatt Bank in the 1970s, the construction equipment maker IBH in the 1980s 
and the metals trading company Metallgesellschaft in the 1990s find surprising little resonance 
in discussions of corporate governance outside Germany. The first bank failures in the financial 
crisis of 2007-09 were in Germany: Industrie-Kredit Bank and Sachsen LB, both of which 
invested heavily in US subprime mortgage securities. 
17 In contrast to the Dutch or Swiss practice, half the members of German supervisory boards, 
are drawn from the workforce, a feature of German law since the time of Bismarck (Fear, 1997).  
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01145, CAD-01148), reflected in related articles in academic journals (Cousins & Sikka, 
1993; A. Mitchell & Sikka, 1993).  
Even after the election in April 1992 had unexpectedly given the Conservatives 
another term in power, the Liberal Democrats' response to the draft code (CAD-02443) 
urged two-tier boards with employee representation on the lower tier and suggested 
that worker votes be counted alongside shareholder votes at the annual meeting. That 
was an extreme position from a peripheral voice, a party with little realistic chance of 
coming to power soon. But the papers in the Cadbury Archive suggest there was some 
sympathy for the topic within the committee. Jonathan Charkham, the Bank of England 
adviser attached to the committee, wrote to Cadbury during comment period on the 
draft assessing a proposal18 to give specific powers to non-executives as "three-quarters 
of the way to a two-tier board". He continued:  
There is much logic in what they propose but I have no doubt that it 
would arouse the fiercest wrath among our critics who can see only 
too clearly this kind of development coming and are thoroughly 
scared of real accountability (CAD-01073).  
This note shows an important voice argued that radical change of some sort was 
needed. Two years after the code was published, when the committee was conducting 
its first planned review, Sir Adrian sought legal clarification from the Department of 
Trade and Industry, an indication he the issue important. Nigel Peace, the DTI official 
who had been secretary to the Cadbury Committee, responded that company law did 
not prohibit two-tier boards (CAD-01363).  
The Cadbury Committee took special note of three groups of responses from 
companies, investors and advisors in the accountancy profession, an analytic device we 
follow here. They are summarized in CAD-02255, CAC-02257, CAD-02259, 
respectively, though references here are made, where possible, to the texts of the 
original submissions.  
Investor reactions: Fund management organizations wrote mainly dispassionately 
but expressed concern over steps that might split corporate boards into opposing 
camps of executives and non-executives. One contributor sees something "dangerous" 
in the draft, but "in one or two places"; another says draft makes "too great a 
distinction" but adds director interests are only "somehow opposed"; a comment on the 
                                                     
18 The "Merrett-Sykes" paper he refers to is not recorded in the Cadbury Archive, although Alan 
Sykes, managing director of Consolidated Gold Fields, mentions it in a separate comment on 
the draft report (CAD-02141). Anthony Merrett, a London Business School professor, and Sykes 
made a second proposal concerning the accountability of auditors (CAD-02185). 
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"different roles but equal responsibilities" accepts division even as it affirms unity; 
changes "may bring a distinction" between classes of directors; the report "undermines" 
the concept of the unitary board, but only "to some extent". (For the fuller context of 
these remarks, see Table 2.) 
 





… the report in one or two places comes dangerously close to 





The Report draws too great a distinction between the responsibilities of 
executive and non-executive directors and could be taken to imply that 
their interests are somehow opposed. We believe that the Code should 
place greater emphasis on the need for each director to recognise his 
responsibility for corporate governance, however the Board is 
constituted, and for the Board as a whole to recognise its responsibility 
and that of each of its members. 
Legal & General 
(CAD-02353) 
We are however concerned that Board balance between executive and 
non executive should not be translated into a separation into 
supervisory and non supervisory functions with the two-tier 
implication that that would suggest. We see the directors as having 
different roles but equal responsibilities, with all of them ultimately 
being responsible to those who elect them – the shareholders. 
British Rail Pension 
Fund (CAD-02453) 
The additional duties proposed for non-executive directors (together 
with the previously mentioned head of non-executives) may bring a 
division into the board if non-executives are to take on a more 
supervisory role. It is probably more important for companies to 
describe their internal monitoring procedures and formally report on 
their operation in the annual report than for a general duty to monitor 
being ascribed to particular members of a unitary board.  
National Association 
of Pension Funds 
(CAD-02449) 
So far as reporting to shareholders is concerned, your suggestion that 
the chairman of the remuneration committee be responsible for 
answering questions at the Annual General Meeting may well 
undermine, to some extent, the concept of the unitary board.  
 
An important voice in the debate was that of the Association of British Insurers, 
whose members included fund managers that collectively owned about 25 per cent of 
the value of the stock market at the time; many were themselves listed companies. The 
ABI eschewed emotive language on this issue, with the exception of the ambiguously 
placed word "disappointing" in the following passage: 
It is perhaps disappointing that there are some who clearly feel that 
the recommendations undermine the concept of the unitary board, 
and it might be helpful if the final report emphasised rather more 
forcefully the support for the unitary board (ABI, CAD-02467). 
                                                     
19 Postel was reincorporated as Hermes Investment Management in 1995. 
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At first its disappointment seems to be with the "some" who criticize the draft 
report, suggested by the proximity of the two words. But the ABI is not in substance 
disappointed with those who defend the unitary boards. It is disappointed, rather, 
with the Cadbury Committee for not being more firmly in favour of them, though that 
point comes clear only after the friendly offer of something "helpful". The word order 
and diction thus seek to accommodate sensitivities to criticism on this point. That this 
voice needed to be accommodated becomes clear from the committee's own minutes 
(e.g. CAD-01303).  
The Pensions Investment Research Consultants, a proxy voting advisory firm 
representing mainly local authority pension plans, took a stronger line than 
mainstream fund managers in favour of unitary boards, but with a different aim: 
At present many companies insulate some or all of the executive 
directors from the need to retire and seek election by shareholders. 
We think this is a serious infringement of shareholder rights and 
reduces directors' accountability. It also strikes at the heart of the 
unitary board in which all directors are equally accountable under 
law (PIRC20).  
As these sentences make clear, PIRC is concerned about increasing accountability 
through elections and wants to ensure that executive directors face re-election to the 
board just as often as non-executives. This seeks a different type of board unity than 
other respondents had in mind, one seeking stronger control over directors, not 
stronger cooperation in the boardroom.  
Accountancy reactions: Generally though not entirely, the accountants' 
contributions on board design objected to the draft and defended the corporate status 
quo. The first two of the responses in Table 3 ameliorate the critique with phrases like 
"tends to imply" and "understand and accept". But the more forceful language of the 
third quote ("unrealistic", "inimical") suggests that feelings were strong. In a 
handwritten note (CAD-02475), Sir Adrian commented that he was "a bit shaken by the 
Ernst & Young demolition job".21  
 
                                                     
20 The PIRC submission itself is not recorded in the Cadbury Archive, but the firm provided a 
late draft of the document for this study, which is what I quote here. The Cadbury Committee's 
summary of investor reactions cites long passages from the PIRC submission on other matters 
but only notes that PIRC supported a unitary board. It does not quote this passage. 
21 The comment referred to the E&Y submission in general, which was also critical of the report 
in other matters. 
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… the language of the draft report as it stands tends to imply a sharper division 
between the roles of non-executives and executives than the Committee 
probably intends. We do not believe there is a satisfactory half way house 




We understand and accept that there is a need for a division of responsibilities 
within a board and that no large listed company should be capable of being 
dominated by one individual but we are concerned about the apparent belief 
that within a board there should be two leaders. We feel very strongly that the 
duty of the Board (within the constraints of the law) as a whole is to create 
wealth for the investors. The Board has, therefore, to work as a team, and not to 
be put in a position where half the Board's main purpose appears to be to police 
the activities of the other half. We are concerned that whilst the report makes 
this point … the overall impression of the report, because it deals with controls 
is one where the vision of the non-executive is that he is there to dismiss the 
chief executive should this prove necessary rather than provide positive input 
to the future direction and success of the company. We believe non executive 
directors have an important role to play in bringing their broader experience to 




We acknowledge the important contribution which non-executive directors can 
and should make in this direction but believe that the Committee’s expectations 
of non-executive directors are unrealistic. We also believe that certain aspects of 
the role which the Committee proposes for non-executive directors are inimical 
to the concept of the unitary board…. The Committee's proposals would create 
a two-tier board within the legal structure of a unitary board. We do not regard 
this as tenable.  
  
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, an important 
professional association whose members included many company chairmen and 
finance directors, commented more gently than the accountancy firms:  
Many have commented, too, that the report appears to recommend 
structures and systems which bring about the existence of something 
close to a two-tier board, in everything but name. The 
recommendation in favour of a leader for the independent element 
on the board, where the chairman and chief executive role is 
combined, and for the use of outside advisers by non-executives are 
examples in support of this perception. We believe that the truth or 
otherwise of this assessment should be more fully addressed in the 
final report and that it would be valuable if a discussion of the 
comparative merits of unitary and two-tier boards in the UK 
environment could be included, additionally. We do not, incidentally, 
favour the appointment of a leader for the non-executive directors 
(ICAEW, CAD-02181).  
The mild phrasing of "it would be valuable" can be read as a quiet taunt to the 
Cadbury Committee to justify its position; the word "incidentally" undermines with 
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irony the neutral reference earlier in the passage to the idea of a leader of the non-
executives (cf. Economist, 2011 on euphenisms in British speech). 
Corporate reactions: Corporate critiques were unequivocal in advocating a unitary 
board and opposing European approaches, including two the committee saw in its 
summary document (CAD-02255):  
This risks appearing to encourage a two tier board system, and 
detracts from the fundamental concept of collective board 
responsibility. Any change in this approach should be statutory. 
Assuming the Committee supports the UK's unitary system, it should 
explicitly state this, and the reasons why it prefers this system (Sir 
Patrick Sheehy, chairman of BAT22). 
The whole thrust of the report is to retain the unitary board but to 
attempt to engraft a two-tier structure on to it. This is not a workable 
arrangement (The General Electric Co. plc; also in CAD-02115).  
The summary did not, however, record some of the stronger sentiments received 
from the corporate side, excluding the emotive words "danger", "resist", "erode", 
"poachers" and "sham", nor an appeal to more rationalist considerations (from Sir 
Adrian's old family company) concerning possible loss of "commercial advantage". 
These remarks are summarized in Table 4: 
 





In our view distinctions between the responsibilities of 
executive and non-executive directors, save in relation to 
remuneration, are both divisive and, for example, in the 




In that setting it is for the board to distribute functions to 
its members; attempts to reserve tasks as a rule to one class 
of directors will create the danger of opening the way to a 
two-tier system…. We oppose the words "monitor the 
executive management" as imparting a supervisory role 
inappropriate to a unitary board. 
Institute of Directors 
(CAD-02423) 
Whilst the presence of such a system of checks and 
balances is an integral element of effective corporate 
governance, it should not way be allowed to erode the 
principle of a unitary board. 
J.F. Mahony, Group 
Finance Director and 
Vice-Chairman, 
Ladbroke Group 
I would resist any movement towards a two-tier system. I 
believe that paragraph 4.3 is unhelpful as the role of the 
non-executive directors outlined in it appears to conflict 
with the principle of a unitary board in so far as it implies 
that the purpose of the non-executive directors is to 
                                                     
22 Sheehy's submission itself is not recorded in the Cadbury Archive; this excerpt comes from 
the committee's summary CAD-02255. 
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(CAD-02441) monitor the performance of the board. In this context, the 
non-executive directors must be monitoring the 
performance of the executive members of the board, not 
the board as a whole. The draft report should be amended 
to make it clear that the principle of a unitary board is 
upheld in all respects. 
Alick Rankin, 
Chairman, Scottish & 
Newcastle (CAD-
02455) 
The code, as proposed, appears to identify non-executive 
directors as 'the gamekeepers' and executives as 'the 
poachers'. Clearly, this must be quite wrong. It is both 
divisive and intrusive and damaging to the positive 
partnership spirit essential in a unitary board. Non-
executives have a strong requirement to encourage, to 
support and to enthuse – this concept is lacking and 
severely threatened by the proposals.  




The emphasis on more involvement and accountability of 
Non-Executive Directors emerging from Corporate 
Governance must not result in or encourage two tier 
Boards, which would be of considerable commercial 
disadvantage to the company and its investors. 
 
Perhaps the most forceful statement came not from a submission to the committee, 
but instead an opinion column published in the Financial Times newspaper, written by 
Sir Owen Green, chairman of BTR and an emblematic executive of the era.23 The article 
was provocatively titled "Why Cadbury leaves a bitter taste". He criticized many 
aspects of the draft report, including the idea of a "leader" of the non-executives, and 
asserted that  
A more divisive aspect … is the way it strikes at the heart of the 
unitary board. It begins by restating the legal position that all 
directors are equally responsible for the board's decisions. But the 
committee immediately reveals its view of the real purpose of non-
executive directors. They are there to monitor the performance of the 
board (including themselves?) and that of the chief executive (O. 
Green, 1992). 
The phrase "reveals its real purpose" signals a conspiracy exposed, while "divisive" 
warns of adverse consequences and "strikes at the heart" points metaphorically at 
murderous intent towards the British way of organizing boards. The forcefulness of its 
sentiment and the impact of its argument is indicated by how Green's column was 
quoted in the committee's summary of contributions, in notes between committee staff, 
and by various letters that favourably cited Green's remarks.  
Support for two-tier boards: Only a few voices supported the idea of two-tier 
boards, none with the fervour of the Liberal Democrats. The accountancy firm Arthur 
                                                     
23 The respect Green achieved is made clear in a recent case study of his long career at BTR 
(Kerr, 2006).  
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Andersen, in a detailed and closely argued analysis of corporate governance, said the 
committee had paid insufficient attention to the three roles of boards, in supervision, 
control and management:  
We believe the Report should be more forthright with respect to the 
supervisory function of the board. It should clarify the objectives and 
procedures that fall within the supervisory function and recommend 
that in all circumstances, the supervisory role should be led by a 
specific non-executive director. 
The Report is predicated on the view that the unitary system is 
appropriate and the unitary board is itself capable of fulfilling the 
supervisory function. While we accept that the recommendations in 
the Report will facilitate supervision, it is disappointing that the 
Report does not discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative forms of governance and encourage experimentation 
(Arthur Andersen, CAD-02361). 
This language falls short of advocacy of two-tier boards. The phrase "predicated on 
the view" embeds less critique than other expressions of similar content might. But 
scepticism echoes in the use of "itself", an otherwise redundant reflexive, as well as in 
the "disappointing" choice not to "encourage experimentation". That Arthur Andersen 
would encourage such experiments suggests a position more nearly aligned with 
concerns of more peripheral players about the need for radical change in board design 
than with actors at the core of the debate or some other intermediaries.24 The 
committee's summary (CAD-02259) quoted the Arthur Andersen view at far greater 
length than those from other firms. Sir Adrian made the notation "experimentation" 
alongside "unitary board" in his handwritten aide memoire concerning possible 
revisions to the draft (CAD-01267), suggesting he took these comments seriously. 
 
Most of these texts involve assertions of unspecified virtues of unitary boards and 
warnings of unspecified dangers in two-tier boards. A subtext came to the surface, 
however, in several contributions. Richard Lloyd, chairman of Vickers, argued that UK 
board practice was "more genuinely unitary in its nature" than what happened in the 
United States or Canada (CAD-01357). J.B.H. Jackson, a self-described "professional 
chairman", also worried about importing US practice. Sir Owen Green (1992) was more 
scathing, attacking the idea of an audit committee entirely composed of non-executives 
                                                     
24 Arthur Andersen was at the time a highly respected voice in the accountancy profession. Its 
disintegration a decade later after the collapse of clients Enron, WorldCom and others may be 
traced in part to what we might term governance "experimentation", but not perhaps 
experiments in enhanced supervision.  
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as the "least meritorious" in the draft, "notwithstanding the practice in the US". He then 
added venom: "The arrogance of this imported proposal is communicated through the 
committee's own words" as the draft proposes limits to auditors' responsibility while it 
"blandly describes the unlimited liability of the board".  
The foreignness of this element of board design perceived in the Cadbury draft 
came in complaints from several others about "continental" or "German" practices, as 
well as some oblique and occasionally direct references to European legislation (e.g. 
CBI, CAD-02349). Ernst & Young linked the two themes in warning that the "failure to 
implement a more effective regulatory regime in the UK now may well deprive the UK 
of the ability to influence future proposals which, we believe, will emerge from the 
European Commission for a European Securities and Exchange Commission" (CAD-
02447), a contribution noted in the committee summary as well (CAD-02259). 
The "jolt" the UK system had received from the failures of Polly Peck, Colorall and 
especially the Maxwell companies25 forced a debate over the appropriate of an aspect 
of corporate governance that industry had long defended. Opposition was based on 
economic and political considerations but in particularly on the social aspects of board 
dynamics. The voices from the twin centres of the debate – corporations and investors 
– as well as much of the intermediaries argued with varying degrees of force against 
foreign encroachment in the issue of board design, even though the Cadbury draft 
report did not explicitly advocate either a German-style supervisory board or an 
American-style board dominated by outside directors. The strength of opposition is 
evident in the language of these contributions. Several complained that the changes the 
draft report sought would demand much effort from companies already well 
governed, and fail to address the rogues. Green's column in the FT put it this way:  
The report's subliminal message is of the need for total integrity and a 
healthy objectivity in company affairs. This is strongly to be 
supported. But the need for a code in addition to existing rules and 
regulations is doubtful – as is its likely effectiveness in reducing the 
relatively few instances of misbehaviour (O. Green, 1992). 
His use of "subliminal message" evokes symbolically the spectre of manipulative 
advertising techniques, which had entered public discourse over in previous decades 
through critiques of technologies to project images interstitially in television signals.  
                                                     
25 Sir Adrian notes to the committee considering the responses to the draft (CAD-01265) speak 
of recommendations needing to pass the "Maxwell test", so called because Robert Maxwell 
would have signed off his companies as having complied with the code, and neither his 
directors nor auditors would have challenged that view.  
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In his briefing to the committee, Sir Adrian worried about the tone: "We are said to 
be 'long on accountability and short on drive and efficiency' and to take a negative 
view of governance"; the code risked "dividing the board". He then added remarks that 
imply the code could damage the unity of a board with a weak chairman: 
Do we stay with these? Minor changes … are no problem. I accept 
that there is a fundamental issue here and that there could come a 
point when logic would point to a two-tier board. I do not believe we 
are at that point yet, (although those who advocate distinct legal 
duties for ned's26 would pass it), and that the unity of boards need not 
be undermined by our proposals, given a competent chairman (Sir 
Adrian Cadbury, CAD-01265). 
The tone of the code changed as a result of the comments and criticism, but these 
notes from the Cadbury Archive suggest the issue was still alive under the surface, 
even after the final version's support for the unitary board. That Sir Adrian thought 
"there could come a point when logic would point to a two-tier board" suggests that 
the issue was still open, even though hostility had closed it for now. 
Board design in the post-Higgs debate 
In his covering letter to the report, Higgs (2003, p. 3) wrote: "The brittleness and 
rigidity of legislation cannot dictate the behaviour, or foster the trust, I believe is 
fundamental to the effective unitary board and to superior corporate performance." 
Moreover,  he expressed the view that the "architecture" of corporate governance, 
defined as structure and processes inside companies "in itself does not deliver good 
outcomes" (Higgs, 2003, Paragraph 1.3). Yet his 53 recommendations, summarized at 
the beginning of the document, dealt overwhelmingly with externally verifiable 
procedures and structures. We examine next how these issues revived concerns about 
two-tier boards and dominated the consultation the Financial Reporting Council held 
to translate those recommendations into the text of a new Combined Code (2003). 
The passage from Higgs quoted above considers a unitary board to be an implicit 
good, and in one of the introductory paragraphs he elaborates that view:  
Some have argued that the increasing complexity of business life – 
whether globalisation or fast changing product and capital markets – 
is such that the whole structure of the board needs to be re-
considered. But the majority view, which I share, sees considerable 
benefits continuing to flow from the unitary approach (Higgs, 2003, 
Paragraph 1.7) 
                                                     
26 ned's (lower case) is Sir Adrian's personal short notation for non-executive directors. 
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As if to emphasize that point, he later adds: 
Increasing the effectiveness of non-executive directors, while 
preserving the benefits of the unitary board, is a principal objective of 
the Review…. In contrast, the European system of corporate 
governance typically separates legal responsibility for running the 
company between a management and a supervisory board. In the US, 
the board is composed largely of non-executive ("outside") directors 
with only a few executives. Evidence collected during the Review has 
not convinced me of the merits of moving away from the unitary 
board structure in the UK (Higgs, 2003, Paragraph 4.2, 4.3). 
This language shows, however, that the debate over board design was not over. It 
shows that the primary objective of his review is to improve the effectiveness of non-
executives. The uses of "unitary" here are defensive: the "whole structure" needs to be 
reviewed, he is just "not convinced" about two-tier boards. He shares the "majority" 
view, simultaneously acknowledging the minority and demonstrating an open mind. 
He has considered other systems ("European" and US) but concludes that the evidence 
in their favour is not convincing, a subtext that those legitimates views nonetheless. 
Evidence in favour of the UK system is not mentioned, an indication that he and the 
respondents to his consultation and research study took those advantages as 
understood, but the word "unitary" does not appear in Higgs's proposed text of a 
revised Combined Code. Whether intended or not, taken together these uses and 
omissions seemed to give respondents reasons to think Higgs had taken a position 
somewhat short of a ringing endorsement of the unitary boards.  
In response to the FRC's limited, "fatal flaws only" consultation, the Association of 
British Insurers, a mainstream investor voice, saw a "potential danger to the unitary 
board" if the code had a "formal requirement" that non-executive directors meet 
periodically without the executives or the chairman present (April 2003).27 In a literal 
sense, this is arguing against a case Higgs did not make. Higgs did not require such a 
move in what is a voluntary code; the text of his draft was that of recommendation: 
"should meet regularly as a group without the executives present and at least once a 
year without the chairman present" (Higgs, 2003, Provision A.1.5), where "should" 
invokes the code's "comply or explain" principle.  
The Confederation of British Industry, representing the interests of large 
corporations, used more forceful language to make a similar point. It expressed "deep 
                                                     
27 Owing to the circumstances concerning the source material, references to submissions to the 
post-Higgs consultation are given only to the respondent and the date of the response.  
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reservations" about provisions that "concern or affect the chairman", whose role is 
"pivotal in the UK's tried and tested unitary board system". The choice of "pivotal" here 
echoes with irony Higgs's own language (2003, Paragraph 5.1). The CBI's next sentence 
elaborates this concern relating it to separate meetings of non-executives, suggesting 
the provision "could be misunderstood and could lead to a two-tier board in practice" 
(16 April 2003). The use of "could be misunderstood" is an example of language aimed 
at repairing unintended damage in drafting to maintain the core values of the code. 
The word might also be seen as a diplomatic way of disrupting a feared change in 
direction. As in the ABI submission, the value in a unitary board does not receive, or 
seem to require, explanation or articulation; neither does the "danger" or "risk" in a 
two-tier board. 
 Sentiment on this point was even stronger among company chairmen. For 
example, Sir Brian Moffat, chairman of the steelmaker Corus, wrote (20 March 2003) in 
his capacity as senior independent director of the banking group HSBC not to the FRC, 
but to its perceived political master: Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Patricia 
Hewitt. He began by stating discomfort about writing separately from the rest of the 
board, lest it be viewed "undermining the unitary board principle or the Chairman's 
position". Such was the "strength of feeling and support in the Board" that he needed to 
add his voice to that of the HSBC chairman, Sir John Bond, who also wrote to Hewitt 
on this point (17 March 2003), and later to the FRC (11 April 2003). Moffat wrote under 
Corus letterhead, making a symbolic claim of legitimacy in his identity as a company 
chairman, as well. 
Board design in the post-financial crisis debate 
The issue of overall board structure came up again in the debate leading up to the 
2010 code. In the initial consultation in early 2009, with its open invitation to raise 
matters of interest, several mainstream investors and companies alike chose to 
emphasize the need for a unitary board.  
We consider that the unitary board model still represents the most 
appropriate way forward in the UK context. We also fully support 
the continued separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive, 
and an appropriately balanced board (ABI, May 2009, p. 2). 
In assessing the merits of these various proposals we have been 
mindful of the need to … [p]reserve unitary board structures, with 
both executive and non-executive directors contributing effectively to 
the operation of the board (CBI, May 2009, p. 2).  
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Sentiments like these might have appeared like boilerplate, language dusted off 
and reused from a previous consultation paper and not of import, except that the issue 
was still alive among other actors in the field. Some of them were fringe actors, but 
others, like the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, were not. A trade 
organization with a longstanding engagement in corporate governance and many of its 
accountant-members working in corporations, the ACCA would not normally be seen 
as peripheral to the field, but its first submission stated: 
As a first step, the FRC should consider the implications of 
introducing as an option a two-tier board structure and should 
consider the changes to the Code that would need to be articulated 
(ACCA, May 2009, p. 3). 
Its argument was that the financial crisis demonstrated that current arrangements 
had failed. It laid the blame on the failure of non-executive directors to control 
managers, and on the custodians of the code for permitting an "untimely" (p. 2) 
relaxation in 2008 of the constraints on board chairmen and audit committee 
membership. Boards needed greater independence, not less:  
To draw attention to the failure of independent directors is not to say 
that less reliance should be placed upon them in the future. But 
consideration needs to be given to addressing the causes of their 
ineffectiveness. 
While two-tier board structures have not always been notably 
successful, they can contribute to ensuring that the supervisory board 
directs and oversees, while the management board manages. In 
practice, much depends on the composition and powers of the two 
boards in a two-tier structure (ACCA, May 2009, p. 2). 
The early mention in and (albeit limited) support for two-tier boards through the 
debate signals that the idea has legitimacy among at least some actors in the field, even 
though it remains a largely alien concept.  
Contributors on the other side, however, affirm the counter-argument but leave it 
largely unarticulated. The CBI, for example, states that its members, "including 
investor members, strongly uphold the UK's unitary board system"; it later states: 
"there is also a need to avoid proposals that tend towards two tier boards" (CBI, 
October 2009). Use of the passive voice here sweeps away any actor, as if the reader – 
that is the authors of the code – took the matter for granted and needed no explanation.  
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Over the course of the three periods, those supporting two-tier boards in their texts 
draw upon a discourse of high performance, secure investments and long-term 
orientation, characteristics of German corporate performance. Their texts, mainly 
tacitly though from some peripheral actors explicitly, invoke employee rights, 
stakeholder theory and the associated curbs on behaviour seen in rapacious Anglo-
American capitalism. That these associations are not explicit in many of the texts does 
not mean they are not there. They featured prominently in the discourse in news media 
at the time.28 
Boardroom ethos 
How directors behave – that is, behaviour within boards and between boards and 
shareholders – has been an important aim of the code since its inception, but one where 
the authors have always accepted the code could have little direct impact. As a result, 
the code has largely sought to deal with behavioural issues by proxy. Structures and 
procedures seek to limit the discretion of board and, thus, the range of possible 
behaviour. Independence of mind aims to encourage constructive boardroom 
challenge; lacking a mechanism to ensure it, the code has settled for formal definitions 
of independence. Some provisions, including the controversial ones of board 
evaluation, may prescribe activities of the board in the hope they will lead to changes 
in behaviour. With the financial crisis of 2007-09, however, came acknowledgement 
that these proxy approaches were insufficient. In this section we examine how 
contributors to code development perceived the issue of the ethos of boards.  
Board ethos in the Cadbury debate 
Documents in the Cadbury Archive clear show the presence of a concern that the 
code might miss the target. A hint comes from the chairman's document (CAD-01265) 
prepared for the committee as it reviewed all the responses to its May 1992 draft report 
on September 17, where the committee would agree the thrust and some of the detail 
of changes for final report. A note in an appendix called "Table of Points for 
Discussion" includes item 12 on "The Board", where the note-writer, presumably Sir 
Adrian, writes: "More emphasis on behaviour needed, less on structure?"  
                                                     
28 In 2009, for example, The Financial Times newspaper produced a long series of articles from 
high profile contributors, later issued as a monograph, "The Future of Capitalism" (May 12, 
2009).  
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That question does not appear in document detailing the conclusions of the 
committee's deliberations, but several of the changes agreed that day came in response 
to concerns about excessive prescription and the "tone" of the draft report, matters that 
link structure and behaviour. This debate suggests recognition by the committee of the 
tension between structure and agency in achieving board effectiveness. Richard Lloyd, 
the Vickers chairman, put it this way:  
… your Report perhaps should pay more heed in your final version 
to certain behavioural aspects which are, in our view, central to a 
Board's effectiveness…. most U.K. Boards, anyway those of medium-
size companies, are probably more intimately involved in the 
knowledge, understanding and direction of the business than is the 
case with counterparts across the Atlantic (CAD-01357). 
These "behavioural aspects" echo the need for the "presence" and "use" of 
knowledge and skills in the Forbes and Milliken (1999) model of board effectiveness. 
Lloyd links them to the "genuinely unitary" nature of UK boards, as opposed to the 
more supervisory approach in the US. Paul Girolami, the Glaxo chairman, worried that 
the draft cast non-executives as "watchdogs or guardians" of interests of shareholder or 
even "the public":  
We do not see this as the only — or even primary — role of the non-
executive directors. They bring to the boardroom independence and 
outside experience which cannot be provided by the executive 
directors, and those qualities are (or ought to be) deployed to enhance 
the general decision-making of the Board on all the aspects of 
corporate affairs with which it has to deal. The constructive 
harnessing of this spectrum of experience requires the creation of a 
team ethos (CAD-02105). 
The equine metaphor of "constructive harnessing", coupled with the 
electromagnetic and colourful metaphor in "spectrum", invokes images the sense of 
abundant and unruly force channelled to good purpose. Use of "team ethos" is valued 
as a "creation".  
The "professional chairman" J.B.H. Jackson said he puts "a lot of effort into keeping 
boards united and am nervous of external interventions which could run against this"; 
he was "particularly nervous of cultivating the notion that the standards of behaviour 
anticipated by 'the City' differ between executive and non-executive directors" (CAD-
02143). Here "the City" – the financiers in the City of London – is a distant, alien force 
seeking to divide those "united" on the board.  
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Stanley Kalms, chairman of Dixons, wrote about the "unique cultures" of 
companies as justifying the assertion that there was "little benefit in absolute 
uniformity for its own sake" in warnings against a code that "did not recognise 
individuality" (CAD-02167). Sir Richard Greenbury, the chairman of Marks & Spencer, 
said companies "must act as a cohesive unit"; the context makes clear this refers in 
particular to boards.29 Moreover, "whatever Code or Regulation may be in place, the 
issue [of power in the boardroom] will be decided by the mix of personalities" (CAD-
02343). 
These comments emphasize simultaneously singularity of companies and the unity 
boards. They perceive a threat in a one-size-fits-all code; the individuality of 
personalities within the boardroom contributes to the unity of the unitary board. The 
purpose this unity-in-individuality served was expressed by the Confederation of 
British Industry in arguing that the draft   
understates the contribution which the non-executives can make to 
the growth of a business: their different experience brings a fresh eye 
to problems and the development of strategy (CAD-02349). 
Non-executives contribute scarce resources ("experience", "a fresh eye") for the sake 
of developing strategy and promoting growth. These views paint a picture in which 
the board is an exciting place to be, a place where structures enable more than they 
constrain, a place alive with contradictions and uncertainties, and a place the draft 
code threatened to disrupt. 
Such considerations are largely absent from the submissions from investors, their 
advisors and the accountancy firms. One of the few that remarked on it from the 
investor side was Legal & General. It welcomed the draft's formal definition of 
differing roles for executives and non-executives, but put emphasis not on the control 
function of non-executives but their service: "balance is provided between executive 
responsibility for day to day management and non-executive strategic input" (CAD-
02353). The investment company 3i went further, noting that it was worried the draft 
wanted non-executives to act as "corporate policeman" when they were needed to 
contribute to policy development. It installed directors on the companies in which it 
invested "to benefit the business not to police our investment" (CAD-02387). It is worth 
                                                     
29 Greenbury would later author the 1995 review of executive remuneration, which would form 
part of the Combined Code in 1998. 
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noting that L&G and 3i were and still are themselves both major listed companies as 
well as important investors. 
Board ethos in the post-Higgs debate 
The Higgs Review of the effectiveness of non-executive directors sought to 
emphasize the importance of behaviour for the effectiveness of boards. In the body of 
his report, Higgs added: "The key to non-executive director effectiveness lies as much 
in behaviours and relationships as in structures and processes" (2003, Paragraph 6.3), 
before outlining the "behaviours and personal attributes" of non-executives 
(Paragraphs 6.9-6.19). He also provided guidance on the behaviour of effective 
chairmen in an annex. He used "behaviour" and "behaviours" almost interchangeably, 
leaving readers to interpret to what extent they mean the general depiction of the 
interaction of directors or observable phenomena. Respondents, particularly but not 
exclusively from the corporate side, worried that proposed prescriptions would require 
specific behaviours, leading to divisions within unitary board, harming performance, 
rather than giving weight to the need to foster trust. We look next at those general 
concerns and at a specific case of their impact: the role of the senior independent 
director and how it would divide the board. 
Higgs recommended that the SID30 have a direct relationship with investors. Other 
non-executive directors meet investors, too, but they should "rely on the chairman and 
the senior independent director to ensure a balanced view is taken" (Higgs, 2003, 
Paragraph 15.16). The SID, by contrast, "should attend sufficient of the regular 
meetings of management with a range of major shareholders to develop a balanced 
understanding of the themes, issues and concerns of shareholders" (2003, Paragraph 
15.15). Moreover, he proposed the SID be available to shareholders "if they have reason 
for concern that contact through the normal channels of chairman or chief executive 
has failed to resolve" (2003, Paragraph 7.5). For many respondents, and especially 
company chairmen, this was a challenge to the authority of the chairman. The CBI 
responded in these terms:  
Business is concerned that the proposed Code inadvertently 
undermines the role of the chairman of a company. It is in no one's 
interests that this happens (CBI, 16 April 2003, Paragraph 10). 
                                                     
30 This is one and now the most common of several designations used in the consultation 
responses. Others include SNED (senior non-executive director), SNEX (senior non-executive) 
and SINED (senior independent non-executive director).  
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We are also very concerned about the proposed role of the senior 
independent director. Business believes that this could inadvertently 
create three separate forces in a board whereas boards need to be a 
united force. The Cadbury Report identified the danger of a CEO 
dominating the board. What the Report says on the senior 
independent director actually does increase the potential risk of a 
CEO playing off the senior independent against the chairman and 
thereby weakening the chairman. This very much undermines the 
Cadbury philosophy (CBI, 16 April 2003, Paragraph 12). 
Here the trade association seeks to assert authority by identifying its view with 
that of "Business", claiming through a totum pro parte authority somewhat beyond the 
scope of its (already powerful) membership. That the "undermining" is "inadvertent" 
seeks to prevent damage without provoking retaliation. Moreover, by suggesting that 
Higgs might undermine the aims of the Cadbury Code and thus strengthen the hand of 
the chief executive, the CBI attacks Higgs by invoking the logic of greater 
independence that runs through his review.  
Baroness Hogg, chairman of the listed private equity group 3i and one of only very 
few women respondents, said Higgs did "not sufficiently distinguish between the 
'backstop' role of the Senior Independent Director, and the day-to-day responsibilities 
of the Chairman" (02 April 2003). This is language that defends ("backstop") and thus 
maintains the status quo and her own role, while seeking to disrupt the changes Higgs 
planned. Lord Weir, chairman of the construction group Balfour Beatty, argued that 
the "promotion" of the SID would "undermine the role of the Chairman". His company 
had not seen the need to follow Cadbury's guidance on designated a senior non-
executive in view of the independence of the chairman. Martin Broughton, chairman of 
BAT, said investors "rarely avail themselves" of the existing opportunity for contact 
with other directors. Moreover, he called another of the Higgs recommendations – that 
the chairman not chair the nominations committee or even sit on the audit and 
remuneration committees – "constitutionally unsound".  
These and other expressions of concern from the corporate side might be seen as 
chairmen protecting their own positions. But their reasoning invokes corporate benefit 
arising from trust and collegial behaviour. Moreover, similar sentiments appear in the 
submission from mainstream investors and their representatives, though in less 
forceful language. It was a shared issue, if perhaps with different salience to these two 
core groups in the centre of the field. 
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Board ethos in the post-financial crisis debate 
As the debate got underway in 2009, the Association of British Insurers called 
attention to a relatively new aspect of terminology in the field: behavioural 
governance. The ABI's first submission urged the code-writers to recognize that how 
people relate is more important than compliance. It did so by drawing a distinction 
between substance and form:  
In our view the Code, which represents form, can only be effective if 
the subjects (in most cases the non-executives) apply its principles 
properly, thereby creating the substance. This application may be 
termed behavioural governance. Behavioural governance will be 
affected by such attributes as skills and experience of the individuals, 
but the two most important attributes a non-executive must have is 
personal integrity and good judgement. The ABI recognises that it is 
highly difficult to demonstrate such attributes through a Code, we 
therefore believe that the most effective way to assess this is through 
interaction and dialogue between non-executives and investors (ABI, 
May 2009, pp. 2-3). 
The value descriptors here are "integrity" and "judgement" not compliance. The 
mechanisms are "interaction" and "dialogue", though crucially these terms refer to the 
relationship between directors and investors, placing emphasis on hierarchical 
accountability rather than mutuality and trust in the boardroom. It asserts shareholder 
primacy while at the same time seeking to move directors' actions away from narrow 
compliance with the code.  
The ABI's submission returned to the theme two pages later when discussing risk 
management:  
The ability to understand the risks includes an element of judgement. 
This therefore is an aspect of behavioural governance that investors, 
as outsiders, will always to a degree struggle to fully grasp. One 
method of addressing this is to look to "expert" directors to provide 
comfort. However, whilst we support the concept of a financial 
expert on an Audit Committee and relevant expertise being present 
on the board, we would counsel against over reliance on "experts". It 
is our experience that whilst experts are useful they also have a 
tendency to be more easily "captured" as they will naturally see 
things in a similar manner to other experts, usually management. As 
important as expert knowledge is, it must be coupled with keen skills 
of critical analysis, the ability to constructively challenge and 
question assumptions. Also, other directors may tend to rely too 
much on the views of the 'expert' rather than bringing their own 
judgement to bear (ABI, May 2009, p. 5, punctuation inconsistencies 
in the original). 
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The section is worth quoting at length because, unlike other submissions from 
central actors or its own submissions on other point, the ABI here elaborated its 
argument, rather than relying upon assumed meanings. Much of the debate preceding 
the consultation was about how the independent non-executives on bank boards had 
failed to understand the nature of risk. One solution, the one the Walker Review would 
suggest two months later, was greater expertise. But here the ABI, a trade association 
for risk experts, argued against expertise, and in rather forceful terms. Experts were 
"more easily 'captured'", so other directors must bring "judgement to bear". The experts 
themselves must be more than expert; they must also have "keen skills of critical 
analysis", and then "constructively challenge" and "question assumptions". This is an 
argument to maintain the institution of the code with its emphasis on independence 
even as it seeks to push it along the path of relying more on behaviour that investors 
like the ABI "struggle to fully grasp". That the language here is much more vivid than 
in much of the rest of its submission suggests that its author(s) saw this as a crucial 
issue. The institutional work is moving in two directions, disrupting the code's reliance 
on structure and independence while maintaining them as well.  
Other submissions also placed emphasis on behaviour more than compliance. The 
CBI's first submission spoke of the importance of the more general importance of 
having a "culture of challenge" in the boardroom, arising from having a "broad talent 
pool" of non-executive directors, before adding: 
The effective application of the Code's principles is largely reliant on 
the behavior [sic] of individuals and their interactions. This is not 
something that can sensibly be legislated for or regulated (CBI, May 
2009, p. 2). 
In contrast to the ABI, this behaviour and these interactions are discussed as purely 
internal to the board, not also in relation to shareholders. Moreover, neither the code-
writers nor government can "sensibly" contribute much to improve it. The CBI's 
language affirms the code's value while undermining readings of it the emphasize 
structure. It denigrates legislation and regulation, implicitly also denigrating the more 
regulatory approaches to the code implicit in the compliance mentality other 
contributors, particularly peripheral actors, had stressed.  
The submission from GC100, an association of corporate counsel from the largest 
companies, made a similar point, in suggesting best practice guidance, a non-
regulatory approach, rather than a revision of the code's principles, which would fall 
under the comply-or-explain regime and its associated enforcement:  
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The Code will only provide a framework for good governance but 
will not alleviate the issues caused by bad management within a 
company. These behavioural issues can certainly be influenced 
through a robust board/committee evaluation process and possibly 
through guidance on best practice from the FRC (GC100, May 2009, 
p. 4). 
This view affirms the value of the code even as it challenges it: the code is "only" a 
framework, though the committees it has legitimated can influence behaviour through 
"robust" process of evaluation, thus affirming while simultaneously questioning the 
effectiveness of code. SABMiller identified with the GC100 stance in its submission, 
before adding:  
If there were governance weaknesses that contributed to the current 
crisis, it was in the application of the Code rather than a lack of 
prescription within the Code itself. Adding extra governance 
requirements is likely to lead to more box ticking and hamper 
effective scrutiny by non executive directors by occupying time with 
form rather than looking at substance. Key to the effectiveness of 
corporate governance is the calibre of the individuals involved, and 
that they have a clear understanding of their role and responsibilities 
and the tools necessary to discharge their responsibilities effectively 
(SABMiller, May 2009, p. 1). 
The contrast between "form" and "substance" returns, as do the limitations of codes 
in dealing with behaviour. Articulation of code leads to "more box ticking", one of 
many uses of the derogatory phrase made in the submissions from actors in central 
positions in of the field. Emphasis is placed, instead on the "calibre of the individuals" 
with the "necessary" tools. That could be read as a request for more tools, had not the 
passage already warned that extra requirements would "hamper effective scrutiny" 
and thus be counterproductive. This is language aimed at maintaining the code, and 
the logic of corporate governance as SABMiller interprets it, but also to disrupt the 
plans of others to assert their interpretation of codes as defining acceptable behaviour, 
not merely providing structures within which agents can act.  
As the three consultations progressed, the topic returns from a large number of 
actors. The CBI's October 2009 submission suggested: "Promoting a culture of respect, 
trust and challenge is the most important issue, and ultimately the job of the chairman. 
The CBI believes that there is only so far you can codify all of this" (p. 3). A few pages 
later in discussing board evaluation, it added:  
The key aspect of board performance is behavioural, and therefore 
much less amenable to formal "testing". External evaluation should 
not be a substitute for open debate and robust challenge between the 
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Executive and the NEDs, nor effective communication and 
engagement with shareholders (CBI, October 2009, p. 6). 
Not all respondents agreed. The second submission by Fair Pensions, an advisory 
firm to pension funds, responded to the FRC assertion that "There is a recognition that 
the quality of corporate governance ultimately depends on behaviour not process" in 
the following terms:  
Everyone accepts that good governance depends on behaviour and 
that regulation alone is not enough. The practical question, however, 
is what form of regulation will best promote the required behaviour 
(Fair Pensions, October 2009, p. 2). 
The word "however" does the rhetorical change of direction and one that invokes a 
different, regulatory logic of behaviour more akin to agency than stewardship theory 
in corporate governance, emphasizing more the structure in an institutional approach 
to the field than the concept of embedded agency. This form of institutional work is 
both maintaining the code and disrupting the attempts of those in more central 
positions to maintain their understandings of what the code means. 
Discussion 
This analysis points to new insights concerning the nature of institutional work 
and the process of codification. It also has implications for further research concerning 
the practice and theoretical perspective of corporate governance as a field.  
Institutional work 
Writing the code was in general a conservative process throughout the period. 
Despite the crises of legitimacy that prompted these three events, these efforts arose 
largely outside the political process. As a consequence, the actors engaged in them 
were largely those with vested interests in incumbent practices as much as in future 
outcomes. Those conditions suggest processes where little institutional change would 
emerge and the work done would be mainly of the "maintaining" varieties in Lawrence 
and Suddaby (2006). 
This analysis shows, however, that more radical ideas did come to the fore. The 
Cadbury Commission heard arguments in favour of a transformation of UK corporate 
governance arrangements and seemingly gave them serious consideration. That those 
ideas, rejected by the code-writers in the face of strong, conservative pressure from 
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directors and investors, maintained alive during the 20 years under review, suggests 
that what MacAvoy and Millstein (2003) call the "recurrent crisis" in corporate 
governance has prevented any ideas from truly coming to be taken for granted, that is, 
deeply institutionalized. That the code left the door open to defiance as well as 
compliance, to experimentation as well as avoidance, suggests that the codes' authors 
recognized the limitations of the process in which they engaged.  
Cadbury's work was something institutional scholars would recognize as 
entrepreneurship, seizing an opportunity when legitimacy of established practices had 
come into question and creating new arrangements. The process, including both the 
consultation this paper has used as its source material and the informal meetings, fact 
gathering and media coverage that surrounded it, provided repeated opportunities for 
the work Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) educating, theorizing, defining and vesting. 
The consultation worked by constructing normative networks and changing normative 
associations by connecting intended practices with a moral basis related to the quiet 
but well established association of the Quaker faith of the Cadbury family over 
generations with practice we now call social responsibility. Cadbury was the moral 
face of capitalism, where Maxwell was the opposite.  
Enlisting important industrialists to the committee and then soliciting views from 
others brought key potential opponents to change into a position where they needed to 
articulate their position and frame a discourse that sat largely within the frame 
Cadbury's draft had set. In contributing to the debate opponents construct identities 
that lie not too far removed from the terms  the draft had given and the code was 
establish as its new mechanisms, which then facilitates diffusion of the new practices, 
or at least their translation (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996) by actors less than 
thoroughly convinced by the arguments they have heard. This echoes the projective 
agency in the version of institutional work in Battilana and D'Aunno (2009). But 
holding open competing logics through the comply-or-explain regime, the code that 
emerged allows actors in the field to keep multiple identities following different logics 
in a kind of suspended animation even as they accepted and incorporate the code in 
their own practice. This identity work (Creed et al., 2010; Lok, 2010) suggests a need to 
add another type of practical-evaluation agency to Battilana and D'Aunno's phase of 
creating institutions.  
The subsequent major versions of the code paint a more complex picture of 
institutional work. With a formal code in place, the canvas that Higgs and then the FRC 
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used in 2003 was not blank. The existing practices from Cadbury had been 
institutionalized over a decade and mythologized, a form of "maintaining" work in 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006). Through the iconic status of the code around the world, 
those practices had won over many of the critics from 1992 . Contributions to the "fatal 
flaws only" review in 2003 suggest that many had come to identify with Cadbury 
precepts, which they had learned to adapt through translation and bricolage to suit 
their companies' circumstances. They praised the Higgs Review (2003) and its insights 
into non-executive directors, a form of "valourizing", but disputed the resulting 
recommendations, "demonizing" as alien in their attempt to split the board along 
German and European lines. This is work by these actors that Lawrence and Suddaby 
would call "maintaining" incumbent institutional arrangements but it is also disrupting 
the institutional entrepreneurship in Higgs. At the FRC, Nicholson faced that fury with 
a fudge. He converted Higgs's recommendation of a definition of independence 
involving a six-year tenure into what came to be called the "nine-year rule" (see 
previous chapter for details). That was work that Battilana and D'Aunno (2009) would 
call "repairing" or a change Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) would see as "enabling", 
both of the "maintaining" variety, but maintaining entrepreneurial ideas, while 
disrupting existing arrangements.  
In 2010, Sir Christopher Hogg's changes to the code recognized many of the issues 
left untreated in both the Cadbury and Higgs inquiries, that the ethos in the 
boardroom was more important than the structures of board design or the formal 
definitions of independence. Contributions to that consultation nonetheless brought up 
old ideas and issues up for reconsideration, ideas that sought again to address 
questions of structure and definitions of independence. The institutional work was a 
repeat of prior attempts by some to repair and others to undermine the moral 
associations of a code that had failed to prevent a recurrent wave of governance 
failings. What emerged from the consultations, however, was advocacy of translation 
and bricolage, advocacy of deinstitutionalizations within institutional arrangements by 
the liberal application of explanations rather than compliance. The 2010 code picked up 
and amplified the subtext of the discourse that spoke of the limitations of code and the 
need for a combination of trust and challenge, respect within critique, that corporate 
actors and some others had advocated since the earliest days, but which previous 
authors of the code had reflected only in part. Was this work disrupting existing 
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arrangements, maintaining the spirit by repairing the language, or creating something 
rather different?  
Actors from different parts of the broader field of corporate governance would 
view these examples of work differently. Those that start with a logic of control as the 
purpose of boards could find the advocacy from corporations and the actions of the 
author in the 2010 process as disrupting to the central purpose corporate governance. 
Those that start from a logic of service, of the board as a solution to resource 
constraints, could see in the 2010 process invention and advocacy of a new and 
welcome set of arrangements that simultaneously undermined incumbent ones.  
This discussion suggests that the concept of institutional work is contingent on the 
position of the actors in the broader field: work one actors might view as maintaining 
an institution they cherish is one that disrupts the diffusion of institutional 
arrangement that others advocate. This is true particularly for this case, because the 
field is unsettled. The increasingly international nature of capital markets and the 
mobility of corporate executives and directors creates pressure for convergence 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Goergen et al., 2008; Steven Toms & Wright, 2005), 
while the path-dependent development of different governance regimes keeps 
alternatives and overlapping logics alive and under discussion (Roe, 2003).  
Codification 
This paper also suggests that the process of writing contributes to the successful 
development and diffusion of codes of conduct. In these examples, codification arose 
through a process with the following stages: An existing set of practices, widely if not 
universally accepted, is unsettled by a shock to the system widely seen as internal to 
the system if perhaps external to many actors within it. That jolt places the equilibrium 
of current arrangements in question. Through services of a (more or less) trusted 
intermediary, views from both the centre and the most distant parts of the field are 
aired and definitions of accepted terms questioned. In those circumstances, authorship 
matters. Through one or more iterations, the author decides the terms in which the 
debate takes place, that is, the language in use. That language creates the discourse that 
legitimates certain categories of actors, activities and forms of organizing, ready for 
codification. Enactment of those forms and activities by multiple actors across the field 
alters social practice, legitimating the discourse and reinforcing the texts, as Fairclough 
(1992) suggests.  
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This study suggests that central to the success of codification are three factors: a) 
the opening of the terms of the debate, b) the services of a trusted mediator/author, 
and c) the sense of broadly shared values among participants, which prevent the 
debate becoming reduced to narrowly self-interested negotiations. In so doing, they 
avoid the interest dissatisfaction and clash of value commitments Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996) see as prior conditions for institutional change. Further research could 
help to establish this. The process is summarized in the map seen in Figure 2. Central 
to the success in this example of codification, which involves powerful elites agreeing 
to cede discretion, seem to be two further factors this paper has analysed only 
tangentially: d) the promise of an iterative cycle, with or without a fresh jolt to the 
system; and e) the "escape clause" of comply-or-explain, which permits differentiation 
with a unified response.  
 
 
Figure 2 - Codification process 
In the case of the UK codes of corporate governance, the jolts leading to the 
versions of 1992 and 2010 were in many ways home-grown and of considerable 
magnitude, increasing their force and injecting urgency into the need for change and 
thus the salience of the calls from change from more peripheral voices. Ideas from what 
we might call adjacent organizational fields – from the German model of corporate 
governance or the European Union's deliberations – get a hearing. The version of 2003 
is somewhat different, in that the jolt was clearly from outside. The problems at Enron, 
WorldCom and other in the US were based in a governance system that made little use 
Donald Nordberg  Page 85 
of executive directors and much use of rules-based regulation of corporate affairs and 
accountancy. Contributions to the Cadbury inquiry suggest UK directors saw these as 
alien. Even the problems that affected European companies at the time came from alien 
systems: Ahold had a two-tier board; Parmalat had a governance system seemingly 
modelled on the Maxwell empire of pre-Cadbury days. That corporate actors rejected 
the specific Higgs provisions, sometimes in quite forceful language, suggests 
insufficient interest dissatisfaction or conflict of values to evoke change (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996). But changes happened nonetheless, suggesting the shared values about 
the greater purpose of corporate governance overcame the inertia of an 
institutionalized field.  
The discussions of board design and boardroom ethos show roots in the experience 
of individual actors, and not just corporate entities responding abstractly to the issues 
the consultations raised. As we have seen in these examples of the debate from a 
limited sample of contributors, respondents came from a variety parts of the 
investment supply chain, bringing with them both a range of views roughly 
corresponding to their economic interests and a large degree of shared values about the 
nature of corporate governance and the importance of finding better ways of making it 
work.  
Analysis of the range of views shows that voices central to the debate had 
considerable impact on shaping the content of the codes, at least in part through 
advocating changes practice and in code, in keeping with the expectations of 
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006). Their positions held greater salience (R. K. Mitchell et 
al., 1997) with the codes' authors, in that they more urgent in terms of the impact on 
their activities, more legitimate if judged from the perspective of invested funds and 
effort, and certainly more powerful. As Sir Adrian Cadbury's notes show in several 
places, had the code authors not won commitment from associations like the ABI and 
CBI, from key institutional investors and from the chairmen of influential companies, 
their efforts might have been stillborn, despite strong "precipitating jolts" (Greenwood 
et al., 2002) in the field.  
On occasion, single voices, like those of Sir Owen Green during the Cadbury 
inquiry, provided a rallying point for others, crystallizing their own thinking in 
language that exercises force over those tasked with writing the code and changing the 
terms of the debate and possibly its direction. Voices from the periphery of the field, 
however, contributed ideas that forced reconsideration of positions by those in the 
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centre, in keeping with the expectations of Rao and Giorgi (2006). Those in 
intermediate positions in the investment supply chain, the large accountancy firms and 
other advisers, may have less urgency and power, but their expertise dealing with 
boards gives them salience, even when their legitimacy, post-Enron, comes into 
question. Their position allows them to bring new and occasionally challenging ideas 
into the debate, with authority arising from their independence, even when that 
independence is based on professionalism brought into question by their own actions.  
The shared values of the participants are perhaps the greater surprise of this study. 
Across the spectrum of opinion, what is evident in the Cadbury inquiry is 
acknowledgement of the need for change towards more formalized and normative 
institutional arrangements to supplement or replace the informal ways that boards 
operated and distilled each others' ideas of best practice. In the post-Higgs and post-
financial crisis debates we see acceptance among actors of the need for renewing 
legitimacy if not about the changes needed to achieve that. Nonetheless, that 
institutional investors and corporate chairmen frequently spoke in the same terms 
suggests that more than narrow self-interest is at work. The contributions of even the 
more distant actors show adherence to many of the same principles, such as the need 
to balance the control functions of the board against it service roles, and perhaps the 
sense that those two functions cannot easily be distinguished from each other. Only the 
most distant of actors lacked a common language of governance with those in the 
centre; others shared the same terms, if sometimes only through ambiguous 
definitions. Most adhered to logics that – even when competing for attention during 
the process of writing the code – contained overlapping meanings for the participants. 
That the values were shared, if unevenly and with variation, has implications for the 
process of codification and the nature of the institutional work involved in their 
authorship.  
Implications for further research 
This paper suggests a number of avenues for further research into the field of 
corporate governance, with broader implications for institutional theory. They include 
a) authorship, the role the authors play in writing the code; b) absent voices, the 
foreign investors and hedge funds who did not contribution to a debate in which they 
clearly had an interest; c) logics, the several competing, conflicting but also 
overlapping logics at work here; d) fields, and what the blurred boundaries in 
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corporate governance say about institutional change; and e) power, how does the 
process of codification assist or disadvantage certain parties. The final section of this 
thesis (Chapter 9) offers some preliminary thoughts.  
Conclusions  
This paper demonstrates how the processes of writing the code of corporate 
governance in the UK contributed to its institutionalization through the negotiation of 
the language of its texts mediated by a trusted authored in a safe environment. In 
listening to ideas from the periphery as well as the centre and intermediate positions in 
the field, the authors confer legitimacy on ideas they do not incorporate, allowing those 
ideas to stay alive in the discourse even when marginalized, ready to resurface when 
the next occasion arises. The codes remained open, subject to periodic review, with or 
without new jolts to the system; they were also voluntary, through the comply-or-
explain regime. Those factors allowed them to win commitment from the powerful 
actors who might otherwise have refused to participate or engaged in mere surface 
isomorphism (Zucker, 1987). These processes have practical as well as theoretical 
importance. The lessons from the Cadbury experience were reflected in other national 
codes of corporate governance but also in the processes used to create them. Moreover, 
the processes discussed in this paper inform and were informed by the mechanisms 
used by the European Commission in formulating policy for the reform of financial 
services regulation (the so-called Lamfalussy process) and in its decisions at various 
stages whether (or indeed not) to pursue a harmonization of corporate governance 
across the European Union.  
This paper also contributes to the literature on institutional theory in examining 
the way the use of language influences the development and promulgation of a proto-
institution as it diffuses or perhaps translates through a field. The language of the texts 
and the contributions that lead to their development inform a discourse that comes to 
dominate the way we talk about corporate governance, both in the UK and abroad. 
That discourse gives legitimacy to certain ideas while placing others in a state of 
suspended animation. The open nature of the processes allows ideas to resurface 
another time, sometimes from other actors, in a semi-legitimated state, half-ready for 
when the next jolt hits the system.  
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Appendix 1  
The contributions to which this analysis pays closest attention were selected on the 
basis of theoretical sampling based on the centrality or otherwise to the issues of 
boards and owners, and on the salience of their claims and arguments. Asset 
management firms are likely to have different interests from corporate directors. 
Agency theory suggests the former would seek to use code-writing to assert greater 
control over boards and managements, while boards and individual directors would 
seek wider discretion and freedom of choice. These also reflect the split in theories of 
corporate governance between agency theory (Fama, 1980) and stewardship approach 
(J. H. Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997) and highlight issues in resource 
dependency (A. J. Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000).  
For each of the time periods, the core samples and the justification for their 
selection are provided in the following tables.  
1991-92 
Table 5 – 1991-92 core sample and justification 




Insurance industry trade 
association; mainstream 
investment orientation; often 
organizes collective 
engagement with companies 
over corporate governance 
concerns 
Many ABI members are also listed companies, so the ABI 
view can be seen as straddling the divide between 
corporations and shareholders. At the time of Cadbury, 
ABI members held about a quarter of the value of the 




Trade association for 
companies, especially large 
corporations 
Notes from Sir Adrian and the committee secretary Nigel 
Peace show that the CBI was seen as an important and 
possibly hostile voice, one whose views needed to be 
taken into consideration.  
Ernst & Young Accountancy firm, one of the 
Big Five, Seven, Eight, 
depending on the year 
E&Y submitted what Adrian Cadbury's notes (CAD-
02475) say he was "a bit shaken by Ernst & Young's 
demolition job" on the draft code. 
Anthony Merrett 
and Alan Sykes 
Accounting academics and 
corporate practitioners 
Their joint paper on boards and audit is referred to 
several times in various committee notes; including by 
Jonathan Charkham, the Bank of England adviser who 
worked with Cadbury. Charkham wrote of the M-S 
paper: "There is much logic in what they propose but I 
have no doubt that it would arouse the fiercest wrath 
among our critics who can see only too clearly this kind 
of development coming and are thoroughly scared of real 
accountability" (CAD-01073). 
Glaxo Holdings plc Corporate Sir Paul Girolami was chairman of Glaxo and comments 
at some length on the proposals.  
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Bodycote 
International plc 
Corporate Joseph C. Dwek, chairman and CEO, responded on 
behalf of the company, a manufacturer of coatings and 
advanced materials that had once been a textile and 
packaging maker and before 1969 part of Slater Walker 
plc, a company involved in earlier corporate governance 
issues. Dwek had been chairman since 1972, shortly after 
it was spun out of Slater Walker, and retired in 1998. He 
was later chairman and CEO of Worthington Industries 
Plc, leaving after a management buy-in in 2010. The firm 
subsequently ran into financial difficulties. Nigel Peace, 
secretary to the committee, called particular attention to 
his comments on resigning auditors.  
Sir Owen Green, 
BTR 
Corporate The contribution to the committee from Green, then 
chairman of BTR, doesn't appear among the papers in the 
archive. He wrote a "Personal View" column in the 
Financial Times of June 9, 1992, attacking the draft report. 
Its critical and public stance meant that others referred to 
it as well. Green is cited at some length in the committee's 
summaries of contributions, however, suggesting there 
might have been another document. This study looked at 
the FT piece and the excerpts in the summary. (NB: Green 
subsequently wrote to Cadbury still criticizing the code 
but also apologizing, as the archive documents. He was 
chairman and managing director of BTR from 1984-86, 
although his contribution discusses the differences 
between the roles and advocates separation.)  
Sir Richard 
Greenbury 
Corporate Greenbury was chairman and chief executive of Marks & 
Spencer. Although using private letterhead, he writes in 
the first person plural, as if speaking for the board; the 
letter is signed "Chairman". He chaired the 1996 inquiry 
into executive pay, part of what became the Combined 
Code. 
Legal & General Insurer; investor Maureen Howe, in the government and investor affairs 
office, responded on behalf of the company with a strong 
nod to its engagement as an investor. 
Arthur Anderson Accountancy The then-highly regarded firm made a long and detailed 
commentary on the draft.  
3i Corporate/investor 3i is a listed private equity company that grew out of a 
government initiative to foster capital formation for new, 
growth businesses. 3i stood for Investors In Industry, and 
the submission still used that expression as a strap line.  
J.B.H. Jackson Corporate A self-described professional chairman 
Kingfisher Corporate Geoffrey Mulcahy, chairman and CEO, had a maverick 
reputation in the City and opposed various elements of 
corporate governance reform over two decades.  
PIRC Advisers Pensions Investments Research Centre is a proxy voting 
service whose clients come overwhelmingly from local 
authority retirement funds. Although many of its clients 
are significant investors, the firm has long taken a 
stakeholder-aware stance to its recommendations. Its 
contribution wasn't among the papers in the Cadbury 
Archive, but it is mentioned and quoted at some length in 
the summary documents. PIRC supplied directly a late 
draft of the submission for this study, with some phrases 
missing in the introductory part.  
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2002-03 
Table 6 – 2002-03 core sample and justification 
Actor Sector/interest Comments 
3i Corporate, also investment 
management (a specialist 
financial group/private 
equity) 
A thoughtful commentary submitted by Baroness Hogg, 
who was to go on to become chairman of the Financial 
Reporting Council just as the 2010 code was published. 
This submission shows her thinking at an earlier stage in 




Insurance industry trade 
association. 
Many ABI members are also listed companies, so the ABI 
view can be seen as straddling the divide between 
corporations and shareholders and a core player. 
Shareholdings of its members now made up a fifth of UK 
equities, down from a quarter in 1992, but it remained an 




Trade association for 
companies, especially large 
corporations 
As at the time of Cadbury, the CBI served as a focal point 
of opposition to the more prescriptive elements of the code. 
It also made one of the most detailed and closely argued 
submissions, of more than 17,000 words, to the "fatal flaws 
only" consultation that followed the Higgs Review, 8,500 of 
which were new comments, the balance an attachments 
giving the FRC a copy of the document sent to Higgs six 
months earlier. Its submission makes clear that Higgs chose 
not to follow many of its suggestions. 
AVECO A trade association of 
CEOs of charities and 
"third-sector" organizations 
A peripheral actor in corporate governance, its submission 
focused on a single issue, the suitability of voluntary-sector 
CEOs to be non-executives of listed companies. It 
otherwise supported adopting the Higgs recommendations 
"in full".  
Balfour Beatty Corporate; construction, 
engineering, a central 
player 
Lord Weir's letter, in a mocking way, questioned his own 
competence; he "must have learned something" in 37 man-
years of chairing four listed companies.  
BAT  Corporate; tobacco Martin Broughton writes as chairman in forceful and 
occasionally ironic tones.  
British Airways Corporate; aviation The letter to the FRC, retrieved from its website, comes 
without letterhead, name or signature. There are reasons 
from the text, however, to surmise it was signed by the 
chairman.  
Corus (HSBC) Corporate; steel (banking) Brian Moffat, chairman of Corus, writes on Corus 
letterhead in his capacity as senior non-executive director 
at HSBC. He levels his critique of Higgs using HSBC as a 
special case that shows the weakness of the approach. 
Moreover, the letter is addressed to Patricia Hewitt, 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the political 
power behind the Higgs Review, not to the FRC, which is 
writing the code.  
Emap Corporate; media Adam Broadbent, chairman, tried to keep his comments as 
short as possible because he had no doubt the FRC was 
receiving a lot of response. 
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Hermes Investment management Colin Melvin was director of corporate governance at this 
activist pension fund management company owned by BT 
and also representing Royal Mail pension plans with £35 
billion under management. This concise note opposes any 
"any significant watering down" of the Higgs 
recommendations. 
ISIS Investment management ISIS governance director Richard Singleton notes that the 
firm was majority owned at the time by Friends Provident 
plc, a listed asset manager. He voiced concern over the 
absence of specific mention of the governance issues in 
companies with a dominant shareholder. 
Gartmore Investment management A mainstream investor owned at this time by the National 
Mutual Association and therefore linked to a major mutual 
building society. 
2009-10 
Table 7 – 2009-10 core sample and justification 




Insurance industry trade 
association; mainstream 
investment orientation; often 
organizes collective 
engagement with companies 
over corporate governance 
concerns 
ABI members have holdings in UK equities equal 
to about 15 per cent of market capitalization, 
following a further diminution of its investment 
power in the face of the growth of hedge funds 
and international investment. ABI is an active 
participant in the International Corporate 
Governance Network; some ABI member 
companies are also listed companies subject to the 







Trade association for 
accountants and auditors; 
frequently publishes guidance 
on corporate governance for 
members 
ACCA is less mainstream than the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales; 
members tend to be accountants working in 
companies more than in private practice; less 
influenced than ICAEW by Big Four accountancy 




Trade association for 
companies, especially large 
corporations 
Often cited as voice of British employers, its 
membership includes mainly large and medium-
sized corporations and therefore those most 
affected by the code's prescriptions. Responded to 
all three consultations. 
SABMiller plc Corporation; FTSE 100 
constituent  
Manufacturer of alcoholic drinks, based in the UK 
but from South African origins and with 
governance arrangements affected by a large US 
acquisition in the recent past. Its heritage makes it 
less mainstream than other companies and 
sensitive to corporate governance practices in 
other jurisdictions, especially South Africa, which 
moved beyond many of the prescriptions in had 
initially adopted from UK practice. Responded to 
all three consultations. 
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Fair Pensions Pension consulting firm As a representative of pension interests, its view is 
generally oriented to long-term corporate success 
rather than immediate performance. It has an 
orientation toward ethical investments and 
advocates of stakeholder interest and 
environmental sustainability. Responded to all 
three consultations. 
GC100 An association of general 
counsel and company 
secretaries from among the 
largest company. 
Adopts both a legal-profession stance and 
represents corporate (though not director-level) 
interests. Responded to all three consultations. 
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Part 3: Power and politics in corporate 
governance 
This part contains two chapters of published work: "Waste makes 
haste: Sarbanes-Oxley, competitiveness and the subprime crisis," 
from the Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance (2008), and "The 
politics of shareholder activism," one of my chapters in the Wiley 
book, Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice 
(2010), edited by H. Kent Baker and Ronald Anderson. Each essay has 
introductory remarks relating them to institutional theory. 
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4. Waste makes haste (JFRC) 
Status: Published in November 2008 by Journal of Financial Regulation 
and Compliance (Emerald). It was accepted on first submission in June 
2008 and given accelerated publication owing to its topicality.  
An institutional view of 'Waste makes haste' 
Passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 was what some commentators have 
called the most important piece of corporate governance legislation in the US since the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (e.g. Kipperman, 
McAfee, & Vakkur, 2008). In some ways, Sarbox, one of the names by which the act is 
known, was more far-reaching. It made supervision of the accounting and audit 
professions a direct federal government responsibility. Moreover, owing to the 
integration of international capital markets in the 1980s and 1990s, Sarbox had 
considerable extraterritorial impact. For example, auditors outside the United States 
might be required to register with and become subject to US inspections, even though 
they did no work for US companies. The requirement applied to all firms that audited 
even some of the accounts of a foreign company that had, at some time in the past, 
listed bonds on the New York Stock Exchange. 
The following paper arose from a request I received to talk about Sarbanes-Oxley 
and corporate governance in the context of a debate over financial regulation following 
the collapse of Northern Rock in August 2007 and the problems at Bear Stearns in the 
early months of 2008. In preparing for the talk, I started to see parallels between Enron 
and the subprime crisis, which I elaborated through a literature review and analysis of 
contemporary news reporting of the subprime crisis. What emerged was a polemical 
paper, intended to provoke a fresh line of thinking about the current problems. 
As the paper makes clear, Sarbox was a direct response to a series of corporate 
failures in the US, in particular that of Enron Corp. towards the end of 2001 and 
WorldCom a few months later. These problems, compounded by the actions (and 
subsequent implosion) of its auditors, Arthur Andersen, can be seen as what 
Greenwood and colleagues (2002) call a "precipitating jolt" that dislodges current 
institutional arrangements, opening the way for radical change. While sometimes 
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called a "law of unintended consequences" (Fletcher & Miles, 2004), Sarbox has 
persisted and both US corporations and the foreign ones with securities listed on US 
markets have come to adapt their practices to it. This essay suggests that the changes 
Sarbox imposed did not address many of the key issues in the Enron cases, and that the 
problems that arose in the financial crisis of 2007-08 had analogies to them. 
While that arguments stands, the paper does not take into account some studies 
that argue or seek to show empirically how Sarbox may have beneficial effects. An 
article published contemporaneously with my paper argues that Sarbanes-Oxley arose 
from a "perfect storm" of forces that swept the bill into law. The authors nonetheless 
saw Sarbox as "legislation that almost by accident created one of the greatest 
protections in history for the public interest" (Canada, Kuhn, & Sutton, 2008, p. 987). 
Time will tell. 
Coates (2007, p. 92) argues that Sarbanes-Oxley should bring net long-term benefits 
by increasing spending on internal control and audit, adding: "If auditing before 
Sarbanes-Oxley was as poor as widely believed, or if incentives for public firms to 
spend money preventing fraud and theft were inadequate, raising the resources spent 
on auditing will bring social gains." Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), in a study 
based on synthetic share portfolios, found in general that companies that complied 
with Sarbanes-Oxley and the new exchange listing rules produced an abnormal return 
to investors of 6–20 per cent. But the results showed variation across company types, 
with small firms disadvantaged by some of the changes, a finding in keeping with an 
earlier assertion concerning the venture capital industry (Fletcher & Miles, 2004).  
A working paper by researchers at Boston College and Boston University (Qian, 
Strahan, & Zhu, 2009), which was issued after my paper had been published, 
demonstrated through a natural experiment that companies complying with Sarbox 
and especially Section 404 enjoyed the benefit of longer duration debt issuance, which 
can reduce the cost of capital or make it more stable.  
Whether this benefit offsets the costs to directors in time and cognitive effort 
would be difficult to establish. Put somewhat provocatively, in view of their bounded 
rationality (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Simon, 1959) and social standing as elites 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Useem, 1979b), directors may assign greater value to time for 
thoughtful consideration of strategy than they do to longer duration borrowing or the 
insurance value of time spent in the audit committee. Value is subjective.  
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Put less provocatively, institutional rearrangements in Sarbox constrained 
managerial discretion (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) by 
imposing on top management new structures and procedures that arise from both the 
task environment and internal organization, and do so with serious potential sanctions 
for misconduct. While these constraints may account for corporate antipathy to Sarbox, 
the outcomes on board practice could be counterintuitive. Finkelstein, Hambrick and 
Cannella (2009), for example, speculate that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, combined with 
the business climate, might spur boards and in particular non-executive directors to 
greater activism in general, including on strategy formation. They suggest, however, 
such activism would be contingent on the power of boards. If so, then an important 
avenue for future research lies in assessing the distribution of discretion between 
executives, non-executives and shareholders, and what activities the new institutional 
arrangements enable, as well as what they constrain. To this end, adapting the model 
of managerial discretion of Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) to the work of boards 
could be a fruitful area for theory development.  
Sarbox was a speedy response to a crisis that had sapped the legitimacy of 
corporations, as evidenced in the public outcry at the time. It passed just one month 
after WorldCom failed. That it persisted despite its weaknesses is a testimony to 
institutionalization, in this case coercive isomorphism (P. J. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), 
imposed when there was no alternative available for discussion.  
A personal postscript: When this article was published, a friend who read it 
commented that Sen. Paul Sarbanes, one of the act's authors, had told him that 
legislation had been drafted several years earlier, but could not get traction in Congress 
in the face of strong lobbying against tighter corporate governance legislation. Argued 
in institutional terms, the jolt had indeed precipitated a reconfiguration of 
arrangements, through what Lawrence (2008) calls a "dominance" form of institutional 
power.
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Waste makes haste: Sarbanes-Oxley, competitiveness 
and the subprime crisis  
(2008) 
Purpose – Passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 followed hard 
on the collapses of Enron and WorldCom. Waste makes haste. 
Official reports for US government agencies worried that the 
legislation may have impaired New York's competitiveness as a 
venue for international capital transactions. But a threat from a 
seemingly different direction – the subprime shakeout – exposed 
bigger issues. This paper raises questions about many of the 
assumptions made in the discourse about the relative 
competitiveness of US and European capital markets. 
Design/methodology/approach – Building on Healy and Palepu's 
analysis of Enron (2003), it compares the root issues at Enron with a 
preliminary view of the sources of the subprime crisis to build a 
outline for regulatory response. 
Findings – Remedies in Sarbanes-Oxley failed to address several of 
the ailments in evidence in Enron. The haste of making Sarbox may 
have lead to us to waste an opportunity to prevent or reduce the 
impact of the subprime debacle.  
Originality/value – The comparison of the seemingly unrelated cases 
reveals similar ethical gaps and regulatory lapses, suggesting a 
different type of legislative and regulatory response may be needed. 
It makes suggestions for further research to guide future 
policymaking.   
Keywords Corporate governance, Sarbanes-Oxley, subprime, capital 
markets, competitiveness 
Introduction 
US Senator Charles Schumer of New York State and Mayor Michael Bloomberg of 
New York City saw the situation like this: "Traditionally, London was our chief 
competitor in the financial services industry," they wrote in the introduction to a report 
from the consultants McKinsey & Co., challenging the competitiveness of New York as 
a global financial hub. "But as technology has virtually eliminated barriers to the flow 
of capital, it now freely flows to the most efficient markets, in all corners of the globe. 
Today, in addition to London, we're increasingly competing with cities like Dubai, 
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Hong Kong, and Tokyo." They claimed that New York is still – in some sense – in the 
lead, whatever that means, but warned not to take the lead for granted. "In fact, the 
report contains a chilling fact that if we do nothing, within ten years while we will 
remain a leading regional financial center; we will no longer be the financial capital of 
the world," they said (McKinsey & Co., 2007, p. i).  
The main body of the report said that the declining position of the US went beyond 
"natural market evolution to more controllable, intrinsic issues of US competitiveness". 
Why? Part of the answer lies in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which Schumer, a 
Democrat, might well want to use this report to alter now that his party has won 
control of both houses of Congress. But there's more than that: "The more lenient 
immigration environment London also makes it easier to recruit and retain 
international professionals with the requisite quantitative skills," McKinsey wrote. 
"Finally, the FSA's [the UK Financial Services Authority's] greater historical willingness 
to net outstanding derivatives positions before applying capital charges has also 
yielded a major competitive advantage for London" (McKinsey & Co., 2007, p. 13). 
The McKinsey report for New York State and City was one of three reports that 
raised issues about the competitiveness of America's capital markets, including another 
commissioned by US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, and a third giving a blueprint 
for a new regulatory environment, penned in part by the Treasury Secretary himself 
(Paulson, Steel, & Nason, 2008). They traced the roots of the problems to HR.3762 The 
Corporate Responsibility Act (Library of Congress, 2002).  
An interim report commissioned by the US Treasury Department, entitled "The 
Competitive Position of the U.S. Public Equity Market", was published about the same 
time as McKinsey's. The final version, completed towards the end of 2007, said the first 
had stimulated much discussion, but added: "Not nearly enough has been done. What 
is still lacking is commitment and political leadership. This Report, therefore, is a 
second wake-up call" (Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, 2007, p. v). "By any 
meaningful measure, the competitiveness of the U.S. public equity market has 
deteriorated significantly in recent years," it added (2007, p. 1). Since 1996, the US share 
of global initial public offerings had "dramatically dropped". Between January and 
September 2007, only just over 10 per cent of new international equity offerings were 
made on US-based exchanges. The level had been 44.5 per cent in 1996 and averaged 
21.2 per cent for the decade from then until 2005, it said.  The picture was even more 
dire if you looked at the value of those new issues. US exchanges raised just 7.7 per 
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cent of the total value of global IPOs through the first nine months of 2007, compared 
to 58.8 per cent in 1996 and an average of 30.9 per cent in the period from 1996 to 2005. 
It was small consolation that the US share in 2007 was a bit higher than in 2006, when 
US exchanges captured 8.9 per cent of global IPOs by number and 6.6 per cent, 
measured by value. In 1996, eight of the 20 largest global IPOs were conducted in the 
US. A decade later only one was. To make matters worse, US companies in increasing 
numbers were going overseas to raise capital, eschewing US exchange listings 
(Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, 2007, p. 2). 
The message was loud and clear: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was too much of a 
straightjacket. A lighter-touch regime would make American equity capital markets 
more competitive. But towards the end of 2007, US capital markets weren't really 
listening. Credit markets had seized up in fear of defaults and insolvencies that might 
arise from distressed selling of mortgage-backed securities issued by US investment 
banks on the back of lending in what had been fierce competition for customers in 
Florida, California and a few others states where household incomes weren't really 
high enough to afford the houses they aspired to hold. Unlike previous property 
booms, this one had been conducted increasingly by mortgage brokers. The originators 
might have been banks themselves, but they were working under the guidance of the 
big investment banks on Wall Street, which, under guidance of the credit rating 
agencies, then packaged the mortgages into tranches, and using derivatives built credit 
default protection around them, making the new "collateralised debt obligations" 
worthy of Triple A credit ratings and investment-grade status. These instruments 
found their way in the billions into the portfolio of banks and investment institutions 
around the world. "Originate to distribute" became the buzzword to easy money.  
Moreover, the "originate-to-distribute" model created what some bankers called a 
"third bite at the cherry". Not only were there fees for originating and a second set for 
distributing. By getting the loans off their balance sheets, they had freed up capital to 
lend even more. It is easy to see, in hindsight, how the bubble inflated almost all by 
itself. US capital markets had begun to look worse than merely accident-prone. They 
began to feel lethal.  
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Waste makes haste  
The roots of the problem can be traced to the dot-com bubble of the second half of 
the 1990s, when technology stocks pushed higher on a speculative wave looking for 
new methods of consumption and new economies in operations from the productivity 
advances offered by fast computing and cheap telecommunications. Combined with 
hyperactive investment banking, the mix grew toxic.  
Enron Corp. became an unlikely emblem of the boom. With its core business in gas 
transmission networks, it didn't look like a dot-com technology stock. But with the 
acquisition of gas pipelines in the American northwest came fibre-optic 
telecommunications capacity. Enron had already leveraged its gas network into a 
resource for trading natural gas futures and options, becoming in effect an investment 
bank with a small gas distribution business attached. With the addition of 
telecommunications capacity and the prospect that derivatives markets in bandwidth 
would develop soon, it was well placed to ride the dot-com wave further into bank-like 
activities, using its position in physical market to originate a source of supply to 
distribute through derivatives. Moreover, closer scrutiny of the accounts showed that 
bad business had been pushed off the balance sheet into special purposes entities in 
which the chief financial officer of Enron was a principal, with quiet guarantees of 
assistance. The bad business was forgotten but not gone. Towards the end of 2001, 
Enron went spectacularly bust (Wearing, 2005 gives a good account of the case).  
Several months later, accounting fraud brought down WorldCom, an even bigger 
player in the US telecommunications market (see Wearing, 2005 for details). Both firms 
had been advised and audited by Arthur Andersen. As lawsuits mounted – and other 
financial problems came to light, especially among Andersen clients – the firm 
imploded, leaving just four major accounting practices with an obvious capability of 
auditing the accounts of major multinational corporations.  The outrage, including 
from among the workforce of Enron who had been encouraged to invest their pensions 
in Enron stock, led to swift government action.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced in Congress in June 2002, within days of 
discovery of the problems at WorldCom. It passed swiftly and was signed into law in 
early August. A short, clear and remarkably jargon-free piece of legislation, it set in 
motion the latest change in law affecting US corporations since the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Those Acts arose – after four years 
and a change in President – from the ashes of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the 
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resulting Great Depression and the loss of confidence in American capital markets and, 
for many, in capitalism itself.  
The provisions of Sarbox31 brought greater accountability for corporate officers and 
greater supervision for auditors. Under Section 302 chief executive and chief financial 
officers were required, under threat of criminal prosecution, to attest to the accuracy of 
their financial statements, both audited annual accounts and quarterly, unaudited 
reports to shareholders. Section 201 forbade the audit firm from engaging in a number 
of activities, including installing financial reporting systems, advising on asset 
valuations or provided internal audit assistance, things that might compromise the 
integrity of the external audit. The act also created a new government agency, the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, working under the direction of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to oversee the accounting and audit professions.  
New listing rules introduced in parallel by the New York Stock Exchange (New 
York Stock Exchange, 2003) and Nasdaq (Nasdaq, 2008) demanded greater board 
independence, financial expertise independent of the CFO on the audit committee, and 
an independent chairman or senior outside director to whom investors could vent their 
issues with senior management.  
The biggest changes came, somewhat surprisingly, from the short, concise part of 
the Act known as Section 404. It demanded that issuer create and report on their 
systems of internal control. Top management would be held accountable for them and 
would have to report on their effectiveness. Accounting firms conducting audits of 
financial statements would have to attest to those assessments. 
The rush to do something after Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco and the other 
cases of corporate governance failures was understandable but not without critics. 
Even inside the SEC doubts emerged. Paul Atkins, one of its five commissioners and its 
longest serving one, said: "The experience with Section 404 is a reminder that it is better 
to get things right the first time around. In the face of uncertainty, the SEC too often 
has exhibited a determination to move forward with extreme haste. Not surprisingly, 
this course of action only invites trouble." Look at all the work the SEC did on 
corporate governance: "All the SEC has to show for its efforts in this area are two 
adverse court decisions and considerable uncertainty in the industry" (Atkins, 2007).  
                                                     
31 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has acquired a number of nicknames; "Sarbox" was quickly joined by 
"SOx" and "SOX" in the Washington nomenclature. We will use the first of these, except in 
direct citations from other writers. 
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Academic studies also found the measures off-target. Roberta Romano, in two 
provocatively titled reviews, called Sarbox "quack" governance, saying that mandates 
passed in Sarbox were not likely to improve audit quality or otherwise enhance firm 
performance (Romano, 2005a, 2005b).  She proposed instead that many of its 
provisions could be made voluntary, on a basis akin to the comply-or-explain regime 
of corporate governance in the UK and elsewhere:  
The alternative of treating SOX as a set of default rules could be 
implemented by the SEC under its general exemptive authority, but it 
is improbable that the agency will do so in a comprehensive way, in 
part because it is still stinging from being perceived as lagging 
behind state regulators in finding and prosecuting entire financial 
industry sectors for alleged misconduct. It is therefore important to 
work to educate the media, the public, political leaders, and agency 
personnel regarding the reality that Congress committed a public 
policy blunder in enacting SOX’s corporate governance mandates and 
that there is a need to rectify the error (Romano, 2005a, p. 44).  
Lawrence Brown and Marcus Caylor (2006) reviewed the Sarbox reforms from the 
vantage point of the governance metrics developed by Paul Gompers and his 
colleagues (2003).  Brown and Caylor found that between them, Sarbox and the 
governance reforms at NYSE and Nasdaq addressed only one of the seven measures 
considered important for corporate valuation. Nor did the Sarbox measures address 
directly the six factors identified by Lucian Bebchuk and his colleagues as signifying 
entrenchment of a board and management that would prevent shareholders achieving 
the greatest possible valuation (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2004).  
The political imperative that led to Sarbox was intended as a way to protect both 
investors and employees, not just to support corporate valuations. Sarbox was 
designed as a series of mechanisms to prevent abuse, to put obstacles in the way of 
management caprice, and to reduce the dangers associated with the conflicts of interest 
inherent especially in the relationship between auditors and management.  
Paul Healy and Krishna Palepu's account of the problems at Enron (Healy & 
Palepu, 2003) shows how the company was able to attract large sums of capital for 
what they termed a questionable business model and then use accounting and financial 
manoeuvres to hype its share price, which then fed the incentive plans to which senior 
management were entitled. One Enron audit committee meeting during the crucial 
period lasted just 85 minutes and dealt with an agenda of nine items including internal 
controls, adequacy of reserves, litigation risks, credit risks, communication with 
investors and analysts, and management use of company aircraft. Despite a high 
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degree of financial expertise among its members, the audit committee did not 
challenge several important transactions that were motivated principally by financial 
reporting rather than business reasons (Healy & Palepu, 2003).  
Drawing in part on their analysis and on other accounts of Enron's issues, we can 
construct a comparison (see Table 8) with the Sarbox provisions that suggests that the 
legislation swept a variety of governance concerns into the legislation and left outside 
elements that were central to the company's governance failure. 
To be fair, internal controls were laxer in the other cases of accounting and 
governance malfeasance at the time, and especially at WorldCom, which was the case 
that led Congress to "step on the gas" of governance reform in the middle of 2002. But 
apart from these, this analysis suggests, albeit tentatively, that Congress rather missed 
the mark. Having left so many of the issues unaddressed or only indirectly treated, 
Congress may well have been inviting the devious to try again to shoot at the centre of 
the target while everyone was distracted by repairs to those elements of corporate life 
perforated by the misdirected blast from Section 404.  
International reaction 
Sarbanes-Oxley mandated that the new rules should apply to all issuers of 
securities in US capital markets, not just issuers domiciled in the United States. 
Moreover, audit firms based outside the US would have to register with the PCAOB if 
they worked on the accounts of any companies with securities listed in the US. The 
reaction was intense. Looking at his 2002 accounts, the finance director of the German-
American carmaker DaimlerChrysler said compliance with Sarbox would cost the 
company at least $10 million, and that was even before the full implications of Section 
404 came to be understood (Nordberg, 2003). Daimler would have faced something on 
the scale even if it had not acquired Chrysler Corp. in 1998, as it had listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange as Daimler-Benz AG four years earlier. His was only one in a 
wave of protests about the heavy-handed and extraterritorial nature of the legislation 
and resulting regulatory changes. Shortly thereafter, a group of eleven business 
organizations, led by the European Association of Listed Companies, appealed to the 
SEC to modify its rules and make it easier for companies to delist their securities and 
deregister with the SEC (EALIC, 2004). The rules, designed for a period when US 
institutional investors had much less ability to invest using overseas exchanges, 
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seemed anachronistic in increasingly global capital markets. Indeed, any companies 
that might manage to comply with the letter of the law could still run afoul of the rules 
accidentally – merely because a few more US-based investors had purchased some 
stock (Nordberg, 2004). The SEC, chastened by such a huge market failure under its 
watch, became uncharacteristically open to suggestions from beyond US shores. The 
process took time, but eventually the SEC agreed to accept most of the EALIC 
suggestions with effect from mid-2007 (SEC, 2007a).  
 











Silent (accounting rules later 
changed to require option 
expensing) 
0 
Marking trading assets to 
market prices, based on 
management valuation of price 
trends, often as far as 20 years 
into the future 
4 
Silent (accounting rules now 
make even wider use of 
marking-to-market) 
- 
Use of derivatives to create 
structured products 
4 Silent - 
Creation of special purpose 
vehicles to take structured 
products off-balance sheet 
4 
Indirectly through PCOAB 
actions 
0 
Conventions between Enron 
and SPEs created a divergence 
between economic reality and 
accounting numbers 
4 Silent - 
Deceptive reporting of 
ownership of SPEs, allowing it 
to avoid consolidation of 
accounts 
4 
Silent (but legal action 
against managers set 
precedent in law) 
0 
Use by SPEs of Enron stock and 
financial guarantees as 
collateral for hedges on illiquid 
investments, thus defeating 
the purpose of the hedge 
4 
Silent (but action from 
PCAOB and FASB) 
0 
CFO role as partner in SPEs, 
raising questions over his 
fiduciary duties to Enron 
shareholders 
4 
Indirectly through Section 
302 (legal action against 
managers also set precedent 
in law) 
0 




Silent (this was a business 
issue and was disclosed) 
0 
Top management's close 
involvement with auditors 
4 
Section 201 addressed 
auditor independence 
+ 
Audit committee's infrequent 
and short meetings 
4 
Silent (but best practice and 
exchange listing rules 
address) 
0 
Audit committee expertise 1 
Silent (but best practice and 
exchange listing rules 
address) 
0 
Related party transactions 4 Silent - 
Auditor dependence on 
consulting fees 
4 
Section 201 addresses 
conflicts 
+ 
Fund managers misled by 
financial statements 
2 
Silent on fund manager 
obligations 
- 
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The result was a move by some foreign issuers to delist in the US and thus escape 
the obligation to comply with the strictures of Sarbanes-Oxley. The New York Stock 
Exchange reported in its 10-K filing for 2007 that 49 companies from abroad had either 
delisted or announced their intention to do so (NYSE, 2008). This outcome – much 
anticipated as the SEC slowly moved towards its decision – lay at the core of the fears 
about the future competitiveness of US capital markets, as evidenced in the Schumer-
Bloomberg statement (McKinsey & Co., 2007) and the US Treasury Department report 
(Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, 2007).  
Delisting obviously saves costs and aggravation, as well as the need for companies 
to reconcile their accounts to US generally accepted accounting principles. But in 
parallel, the SEC had invited comment on a proposal to end the reconciliation 
requirement for issuers using international financial reporting standards (SEC, 2007b), 
as European firms were, another sign of the changes in the financial climate in the US. 
Convergence of US accounting rules and IFRS was also underway with the aim of 
achieving a common standard that went beyond the mere mutual recognition of 
equivalence.  
The change raises several questions, however:  
• To what extent were US exchanges themselves made less competitive by the 
measured that cascaded from Sarbanes-Oxley? 
Fund managers misled by self-
serving sell-side analyst 
reports 
2 
Silent (addressed obliquely 
through unrelated cases 
brought against banks by 
New York State's Attorney) 
- 
Fund managers lacked 
incentives to seek out high-
quality information about the 
company (including index-
trackers) 
3 Silent - 
Close ties between sell-side 
analysts and corporate finance 
departments of investment 
banks 
2 
Silent (addressed obliquely 
through unrelated cases 
brought against banks by 
New York State's Attorney) 
- 
Peer pressure among sell-side 
analysts 
3 Silent - 
Financial Accounting Standards 
Board inaction over SPE 
accounting rules 
3 
Indirectly through PCAOB 
action 
0 
Credit rating agencies' failure 2 
Silent (addressed indirectly 
by SEC action on agency 
recognition and IOSCO code 
of conduct) 
- 
Fear of reprisal for 
whistleblowing 
3 
Indirectly through SEC 
action 
+ 





to crack nut? 
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• To what extent was the advantage that other markets may have achieved 
sustainable and of real value?  
• To what extent did the perceived lack of competitiveness of US exchanges reflect 
a lack of competitiveness of US capital markets generally?  
• In what ways might Sarbanes-Oxley have brought benefits to US 
competitiveness and the foreign issuers who choose to stay, or indeed to join? 
• To what extent was the failure of Sarbanes-Oxley to deal with the real issues in 
Enron a factor in the perceived loss of competitiveness of US capital markets?  
Competitiveness of US exchanges 
Exchanges have long been symbols of capital markets. "Wall Street" means the US; 
"The City" means the UK; the "Frankfurt Bourse" (almost) means Germany, and so on. 
In a time of immobile capital and domestic markets, this was entirely appropriate. But 
as capital markets integrate, how much sense does that still make? Moreover, 
demutualization of stock exchanges stripped most of them of their regulatory and 
therefore policymaking roles, making them less symbolic of the country in which they 
happen to reside. One consequence that faced these newly listed corporations whose 
business happened to be running stock exchanges was the need to make profits 
through innovation and the type of cost reductions that would arise from consolidating 
the increasingly technology-led back offices.  
If the measure is, then, the competitiveness of the exchange, perhaps it would help 
to look at the exchange's business model. The viability of, say, the New York Stock 
Exchange depends less on its foreign listings than on 1) the total number of listed 
entities (ongoing fees from listed entities), 2) the number of new listings (the joining 
fees, which are one-offs and bring with them a temporary surge in trading), and 3) the 
volume of transactions. Transactions income is the largest, which in turn depends on 
liquidity and depth of the order book.  
As the issues over the competitiveness of US capital markets have been couched by 
the reports in terms of number of listings, however, let's consider NYSE's performance. 
According to its 10-K filing for 2007, NYSE Euronext reported a surge of new listings in 
2007, both in terms of number of issues and volume of money raised (see Table 9). The 
NYSE figures include listed operating companies, closed-end funds, and exchange 
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traded funds, but do not include NYSE Arca or structured products listed on the 
NYSE. These figures include but are not exclusively foreign issuers, of course. 
Table 9 - New listings on NYSE 
 2007 2006 2005 
Number 282 199 192 
Capital raised ($m) $34,231 $25,853 $21,305 
 
But if the strength of the exchange is the indicator of the strength of competitiveness 
of US capital markets, then NYSE doesn't seem to be in particular trouble on the new 
issues side. One might argue that having liquid, sought-after ETFs would auger better 
for NYSE's future profitability than an equal number of illiquid foreign stocks where 
the bulk of trading occurs on the company's home-market exchange.  
How is Europe faring by comparison? What better place to look than in same 
document, for Euronext's performance on the same criteria? Euronext, which merged 
with NYSE in 2007, embraces the stock exchanges in France, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Portugal, as well as the derivatives exchange in London known as Euronext-Liffe.  
Table 10 - New listings on Euronext 
 2007 2006 2005 
Number 140 142 178 
Capital raised ($m) $13,286 $26,862 $21,438 
 
Table 10 shows us that Euronext's share of the new issues business was quite 
lacklustre, perhaps even pathetic in 2007. Perhaps the people at Euronext's branches 
were distracted more than their US counterparts by the convulsions associated with the 
merger. This shows the NYSE Euronext company facing operational issues, but it also 
underscores perhaps how the health of the exchange company is losing its symbolism 
for the strength of a domestic capital market.  
London was, along with Hong Kong, the major beneficiary of the supposed exodus 
from New York and wariness about new listings in US. Comparable figures aren't 
published routinely by the London Stock Exchange, but its annual report for the year 
ended March 31, 2007 indicates a sizeable volume and number of new issues. Its fiscal 
year 2007 saw 503 new issues come to market, and the total number of companies 
quoted either on the Main Market or on the "junior" platform known as AIM rise to 
3,245. The capital raised in new and secondary placements jumped 57 per cent to £53.7 
billion. The exchange was especially proud to trumpet that 26 US companies had 
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chosen to use the AIM market to raise funds, raising the total to 67. Twenty-five 
Chinese joined AIM as well, for a total of 46. 
Sustainable competitive advantage  
What these figures mask, however, is the shift in composition of the London 
exchange's mix of listed companies. The number of shares listed on the Main Market 
has now fallen five years in a row to 1,608, down by 464 or more than a fifth in that 
period. The Main Market is where the larger and more liquid shares trade, the ones 
that are targets of the large asset management firms that trade large blocks. AIM, by 
contrast, has much wider bid-ask spreads and many stocks simply don't trade because 
of the lack of liquidity, the absence of investment research coverage, and their narrow 
appeal. For the future profitability of the exchange company, this shift in balance from 
the Main Market towards AIM may prove counterproductive. The decline in Main 
Market listings can be attributed to takeover activity, through both mergers and 
private-equity-driven withdrawals of companies from the market. The latter take 
companies away for extended purposes, after which they may return to listing, as the 
retailer Debenhams did in the exchange's 2007 fiscal year, raising £950 million. But the 
former have recently involved bids from foreign companies with their primary listings 
on other exchanges. These can involve a long-term impairment to trading volumes in 
London, and therefore to transaction-fee revenue. 
The principal differences between AIM and the Main Market underscore another 
potential source of future problems. AIM is a lightly regulated market. It is not 
recognized as an exchange by the European Union, and its trading isn't overseen by the 
Financial Services Authority in the UK. Instead, the London Stock Exchange acts as 
regulator as well as exchange owner. It works through investment banks and brokers 
to enforce standards, which sponsor and are supposed to guide companies in their 
disclosure and reporting practice.  
Moreover, companies quoted on AIM are not expected to meet the even the 
comply-or-explain strictures of the standards Combined Code of corporate governance 
that form part of the listing requirement for companies on the Main Market. Compared 
with the US regime of quarterly filings with the SEC, Sarbanes-Oxley and NYSE or 
Nasdaq listing rules, what's surprising is that even more companies haven't gone to 
AIM.  
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The strain was evident in the controversy that surrounded a visit to London in 
early 2007 by Roel Campos, then one of the commissioners of the SEC, when he likened 
the AIM market to a casino. John Thain, then CEO of the New York Stock Exchange, 
followed up with statement criticizing the lax corporate governance standards on AIM. 
Writing in The Guardian newspaper, Marianne Barriaux commented: "There are plenty 
of examples to back up the criticism" (2007).  
Exchanges as symbols of national advantage 
New listings on markets like AIM get a high level of exposure, partly due to the 
publicity machine of the exchanges that support them. A study by scholars at the 
London School of Economics, commissioned by the London Stock Exchange, defended 
the market's role showing that although large proportion were early-stage businesses 
operating in high-risk sectors, the failure rate on AIM was low, less than three per cent 
in four years (Arcot, Black, & Owen, 2007). But that isn't the only view of these types of 
markets. A 2006 survey of users showed that 41 per cent of investors claim AIM’s 
performance was "due to the poorer quality of companies coming to market" (Baker 
Tilly & Faegre & Benson, 2007).  
Market for new companies serve a valuable economic purpose, giving growing 
companies a chance to accelerate their growth through the access to external capital, 
taking advantage of the transparency that a "listing" gives to reduce the risk to 
investors and therefore, so the theory goes, the cost of capital to the company. That 
encourages entrepreneurship and stimulates job creation, innovation and eventually 
profitability and tax revenues. For a while, we live with a regime of transparency, 
regulation and corporate governance that's less strict than we demand of larger 
companies that are better able to bear the costs of compliance. It worth it because the 
small companies of today, so the theory goes, are the big companies of the future – 
some of them, at least.  
It's less clear that facilitating access to capital for foreign issuers has quite the same 
beneficial effects for the listing venue. Financial services are clearly a strong point of 
the economies of both New York and London, something that Michael Porter noted as 
a source of national competitiveness (Porter, 1990). But Britain benefits from a Russian 
company coming to the AIM market to the extent of investment banking fees, listing 
fees and transaction fees associated with trading the in stock, which in turn pay 
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salaries and bonuses to City workers and generate tax receipts on any surplus. Benefits 
to the real economy are less obvious, though it's conceivable that company executives, 
visiting the UK for investor relations purposes, might become familiar with UK 
companies in related businesses and strike up joint ventures or supply contracts whose 
effects would boost the exchange's home country.  
Indeed, as stock exchanges become more like ordinary companies, the link 
between the exchange company and national competitiveness gets more tenuous. 
Trading itself is dematerializing as it moves to electronic platforms accessed from 
anywhere in the world (except perhaps the US; institutional investors can, however, 
still trade, though perhaps by placing a long-distance telephone call, or by using 
email). Moreover, regulatory changes like the adoption in the European Union of the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, known as MiFID, have increased the scope 
and scale of competition for financial transactions. Electronic trading platforms almost 
devoid of nationality are now free to compete for transactions services, and investment 
banks, in Europe at least, may now match orders internally without going to the 
exchange at all. The London Stock Exchange may still be a UK company despite having 
acquired Borsa Italiana, and NYSE Euronext may feel much more like a US company 
than a French one. But it's less than clear the Euronext-Amsterdam is really very Dutch 
or that any of these will stay that way as trading fragments across a wide variety of 
platforms. It is materially different now that exchanges have largely lost their 
policymaking and regulatory roles.  
Benefits from Sarbox 
If the benefits of markets to national competitiveness may be in question, perhaps 
there's a benefit of companies from associating themselves with national regulatory 
regimes that are perceived to offer a higher standard of investor protection. A reason 
often cited for why companies list on capital markets outside their home countries is to 
gain easier access to investors. But what makes that access "easier" is that it means 
achieving a lower cost of capital. The Russian company, for example, that is "good 
enough" to list in London is presumed to have demonstrated a quality of transparency 
and accountability sufficiently high to reduce any stigma there is from being based in a 
country without a long history of property rights or commitment to capital markets or 
indeed the market economy in general.  
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The issue surrounding the quality of listings is, therefore, important for the 
reputation of national capital markets. The perceived excessive regulation in the US 
that followed the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley raised questions in the opposite direction: 
was the net economic benefit of such a heavy-handed approach to regulation still 
positive?  
The value to a non-US company of a listing on US capital markets has been 
demonstrated on several occasions. In the face of pressure from Sarbanes-Oxley, a 
study commissioned by the Bank of New York, the leading sponsor of American 
Depositary Receipts through which most foreign listings in the US are achieved, 
showed benefits for companies' cost of capital. The work, conducted by the 
consultancy Oxford Metrica, showed that having depositary receipts trading on 
markets other than the home country added up to 10 per cent to shareholder value in 
the first year of listing. But taking up a US listing added a further 15 per cent. 
Moreover, terminating a DR programme destroyed 20 per cent of value (Knight & 
Pretty, 2003).  
The timing of the research – before issuers felt the full impact of Sarbanes-Oxley – 
more than its sponsorship raised some doubt about how relevant its conclusions might 
be for future decisions, especially in view of the competition for new listings coming 
from London and the increasing irrelevance of national borders for investment 
decisions by large asset management firms. Since then, however, new studies have 
emerged revisiting these themes. Joseph Piotroski and Suraj Srinivasan found that US 
capital markets mattered for smaller companies with perceived lower governance 
standards. After controlling for company characteristics and other determinants of 
their exchange choice, they found that the listing preferences of large foreign firms 
choosing between US exchanges and the London Stock Exchange's Main Market did 
not change following Sarbox. But the choice for a smaller company of listing on 
Nasdaq or on the AIM market in London showed rather different results. "The 
screening of smaller firms with weaker governance attributes from U.S. exchanges is 
consistent with the heightened governance costs imposed by the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act 
increasing the bonding-related benefits of a U.S. listing" (Piotroski & Srinivasan, 2008).  
Another study found a two per cent gain in foreign companies' value from being 
subject to the rigours of Sarbox. "This suggests that minority investors regard SOX as 
providing them with benefits in excess of the costs of complying with the regulation," 
the authors wrote (Duarte, Kong, Young, & Siegel, 2007). US-based companies fared 
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even better: Sarbox increased the value of medium-sized ones by between six and 11 
per cent.   
Failures of Sarbox and their impact 
These findings suggest we ought to take a nuanced view of the value and 
drawbacks that arose from enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. Costs of 
compliance were certainly great. They fell perhaps disproportionately on medium-
sized companies, which may have lacked the accounting and compliance infrastructure 
to cope with the additional data collection and analysis but were too large to escape 
into the category of "small" companies granted exceptions from Sarbox in terms of both 
its effective date and the extent of the reporting requirements. The legislation brought 
benefits in terms of restoring investor confidence in US capital markets and asserting a 
higher level of corporate governance and accountability than had previously been the 
case.  
Without doubt, Sarbanes-Oxley prompted a number of foreign issuers to abandon 
their US listings. They might have done anyway, as the cost of listings on any foreign 
market has been thrown increasingly into question over recent years, as institutional 
investors learned to use markets other than their home country ones and as 
transactions came to be concentrated on markets with the greater liquidity rather than 
the greater proximity to the trader.  
But let's recall that the legislation, whatever its virtues and vices, had failed to 
address in any significant way several of the most important failings at Enron, the case 
that was most centrally responsible for the loss of confidence in US markets as well as 
for the losses investors and employees suffered in the wake of its collapse. Would this 
missed opportunity – this opportunity cost – come back to haunt us?  
The subprime link 
On August 9, 2007, trading in many credit markets around the world came 
suddenly to what seemed a complete halt. The Frankfurt-based European Central Bank 
injected nearly €100 million into money markets (FT.com, 2007). It was the first public 
sign of a problem that had been growing for months, perhaps even a year or two, as 
the US housing market suffered a downturn after several years of heady growth in 
both prices and new building. The boom in activity was funded by cheap credit 
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coupled with the development of wholesale markets for collateralized debt obligations 
all around the world. Two banks in Germany, the state-owned Sachsen LB in Leipzig 
and Industrie Kredit-Bank in Düsseldorf, suffered severe liquidity crises brought on by 
their exposure through "conduits" to the credit default risk that arose from the looming 
possibility of mortgage foreclosures on parts of the portfolio of assets bundled into the 
CDOs they had purchased.  
The infection was global, and over the next six months banks around the world 
would report losses and impairments of assets. It is still early for academic or 
regulatory research to trace and evaluate all the causes for this sudden market failure. 
But the price tag – perhaps a trillion dollars – dwarfed Enron and WorldCom and all 
the other failings that had given rise to the previous financial crisis just a few years 
before. US capital-market practice was, once again, under serious question. Indeed, 
some questioned the integrity of the financial system as a whole, with calls for new 
approaches to governance of financial firms and higher standards of personal ethics 
(for an example, see de Rothschild, 2008).  
The credit "squeeze" became a "crunch" before the media and many market 
participants settled on "crisis" as the correct description. There were significant 
differences, of course, from the previous crisis, set off by Enron. This one started in and 
affected mainly credit markets, not equities. The proximate cause was the busting of an 
asset bubble inflated by years of low real interest rates causing housing prices to 
escalate beyond the means of ordinary workers – the so-called "subprime" borrowers – 
to pay for them. Enron's fall, too, stemmed from an asset bubble, but it was a bubble 
largely of the company's own making, aided or abetted by its auditors.  
Despite the differences, there are some eerie similarities. Both involved hyperactive 
financial intermediaries. Both involved use of new instruments of finance to offload 
risk, and in particular the use of off-balance sheet entities to disguise (in the case of 
Enron) or just "distribute" (in the case of subprime CDOs) the risk. The accountants at 
Arthur Andersen, like others in the profession, pursued a business model using one set 
of fees – audit – to accelerate another – consultancy. The subprime crisis involved 
banks using one set of fees – mortgage origination – to accelerate another – distribution 
– and with the added element that their capital would then be free to originate again, 
and distribute again, and again and again.  
Enron's collapse was also brought about by excessive trust in numbers and the 
experts who created them. Derivatives modelling taught both Enron and the 
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investment banks that packaged up mortgages into CDOs that it was possible to do 
something no one had been able to do before – eliminate risk. In both cases, the credit 
ratings agencies agreed, and in the case of the subprime industry they actively 
participated in the development of the market but modelling the business idea ahead 
of time, and then validating the model after the fact. But let's remember: without a 
fundamental shift in the economic background, risk doesn't go away – it just goes into 
hiding. 
If we compare Enron and the Sarbox response with the root causes of the subprime 
crisis, interesting lessons emerge (see Table 11). Many of the failings that we saw in 
Enron – the use of creative accounting through off-balance vehicles and the excessive 
faith in the modelling of market responses to complex financial instruments – recur in 
the subprime world.  








Stock options-based remuneration 4 Silent  
Bonus-led remuneration of 
investment bankers; option-
based for managers 
Marking trading assets to market 
prices, based on management 
valuation of price trends, often as 
far as 20 years into the future 
4 Silent  Perhaps not an issue 
Use of derivatives to create 
structured products 
4 Silent 
Creation of CDOs and other 
structured finance instruments 
Creation of special purpose 
vehicles to take structured 
products off-balance sheet 
4 Indirect 
Creation of Structure 
Investment Vehicles and 
"conduits" to take risk off-
balance sheet 
Conventions between Enron and 
SPEs created a divergence between 
economic reality and accounting 
numbers 
4 Silent 
Lack of consolidation of SIVs 
within Basel II 
Deceptive reporting of ownership 
of SPEs, allowing it to avoid 
consolidation of accounts 
4 Silent Deception or self-deception?  
Use by SPEs of Enron stock and 
financial guarantees as collateral 
for hedges on illiquid investments, 
thus defeating the purpose of the 
hedge 
4 Silent 
Distribution of debt 
instruments freed capital for 
repeated lending 
CFO role as partner in SPEs, raising 
questions over his fiduciary duties 




Section 302  
Perhaps not an issue 
Write-downs of other assets, 
including telecommunications 
networks 
3 Silent  
Write-downs eventually forced 
the collapse of Bear Stearns, 
need for recapitalization 
among other investment banks 
Top management's close 
involvement with auditors 
4 Section 201  Perhaps not an issue 
Audit committee's infrequent and 
short meetings 
4 Silent Perhaps not an issue 
Audit committee expertise 1 Silent  Probably not an issue 
Related party transactions 4 Silent 
Were SIVs and conduits 
"related parties"? 
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Auditor dependence on consulting 
fees 
4 Section 201  
Intermediaries dependence on 
distribution fees on top of 
origination fees 
Fund managers misled by financial 
statements 
2 Silent  
Fund managers misled by 
expert guidance on risk 
modelling 
Fund managers misled by self-
serving sell-side analyst reports 
2 Silent  
Aggressive sell-side sales 
activity 
Fund managers lacked incentives 
to seek out high-quality 
information about the company 
(including index-trackers) 
3 Silent 
Fund managers lacked 
incentive to question modelling 
Close ties between sell-side 
analysts and corporate finance 
departments of investment banks 
2 Silent  Perhaps not an issue 
Peer pressure among sell-side 
analysts 
3 Silent Perhaps not an issue 
Financial Accounting Standards 
Board inaction over SPE accounting 
rules 
3 Indirectly  
Banking supervisors, Basel 
Committee silent on SIVs, 
conduits 
Credit rating agencies' failure 2 Silent  
IOSCO code, SEC recognition 
brought only nominal changes 
to agency practices 
Fear of reprisal for whistleblowing 3 Indirect Perhaps not an issue 




Internal controls strong, self-
control lacking 
 
Importantly, internal controls – over which so much ink was spilled and money 
was spent in Sarbanes-Oxley's infamous Section 404 – weren't particularly a problem at 
Enron. Management knew what it was doing. But during the subprime crisis, one bank 
– Société Générale – showed a spectacular lack of attention to internal control. But the 
problem had nothing to do with the subprime mortgage market.  
Conclusions and questions for further research 
The dust hasn't settled on the subprime mess and how it grew to infect banks and 
asset management firms so widely around the world. Bear Stearns faced a liquidity 
crisis leading to a fire sale to J.P. Morgan-Chase, orchestrated by the US Federal 
Reserve Board and funded, at least temporarily, by US taxpayers to the tune of $50 
billion.  Northern Rock, a UK mortgage lender that didn't engage much in subprime 
lending but got caught in the crossfire because it relied on interbank loans to finance its 
lending, ended up nationalized by the Bank of England. Perhaps £100 billion of 
taxpayer money is at risk, with the potential to distort the UK retail banking market for 
years. Sachsen LB and IKB both required intensive care from state-run institutions. The 
CEOs and chairmen of banks ranging from Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and UBS lost their 
jobs, though none seems particularly short of funds themselves.  
This analysis is perforce quite preliminary. But it suggests that the opportunities 
we missed after Enron – that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the attendant regulatory 
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measures that it directly engendered also missed – may have entailed a massive 
opportunity cost. We spent too much time and money looking at internal controls – 
and especially the bottom-up documentation that the lawyers and accountants pushed 
on corporate management – despite SEC attempts, as early as 2005, to warn against 
excessive effort in complying with Section 404 (Nordberg, 2005a). 
And what of Sarbox Section 405? "Nothing in section 401, 402, or 404, the 
amendments made by those sections, or the rules of the Commission under those 
sections shall apply to any investment company registered under section 8 of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940," it reads (Library of Congress, 2002). Investment 
companies registered under the 1940 Act are mainly the mutual fund companies. But 
perhaps it created an air that financial institutions were, in some ways, exempt from 
learning its lessons.  
The answers to many of the questions must await research, though some deserve 
contemplation even before the data arrive:  
• How can we regulate the use the off-balance sheet vehicles to forestall another 
crash, where "regulate" means getting the right balance of fuel to reach the 
flame?  
• How should credit ratings work? The issuer-pays model is clearly broken. The 
user-pays model suffers from a deep-seated problem of free-riders.  
• How can we structure the oversight by boards of directors of the activities of 
investment banks that are now so complex that even the originators of the 
business cannot understand it, and the distributors cannot really get it off the 
books?  
• In global financial markets, how can we keep a connection between stewardship 
of assets and the liabilities they incur, whether on or off the balance sheet?  
• Now that western financial institutions may become deeply dependent upon 
equity capital from non-traditional sources, what changes do bank supervisors 
face? How should they play their new foreign-policy role?   
• How can we change the remuneration structures so that incentives remain, but 
without poisoning their purpose?  
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Postscript 
On the first anniversary of passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Cynthia Glassman, 
then a Securities and Exchange Commissioner, reflected on life in the world of financial 
regulation (Glassman, 2003). It was a statute that demonstrated how complex the job of 
cleaning up Wall Street had become. "Consider, in simpler times," she said, "that the 
mayor of New York City was able – quite literally – to clean up the street for 7 pounds, 
11 shillings, and one penny. That is how much it cost in 1788 to clean and repair the 
Wall Street sewer system. And, according to Financial History magazine, '[a]s late as the 
1840s, thousands of pigs roamed the streets of New York. Their job was garbage 
consumption'."  
Waste makes haste. Haste makes waste. 
 

 Page 121    
5. Politics in shareholder relations (book 
chapter) 
Status: Published as a chapter of the book H. K. Baker & R. 
Anderson, Eds. (2010), Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, 
Research, and Practice (pp. 409-425). Robert W. Kolb Series on Finance. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons.  
An institutional view of shareholders and activism  
Corporate governance is a field of many institutions, including the 
institutionalized practices within the group of actors known (somewhat confusingly in 
this context) as institutional investors. As discussed in Chapter 3, above, some 
investors occupy positions close to the centre of the field. Pension funds, the 
investment arms of insurance companies – in particular those which are themselves 
listed companies – and main traditional asset management firms operate under 
broadly similar points of references. Their trade associations often work together on 
lobbying and on occasion intervene together when corporate governance arrangements 
at specific companies deviate too far from the standards those organizations support.  
In recent years, the rise of hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds, as well as the 
growing prominence of non-UK institutional investors in UK markets, provide 
indicators that current arrangements were undergoing changes, at some times radical. 
What happened in the UK was replicated in other national markets around the world. 
If anything, the trend was stronger in other markets, which lacked the UK's match of 
large-scale asset management operations and large listed companies.  
Another shift has altered the investment landscape, with implications for 
institutional arrangements in corporate governance. Cross-border listings of some large 
corporations mean that large companies domiciled in one jurisdiction now have their 
primary listing on the stock market of another country, as discussed in the chapter 
above "Waste makes haste". Viewed through the lens of institutional theory, in 
particular Greenwood and Hinings (1996), such developments represent shifts the 
institutional and/or the market context, which may run counter to the values or 
interest of actors in which organizational field we use as our level of analysis, forming 
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part of the background needed for radical institutional change. They also look 
different, depending on whether you view the field from the vantage point of a 
corporate board, a mainstream investor, or an alternative investor; they depend as well 
on the stance those investors take, as the chapter seeks to describe.  
Although written as an attempt to provide a framework for practical analysis of 
the field, this essay may be seen as describing ways of view competing and conflicting 
institutional logics at work (Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2009), where an 
institutionalized view of shareholder value held by actors in one part of the field 
conflicts with the presence of multiple and divergent logics arising from the shifting 
market conditions. This is a theme to which we return in the concluding chapter. 
 
 Page 123    
The politics of shareholder activism  
(2010) 
Abstract: Shareholder activism is an exercise of power that is 
sometimes benign or threatening to the interests of corporate 
management, boards, and other shareholders. The complexity of 
these relationships helps explain the difficulties directors face in 
pursuing shareholders' interest. What arises, particularly in relation 
to the growth of hedge-fund activism, is greater dispersion of 
shareholder interests and growing questions about the legitimacy of 
how those interests are acted out in the political landscape of 
corporation governance. This chapter offers a framework to examine 
the stance that shareholders take when exercising or not exercising 
their power. Anticipating the expression of shareholder power 
involves assessing their intentions along three dimensions: (1) their 
attitude towards an individual stock (buy-hold-sell), (2) their 
approach to activism (docile, "walkers", or activist), and (3) their 
investment horizons (long-term, short-term, or "perverse" where 
shareholders’ economic interests do not coincide with their holdings).  
Introduction 
By the middle of 2008, big institutional investors had grown uneasy about their 
investments in the German carmaker Volkswagen AG (VW). Owning the shares had 
become too political. Porsche Automobil Holding SE held more than 30 percent of the 
shares. VW's supervisory board chairman, Ferdinand Piëch, was a member of the 
family that controls Porsche, which had become something of a corporate governance 
pariah by refusing to accept the unofficial norm of quarterly financial reporting in 
Germany. Porsche had also irritated the country's Social Democrats by dropping the 
Aktiengesellschaft legal form in favor of the new European Union Societas Europeas form 
that allowed Porsche to reduce representation of German workers on the supervisory 
board. Moreover, Piëch had ousted the VW chief executive in 2006 and then entered a 
court battle with the company's second largest shareholder; the state of Lower Saxony 
that held more the 20 percent of VW’s equity. Lower Saxony also benefited from a 
special law giving it veto power over important managerial and board decisions, a 
statute recently reinforced by the German parliament after the European Court of 
Justice ruled parts of the old law illegal. The European Commission had said that the 
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new version of what German news media called the "VW law" was illegal and Porsche 
agreed. But attempts at VW's annual meeting by other shareholders – including activist 
institutional investors – to challenge Porsche's creeping control of its rival carmaker fell 
on deaf ears (Milne, 2005, 2006; Milne, Williamson, & Tait, 2008).  
Within a few months Porsche used a derivative instrument known as a contract for 
difference to acquire an economic interest equivalent to about 75 percent of the stock. 
Although Porsche had not directly purchased 75 percent of the shares, under German 
law, the company was able to keep this fact a secret. Speculators, including hedge 
funds that had expected a fall in the price of VW and sold short, soon faced a mad 
scramble to cover their positions. VW shares soared by 400 percent, briefly making it 
the most valuable company in the world. Newspaper reporters began to liken Porsche 
itself to a giant hedge fund with a small carmaker attached (Schäfer & Mackintosh, 
2009).  
Shareholder activism is fundamentally a battle for power acted out in a political 
landscape that stretches from boardrooms through national legislatures and 
encompasses supranational organizations. The exercise of power by shareholders 
shapes and is shaped by the political force-fields of corporate governance. When public 
policy concerning private-sector companies is set, some shareholders make their voices 
heard as well. Sometimes, the goal is to ensure that shareholder power over 
management is strengthened. Sometimes, it is to avoid the erosion of power to 
employees or outside lobbies. Often, however, the goal is to wrest power away from 
other shareholders.  
An obvious and occasionally overlooked question when considering the forces that 
shape corporate governance is: What is in the shareholders’ best interests? One 
interests of one shareholder often do not coincide with those of others. Most of the 
time, diverging shareholder interests do not matter because shareholders are not often 
able to vote on matters of corporate policy. But for directors with their fiduciary 
responsibility to look after shareholder interests, understanding what is in the 
shareholders’ best interests represents an important question. The competing interests 
of shareholders arise from different stances that investors take to their investments. 
Shareholder interests constitute a complex picture of rivalry for the high ground. The 
rivalry shapes the way shareholders vote at company annual meetings, how they vie 
for directors’ attention, and how they seek to influence the public policy debate on the 
enterprise’s future. The discussion of activism focuses mainly on the approaches that 
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institutional investors take. They dominate the investment landscape, even in the 
United States, where private persons – retail investors – give a greater sense of 
"democracy" to shareholder capitalism than in many other countries around the world. 
These private individuals, unless extremely wealthy and willing to take risks, are 
rarely able to gain a voice in the political debate that sets the policy of individual 
companies and the framework of laws and regulations in which boards operate. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the role that shareholder activism plays 
in corporate affairs. The first section gives a history of activism, showing how the 
practice has changed, especially as hedge funds have become activist investors, and 
discussing the issues that type of activism raises. The next two sections develop a 
model called the Shareholder Stance. They explore how different shareholders' 
interests can collide and how coalitions of shareholders can develop over issues, 
despite the different approaches to their investments. The next section shows how 
these differing stances can lead to conflict over policy decisions, leading to conclusions 
that suggest the difficulty in identifying what "shareholder value" means when 
activism is viewed as a political process.  
Issues in shareholder activism 
Many people, including policymakers in major countries, believe that shareholders 
ought to actively engage with the managements and boards of the companies in which 
they invest. In Britain, for example, the government has encouraged institutional 
investors, who collectively own more than 80 percent of the equity in U.K. listed 
companies, to vote their shares. Pension funds have been under pressure to publish 
their voting records so that beneficiaries can judge their performance. But in the minds 
of many corporate executives, a difference exists between shareholders being active 
and being activists. From its origins in the efforts of small shareholders not to be 
overlooked, the evolution of shareholder activism has resulted in institutional 
investors ousting management, changing a firm’s strategic direction, or altering a 
company's direction. With the addition of activist hedge funds to the mix in the past 
few years, some writers such as Lipton (2008) now see a condition in which 
shareholder activism is on steroids. 
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Naming and shaming 
The practice of naming and shaming began in the United States during the 1940s 
when a change in securities regulation gave shareholders the right to offer resolutions 
for consideration at corporate annual meetings. However, there were restrictions: 
proposals had to be "proper subject for action by securities holders" (for elaboration, 
see Gillan & Starks, 2007, p. 56). In the 1970s, many such resolutions were the product 
of a handful of "gadfly" investors, private investors including Lewis and John Gilbert 
and Evelyn Davis. These “gadfly” investors demanded higher dividends or other 
shareholder-friendly changes in company policy through a combination of direct 
agitation at annual meetings and skillful use of the media to publicize their efforts. 
Other activists came from religious groups and from those espousing political causes, 
often adopting the techniques of the gadflies (Marens, 2002).  
In the mid-1980s came the addition of research-led programs, backed by pension 
funds and other institutional investors to seek out underperforming companies and 
effect changes in direction. Robert Monks used his LENS asset management company 
and his research firm Institutional Shareholder Services to identify issues with 
corporate governance practices in companies. He built coalitions of investors including 
large, public-sector pension funds such as the California Public Employees Retirement 
System (CalPERS) to demand changes from corporate managements as well as 
legislative and regulatory actions that would give shareholders a bigger say in setting 
corporate policy and selecting directors.  
Ward, Brown, and Graffin (2009) found that naming and shaming poor performers 
had an effect on share prices, as institutional investors reacted to a reputable signal, in 
their case, the Council of Institutional Investors and its focus list. But, they found the 
investors' reaction was less pronounced in the case of companies with boards that were 
seen as independent of management. Those boards responded to the signal by 
changing management incentives to favor a change in direction. 
These efforts are often confrontational as these activists frequently use the media to 
challenge corporate decisions and muster support for their positions from other 
investors. By contrast, much of this form of shareholder activism in Europe takes place 
behind closed doors. Asset managers occasionally join together to discuss issues with 
companies in their portfolios.  Asset managers, however, must bear in mind the rules 
about not acting so closely together that they might be deemed to be "acting in concert" 
and thus be forced to make a takeover bid. The Association of British Insurers and the 
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National Association of Pension Funds in the United Kingdom, whose members have 
investments in financial markets around the world, will sometimes organize meetings 
with company executives and directors to seek to resolve issues or change the board's 
thinking. Seldom do these encounters reach the glare of public attention. "If our 
engagement ever reaches the front page of the Financial Times," one pension fund 
manager states, "that is because it has failed" (in a private conversation with the 
author).  
A somewhat different approach can be seen in perhaps the most vocal of European 
investment institutions, Hermes. Similar to CalPERS, the U.K. asset management firm 
Hermes, owned by the old British Telecommunications pension fund and the largest 
pension fund manager in the country, set up a special unit to conduct activist 
campaigns. Because of its size and its actuarial needs, Hermes invests across the entire 
U.K market. Hermes justifies its activism as the only way to improve the performance 
of its investments. Again like CalPERS, Hermes has a subsidiary to target 
underperforming companies, takes very large stakes, and then presses management for 
changes in policy and personnel − often in private but occasionally in public. A study 
of Hermes’ performance by (Becht, Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2008) shows abnormally 
high returns on its portfolio through engagement activities. The lesson: activism pays. 
Its success in the United Kingdom led Hermes to move into continental European and 
U.S. markets. 
Hedge fund activism 
Actions such as those undertaken by CalPERS and Hermes became in many ways 
the model for a new form of shareholder activism. Activist hedge funds use detailed 
analysis of a company's business to identify weaknesses. They then build large equity 
stakes to force management to listen. The biggest difference between the older-style 
activists, such as Monks and his allies, and the newer-style activists, such as hedge 
funds, is that the hedge funds exploit very high leverage. They also build positions in 
options and other derivative instruments that traditional asset managers would not be 
willing or allowed to use. As a result, hedge funds potentially seek policy changes 
designed to affect shorter-term performance than their more traditional counterparts. 
This short-term orientation frequently allows the popular press to portray hedge funds 
as rapacious. In Germany, a politician once likened them to "locusts" (see the section on 
"Shareholder politics and markets" below). Are hedge funds, especially the activist 
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ones, the devil described in popular accounts? They may be aggressive, but do they 
justify the fear that corporate managers often show?  
In the United States, Klein and Zur (2006) find that hedge funds took quite a 
different activist approach than traditional activist investors. Instead of targeting 
underperforming companies and seeking changes in direction, these funds sought to 
extract cash from generally well performing companies.  
Activist strategies among hedge funds have gained support, albeit based on data 
during the heady days in investment markets in the mid-2000s. Brav, Jiang, Thomas, 
and Partnoy (2006) find hedge funds working in ways often prescribed to large 
blockholders: friendly interaction with management in striving for better financial 
performance. At other times, hedge funds may confront management that they see as 
entrenched. Importantly, Brav et al. find that the performance improvements they 
sought persist after the hedge funds had exited their positions. As Brav et al. (p. 37) 
note, "Unlike traditional institutional investors, hedge fund managers have very strong 
personal financial incentives to increase the value of their portfolio firms, and do not 
face the regulatory or political barriers that limit the effectiveness of these other 
investors."  
Clifford (2008) reports that target companies of hedge funds pursuing activist 
agendas perform better than a control group of investments that hedge funds passively 
held. But Clifford's evidence suggests that the funds seek a greater liquidity buffer for 
activist portfolios. That is, the lock-in periods for activist funds are typically longer 
than the lock-in periods that the hedge funds manage without engagement. By 
examining the record of voting, litigation, and change of control contests, Partnoy and 
Thomas (2006) find that hedge-fund activism is more effective in inducing change in 
corporations than engagement by traditional institutional investors.  
Moreover, Haarmeyer (2007) believes that activism by hedge funds has accelerated 
the distribution of corporate cash in mature businesses, through dividends and share 
buy-backs. According to Haarmeyer (p. 38), "Hedge fund activists become catalysts for 
initiating and helping to execute the painful but critical process that moves resources 
into more productive uses and thus drives shareholder value creation and economic 
prosperity." 
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Issue-based activism 
A more limited form of activism comes in agitation over particular issues either in 
corporate policy or in company law and regulation. A topical case is the growing calls 
for new ways to address the persistent problem – as seen from the perspective of 
investors – of giving shareholders a "say on pay" of senior management. Since 2002, 
shareholders in the United Kingdom have had an advisory vote on compensation 
policy, an example where "voice" has made some difference. Practitioners argue that 
such efforts – copied in some other European and Australian jurisdictions and a matter 
of heated debate in the United States – could undermine the board's discretion in 
setting pay levels. Keith Johnson, a former Wisconsin state pension fund manager, and 
Daniel Summerfield from USS, the U.K.'s second largest pension fund, argue that 
giving shareholders a direct voice on pay should empower the board, rather than 
undermine it. As Johnson and Summerfield (2008, p. 3) remark, "Say on Pay leaves 
boards with full control over executive compensation while giving them increased 
support for a display of backbone when needed! … Muddling through is no longer an 
option." Johnson and Summerfield see the move at many U.S. companies for majority 
voting, instead of plurality voting, as a step to create greater shareholder voice on pay. 
A study of the outcome of the U.K. experience by Ferri and Maber (2008) gives a more 
qualified view of the success that shareholder votes on pay might have on the level of 
executive pay. Their analysis suggests that say-on-pay increased the sensitivity to pay 
levels of executives in poorly performing companies, and especially among those that 
had high compensation before introduction of the law. Still, giving shareholders a 
voice had little effect on the overall levels of pay.  
Giving shareholders greater rights is only one part of the activist equation. For a 
director seeking to act in shareholder interests there is another question. What is it that 
interests shareholders?  
Dimensions of shareholder politics 
Many factors contribute to the interests that a single shareholder might have in the 
board's decision making. A shareholder may be more interested in receiving dividends 
than capital gains or want the board, for example, to avoid investments in genetically 
modified crops. Shareholders from one country may bring with them preconceptions 
about the best way to organize a business when they invest in a company based in a 
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different country. These factors all contribute to the content of any recommendations 
that shareholders make to the board. Taking a step back from the content of their 
interests, one can assess their political stance across three dimensions: (1) their attitude 
towards the stock, (2) their approach to engagement and activism, and (3) their 
investment horizons. 
 Attitude 
At any given time, shareholders have a simple view of each stock in their portfolio 
or watch-list: they buy, sell or hold. Investment analysts use a wider variety of 
categories in their research recommendations and these nomenclatures vary somewhat 
between investment banks. In the wake of the dot-com collapse in 2000-2001, 
investment banks and the analysts they employed faced criticism for their use of 
arcane classification systems and for making recommendations where the intended 
advice meant something different from the words themselves (Dreman, 2000). 
Legislation, litigation, and new codes of ethics for research around the world ensued 
(for an example, see CFA Institute, 2005).  
For many asset managers, the investment decision rarely involves massive shifts 
towards or away from a particular stock. Consequently, a more nuanced version of the 
old "buy-sell-hold" mantra has emerged: investors might accumulate, reduce, or 
maintain their exposure to a particular security.  
Participation 
Investors can take three participatory stances towards their investments; either as a 
general inclination towards their entire portfolio or towards a specific stock. Investors 
may be docile, passive in their approach to the company, its strategy, and its 
management. That may involve routinely voting with management at shareholder 
meetings or perhaps not voting at all. This is frequently the stance of index-tracking 
funds, which are explicitly designed as low-cost operations. These funds seek to avoid 
the cost of voting and trading the shares they hold.  
A second approach is the "walkers", invoking a notion sometimes called the "Wall 
Street Walk" (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2007). If unhappy with a company’s direction, 
investors will sell their shares to avoid future price declines or to seek greater returns 
in an alternative investment. They can also walk into an investment. That is, investors 
buy when seeing a strategic decision they like or a change in the business environment 
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that might be favorable to a particular stock or industry. Traditional active portfolio 
managers, who seek to outperform the index or benchmarks by intelligent stock 
selection, often adopt this stance. A wide range of other investors use this approach 
whether they are the traditional "long-only" asset management firms that buy and sell 
actively, individual investors looking for a gain, or leveraged investors seeking to 
turbo-charge their holdings by buying stock on margin.  
"Walkers" can affect corporate policy and therefore governance. If the stock price is 
depressed by their decisions to sell, then the company may have difficulty raising 
capital in debt and equity markets. The resulting increase in the cost of capital, so the 
theory goes, makes the company less competitive, putting pressure on profitability and 
on management to change direction. Some writers such as Coffee (1991) find this an 
inefficient way of monitoring and controlling corporations. Such writers argue that the 
role should fall to certain types of investors, particularly pension funds and closed-end 
collective investment funds.  
Edmans (2009), however, has modeled situations in which the use of exit rather 
than voice can itself be a form of activism. Studies by Edmans (forthcoming; Edmans & 
Manso, 2009) consider companies in which investors’ stakes are too small to influence 
the company by either gaining a seat on the board or getting its concerns heard by 
management. These investors' stakes are large enough that staying informed about the 
company's business and monitor management performance, and then using the threat 
of an exit to gain attention is worthwhile. Edmans' work suggests that using "exit" as a 
form of "voice" need not lead to a short-term management focus. The signals sent 
through activism-with-your-feet could even stimulate boards and managements to 
take a long-term focus.  
There are funds that are neither passive nor walkers but take a different approach 
with at least some of their investments. Activist shareholders seek to influence the 
direction of the companies in which they invest. They often use their voting rights to 
indicate displeasure with strategy or management, while lobbying occasionally with 
directors and senior management for a change in policy. Activists come in a variety of 
flavors. Some advocate specific policy changes on ethical grounds. This approach was 
commonplace as shareholder activism gained ground in the 1960s and 1970s as 
individual shareholders, churches, and charities used their votes to force changes in 
policy of companies towards investments in munitions and tobacco or on trade with 
the apartheid regime in South Africa. Indeed, much of the early effort in the United 
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States to develop corporate governance research arose from churches who sought to 
use their votes at shareholder meetings to express their displeasure with U.S. foreign 
policy and military actions in Vietnam.  
Other activists seek changes in management or shifts in strategy in poorly 
performing companies. Others lobby for actions to give shareholders greater rights, for 
example, to oversee executive pay policy or to vote on potential acquisitions. Still 
others may seek to oust the board of directors and impose a new board and new 
management or push through a merger or acquisition by another company hostile to 
the incumbent management and board.  
Some, by dint of the size of their holdings, can get private access to senior 
managers or members of the board to make their opinions known. Others, generally 
the smaller ones, resort to "megaphone diplomacy" as a way to be heard. A few, 
notably large pension funds in the United States and United Kingdom, combine the 
two using the latter when attempts with the former have shown few results. What 
these activists share is their active use of voting rights and often other ways of 
expressing their voice on policy. But they share something else as well. All seek to 
assert what they see as their rights as owners to influence decision making with the 
board and management (S. Davis, Lukomnik, & Pitt-Watson, 2006).  
Horizon  
Shareholders' intentions towards a stock also vary over time. Stocks held today are 
ones that shareholders might be inclined to buy again or sell at some time in the future. 
Beyond that lies a general inclination toward the process of buying and selling. Index-
tracking funds, for example, hold shares for as long as the company is a constituent of 
the index they track. Their actions are dictated by index decisions. Only those on the 
cusp of the index are ever likely to be traded. Thus, for most of the investments of these 
managers, the time horizon of the investment is quite long. Pension funds, looking to 
achieve sufficient yields over the lifetime of their beneficiaries, share a long-term 
orientation toward the market in general although some may choose to manage their 
portfolios more actively. They tend to be long-term investors despite sometimes having 
a short-term horizon for an individual stock. The investment literature, similar to the 
tax code in some jurisdictions, draws a distinction between long- and short-term 
investing. The latter is more speculative in nature. For tax purposes, capital gains and 
losses might be treated more like earned income for individuals or income from 
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operations for corporate entities rather than savings. Both academics and the taxman 
often set an arbitrary threshold to distinguish between the short- and long-term, for 
example, one year. In practice, differentiating between an investment of 13 months, of 
11 months, or even decades can be quite difficult. From a corporate governance 
perspective, long-term investors sometimes expect different treatment from the 
companies, even if their attitude towards the stock might involve an inclination to sell. 
There has been a growth of speculative, short-term investing among traditional, long-
only funds as institutional investors seek to build their businesses by outperforming 
rivals as a result of beating their quarterly benchmarks. In turn, this has put pressure 
on corporate managements to strive for better short-term performance often at the 
expense of strategic decision making (Tonello, 2006). 
A third stance exists under the rubric of horizon – the perverse orientation towards 
an investment. The horizon is often short-term though it need not be. One version of 
this stance might involve buying and selling simultaneously but with differing time 
horizons for the two actions. For example, otherwise long-term investors seeking to 
achieve capital gains but avoid dividend income often take this stance. They will sell 
the stock on a "cash" basis over the dividend record and/or payment date, having 
arranged ahead of time to buy the stock back "forward" at a predetermined price. 
These stock "lending" activities have counterparties. Sometimes the counterparties are 
investors seeking dividends to boost the yield of a portfolio that pledges its 
beneficiaries a regular stream of income. These investors then capture the dividend in 
exchange for an interest payment to the lender. Depending on their separate tax 
positions, these approaches can produce benefits for both sides.  
Corporate governance implications arise when these arrangements cover voting 
periods at the company's shareholder meeting. Who is the "real" owner? When both 
tend to be long-term in orientation, the governance implications might not be 
particularly large. Given the broad diversification of assets in many institutional 
portfolios, the borrower might well be a holder or even a lender of the same stock it has 
borrowed, so the implications for voting and corporate governance are perhaps of 
greater theoretical than practical concern.  
Other types of borrowers such as short sellers with non-neutral intentions may 
hold the stock. These "shorts" borrow the stock so they can deliver it to someone to 
whom they have sold. The intention in a short-sale is to buy the stock back at some 
point in the future before the pre-arranged return sale to the original lender. If the 
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stock falls in the meantime, the short-seller makes a gain on the difference less the fee 
paid for having borrowed the stock in the first place. As a result, short-sellers can 
benefit from a fall in share price or a collapse of the company. During the period in 
which they maintain the short position, they are in a technical sense the holder of the 
shares. For these reasons, various countries ban short selling and other restrict its use. 
Before the banking crisis hit in the second half of 2008, many countries had begun to 
give short-sellers a freer hand. In 2004, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) experimented with a new rule to lift the requirement that a short sale could only 
take place when the previous transaction in that stock was at a higher price than the 
one before, called the "uptick" rule (SEC, 2004).  
Hong Kong, a market with a history of stock trading almost as old as London and 
New York, introduced short selling subject to an uptick rule in 1994. It allowed "naked" 
short sales – when the seller does not first borrow the stock – a year later and then 
removed the uptick rule. After a cascading sell-off in the Asian markets in 1998, the 
uptick came back only to be repealed again in 2007. McKenzie and Henry (2007) 
believe short selling is broadly neutral over time as heavy selling in one period 
reverses in the next.  
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority broadly backs short 
selling. Yet, incidents in the early months of 2008 led it to adopt a temporary measure 
to tighten reporting requirements when companies were in the process of issuing new 
capital through "rights" issues (FSA, 2008). Australia, which had some curbs on the 
practice, sought market opinion in 2008 about how to tighten short selling regulations 
(ASX, 2008). In the weeks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
authorities in many jurisdictions, including the United States, moved to curtail short 
selling in the stocks of financial companies. The SEC quickly rescinded the U.S. ban; 
Christopher Cox, the outgoing chairman of the SEC, even called the ban the "biggest 
mistake" of his tenure (Paley & Hilzenrath, 2008). Constraints in other countries stayed 
in place for many months.  
In the last several years, the perverse stance has added a layer of complexity. 
Through the use of derivative instruments, including a device called a contract for 
difference (CFD), an investor may have a large economic interest – whether the share 
rises or falls – without actually buying or selling the shares themselves. These can pose 
governance issues for the companies involved because CFDs can be linked with an 
implicit commitment on the part of the counterparty such as an investment bank to 
Donald Nordberg  Page 135 
hold the equivalent number of shares and even vote them on the instruction of the 
derivative-holder.  
An example of a governance problem in this type of perverse relationship is the 
Mylan Laboratories bid in 2004 to acquire King Pharmaceutical in the United States, 
which resulted in so-called "empty voting." The hedge fund Perry was a major 
shareholder of King and stood to benefit from the transaction. However, shareholders 
in Mylan needed to approve the transaction and opposition to the deal arose from 
some large shareholders including the activist investor Carl Icahn. To push the deal 
through, Perry bought a stake in Mylan, simultaneously hedging the investment with 
an equity swap with two investment banks. Indeed, the swaps more than covered 
Perry's exposure and gave Perry 9.9 percent voting rights at a time when it had a net 
negative economic interest in Mylan (Hu & Black, 2006; Kahan & Rock, 2006).  
Shareholder politics and markets 
Because investors take these different stances, traders can make a market in 
company shares. Buyers need sellers and even long-term investors sometime sell. 
Differences of tax positions can lead otherwise like-minded investors to take opposite 
stances towards the same stock. Even short-sellers, who are the most perverse of the 
perverse stance, perform a valuable function in providing sellers when others seek to 
buy. When coupled with an activist stance, actions of short-sellers can raise serious 
governance concerns. Evidence exists that short selling helps the market achieve the 
best price for corporate equity (for recent examples, see Bris, Goetzmann, & Zhu, 2007; 
Chang, Cheng, & Yu, 2007; Charoenrook & Daouk, 2005; Curtis & Fargher, 2008; 
McKenzie & Henry, 2007). Indeed, Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) show that in 
markets with poor disclosure regimes, short selling provides a useful mechanism for 
the transmission of private information. Bris et al. (2007) present a more nuanced 
picture. By looking at dual-listed shares that trade on markets that either permitted or 
restricted short selling, they find evidence supporting the notion that price discovery 
was better with short selling. Although short selling does not cause a crash, their 
results indicate that it may affect the magnitude of a crash.  
Figure 3 summarizes the variety of possible approaches along these three 
dimensions. A complex picture emerges indicating the difficulty for investors or any 
individual to know what constitutes "shareholder value" when shareholder interests 
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fundamentally diverge on structural grounds, irrespective of differences on companies’ 





















Figure 3: Shareholder stance 
The shareholder stance is a tool to evaluate what a particular shareholder's interest involves. It 
has three dimensions: the attitude towards the stock (accumulate, maintain, and reduce), its 
participation in company affairs (docile, walkers, and activists), and the investor's general 
investment horizon (long-term, short-term or perverse).  
 
The balance between investors' different interests will change over time for both 
individual companies and the market as a whole. For example, the growth of passive 
investment through index-tracking funds has led to an expansion of funds that seek to 
maintain their stakes in companies over a long time-horizon. To keep costs down, 
many of these funds are docile and vote with management if they vote at all. With the 
rise of index funds has come a relative decline in the strength of traditional long-only, 
actively managed asset management firms that were the backbone of the "walkers" and 
activists taking a long-term approach to the horizon.  
While the growth of hedge funds in 1990s and the early years of the new century 
vastly expanded the number of managers taking a short-term view of their 
investments, hedge funds probably still represent a small proportion of equity 
ownership. Data concerning the size and shape of hedge fund investing are 
fragmentary at best. The industry is secretive and lightly or unregulated in many 
jurisdictions. Early versions of hedge fund strategies often speculated on intra-day 
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price movements with any associated risk hedged through the use of derivatives.  
These trades had little to do with the governance of the company. What created a new 
governance relationship and a new set of politics to go with it was the development of 
hedge-fund activism: asset managers taking a large, often highly leveraged stake in a 
company and holding it while agitating for a change in policy. 
Perhaps the most celebrated case in the brief history of hedge fund activism is the 
move by a fund with the cuddly name The Children's Investment Fund (TCI). TCI 
rocked the tradition-bound world of German equities when Deutsche Börse, the 
German stock exchange company, tried to take over the London Stock Exchange in 
2004. TCI sensed an opportunity to prevent the merger and generate a higher share 
price for Deutsche Börse. The shares of bidding companies often fall during or after a 
takeover, reflecting the premium paid for the acquired company. In cases of contested 
takeovers, the premium is likely to be even higher. TCI sensed that if it could thwart 
the merger, then Deutsche Börse's share price would increase. TCI acquired a 
substantial stake and agitated for a change in direction through contesting the re-
election of directors at the exchange company's 2005 annual meeting. The move 
attracted other hedge funds to follow suit and soon U.K.-based and U.S.-based hedge 
funds held a large portion of the shares in this German institution. The tactic succeeded 
to a greater extent than almost anyone had imagined possible. Deutsche Börse not only 
abandoned its bid but also dismissed the chairman of its supervisory board, its chief 
executive officer, and its chief financial officer (Nordberg, 2005b). Germany's vice 
chancellor then famously warned about "locusts" invading the capital markets 
(Bovensiepen & Blechschmidt, 2005) and a new term – hedge-fund activism – entered 
the corporate governance lexicon (Achleitner & Kaserer, 2005).  
TCI's intervention in the case of Deutsche Börse was in the spirit of much of the 
activism of corporate raiders in the 1980s and 1990s. That is, this intervention used 
leverage to invest heavily in a company and then used its voting power and appeal to 
persuade other investors to seek a change in strategic direction. Whether the campaign 
ultimately created value is unclear because so many other changes in the company and 
its competitive landscape have ensued. TCI attracted support from other traditional, 
long-term investors more associated with "walking" rather than activism, suggesting 
that TCI's interest was not perverse. But the approach to get their slate of directors 
elected rather than following the company's plan of action shows that TCI’s 
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engagement was a play for power with the board and management of Deutsche Börse, 
the German government, and the trade unions to defend the status quo. 
 Power and politics between shareholders 
The array of potential political stances that shareholders take shows how the lines 
of conflict potentially develop around company-specific issues, corporate control, and 
law. A few examples help to illustrate the point.  
1. Entrance versus exit. A venture capital fund is typically an investor with a 
long-term horizon. Its interests differ fundamentally from those of another 
long-term investor, such as a pension fund, in the period shortly after a 
company issues stock on a public exchange. The venture capital firm wants to 
sell its stake soon and uses its seat on the board to agitate for policy that would 
maximize cash flows and enhance short-term performance. The interest of the 
pension fund, a large but distant investor with little voice and perhaps even a 
docile approach to participation, would be better served by a policy of 
investment in research and development aimed at providing sustainable 
profits. 
2. One share, one vote. The founder maintained supermajority voting rights 
when his company went public 25 years ago. The founder’s shares carrying five 
times the voting strength of those held by others. The founder only owns 10 
percent of the cash-flow rights but has 50 percent of the voting rights. The 
founder retires. The institutions that bought the lower-voting shares now argue 
that because of the founder’s retirement, the disproportionate voting rights 
should be abandoned. Because the matter cannot be resolved in the boardroom 
or the annual meeting, the institutional investors take their case to the 
government seeking a new law banning disproportionate rights. Having been 
rebuffed by government, they then turn to a supranational body urging it to 
propose a new legislative mandate to be imposed by all member governments.  
3. One share, more votes. Aware of the rise of hedge fund activism and the 
perverse horizon incentives of many hedge funds, pension and insurance funds 
argue empty voting could lead to decision making that would damage the 
economic interests of the company and perhaps even the sustainability of the 
business. They argue, first with the board, then at the shareholder meeting, and 
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later with the government for long-term investors to be given superior voting 
power over "mere" speculators.  
4. Director nominations. To avoid the practice of a powerful chairman-CEO 
creating a board of cronies, institutional investors agitate – first with the board 
and then at the shareholder meeting – for a change in the articles of association 
that provides shareholders a voice in nominating candidates to the board. 
Unsuccessful, they turn to the securities market regulator for a rule opening the 
proxy statement. A lobbying organization representing CEOs makes 
representations about how damaging such a measure would be. Opening the 
nominations process would make companies subject to an assault from single-
issue lobbying organizations that would seek to get their own board members 
elected, who would pursue their own agendas rather than those of the 
company. The regulator considers the arguments and proposes that only 
shareholders representing at least five percent of the equity should be allowed 
the right to nominate directors.  
These are not far-fetched examples. Each is drawn from a real-life example of 
politics-in-action in corporate governance. Each case involves the assertion by one 
party that its interests are more important or even more legitimate that those of other 
shareholders. Each actor in this political system seeks to use its power to enforce its 
view on the board's decision, the shareholders' decision, or the macro-political 
decision. In these disputes, each side had a legitimate point even when those points are 
sometimes in conflict. Resolving these conflicts without resorting to physical force 
requires that the exercise of power depends crucially on its perception of legitimacy. 
 Summary and conclusions 
The changing nature of shareholder activism has led some to argue that activists 
should be subject to more rigorous public scrutiny and accountability. Anabtawi and 
Stout (2008) argue that an increase in shareholder power should accompany an 
increase in fiduciary responsibility on activist fund managers. For its part, the 
International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), a loose association of long-term, 
traditional asset management firms with a bent towards activism, has recognized the 
problem. Perhaps to head off too much intervention from the government, the ICGN 
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set itself the task of reforming the governance approaches of the firms themselves 
(Cadbury & Millstein, 2005).  
Such calls indicate potential concerns with the power that institutional investors 
hold. Weber (1922/1947), a sociologist, identified three bases for legitimacy in the 
exercise of power. Legitimacy arises in a pure way either through tradition, by an 
appeal to reason and legality, or in the charisma of the leader. The power of the 
chairman or CEO in dealing with activist investors comes mainly from charisma 
entrenched with a dose of legality as boards invoke company law to limit shareholder 
involvement in the day-to-day affairs and management decisions. Tradition looms 
large in persistence of the unequal voting rights in many established continental 
European companies.  
But what provides the basis for legitimacy by one type of shareholder – long-term, 
activist asset management firms – that corporate boards and management should 
ignore the wishes of another type of shareholder – the perverse activist? Those long-
term activists may be outnumbered in voting strength by the perverse activists and the 
long-term, docile investors who lent them stock, and other long- and short-term 
investors who have chosen to walk. Whose rights are more legitimate and on what 
basis? 
In these circumstances, legitimacy involves an appeal to reason. Can it be 
reasonable, as these investors plead with boards of individual companies and with 
governments, that companies act in the interests of the holders of a majority of the 
shares when those interests are perverse? Is it not better under all circumstances, they 
say to heed the wishes of the long-term investor, even if the short-term and perverse 
ones have control? Company policy cannot be set for all investors equally. Even 
determining where the majority interest lies is hard enough when investors take 
differing stances and use their power in differing and even perverse ways to influence 
company policy. How should managements and boards take account of the interests of 
the docile, long-term institutional investor who has lent its stock to a short-seller?  
There is another approach, another political channel to explore. It involves 
appealing beyond the circle of shareholders, to government or another authority with 
political legitimacy, to impose accountability on the asset management industry such 
as through mandatory share voting or mandatory reporting of how they voted their 
shares.   
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Legitimacy helps. Legitimacy allows corporations to enjoy the trust of the 
investment community with the benefit of lowering investors' perceived risk and the 
cost of capital. The company becomes more competitive with economic benefits for the 
whole economy. But as the VW/Porsche case shows, in a crunch, the decisions that 
boards adopt come back to raw power – legitimate or otherwise – and its skilful 
deployment in the politics of shareholder activism. 
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Part 4: Ethics in corporate governance  
This part includes three articles: "The Ethics of Corporate 
Governance," in the Journal of General Management (2008); the paper 
"Rules of the game" accepted in September 2011 for publication in 
Business Ethics: A European Review; and "News and Corporate 
Governance," in Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism (2007). Each 
has an opening note setting them in the context of institutional 
theory. The JGM piece is theoretical; the BEER and Journalism pieces 
are examples of differing ethics in conflict. 
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6. Ethics (JGM) 
Status: Published Summer 2008 by Journal of General Management 
(Braybrooke) 
An institutional view of ethics and corporate governance 
The previous two chapters dealt with conflicts of ideas, and by extension of 
institutional logics, between corporations and a variety of publics they face. In Chapter 
4, the struggle takes place over the public interest, first broadly construed and then 
defined in law and regulation. The argument presented in Chapter 5 conceptualized 
the tensions between different shareholder types and suggests reasons for the difficulty 
corporations face in understanding where shareholder interests lie. That is, an 
important contest over corporate governance lies between the corporation and external 
constituencies. In this conceptual chapter and the two case examples that follow that 
contestation moves inside the boardroom, and how the directors as individuals and 
collectively as boards choose what they believe is the right thing to do. 
It might be argued that, however insignificant, every decision of a director of a 
public company of behalf of the company is an ethical one, because it involves 
spending someone else's money. That is not to say that directors deliberate in ethical 
terms about all – or even many – of the decisions they face. This chapter argues that 
conventional, shareholder-value-based attitudes among directors, as well as many of 
the prescriptions of agency theory, entail an implicit utilitarian ethical stance. It 
conflicts with duty-based ethical view implicit in some versions of stakeholder theory.  
That these attitudes go unstated, even undiscussed, much of the time suggests that 
institutional forces are at work as much as ethical ones, and that what appears in an 
abstracted way to choices are often behaviour conditions by rules taken for granted. In 
that sense, this chapter, one of the first pieces written and published among this 
collection, is one whose issues I now think are most in need of further analysis. There 
are three reasons for this. First, the discussion of competing claims and stakeholder 
theory presented here does not fully reflect the factors that point towards the concept 
of boards as mediating hierarchies (Blair & Stout, 1999), which becomes important in 
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view of the difficulties, discussed in Chapter 5 and also raised in this chapter, of 
determining where shareholder interests lie. Second, seeing the role of boards as 
adjudicating conflicting stakeholder claims opens an avenue to consider the 
implications of virtue ethics, which this chapter does not discuss. Finally, the 
distinction here between act- and rule-based ethics has links to codification and 
institution-building, suggesting that links between ethics and institutions need further 
discussion. The concluding chapter returns to these themes. 
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The ethics of corporate governance  
(2008) 
Abstract: How should corporate directors determine what is the 
"right" decision? For at least the past 30 years the debate has raged as 
to whether shareholder value should take precedence over corporate 
social responsibility when crucial decisions arise. Directors face 
pressure, not least from "ethical" investors, to do the "good" thing 
when they seek to make the "right" choice. Corporate governance 
theory has tended to look to agency theory and the need of boards to 
curb excessive executive power to guide directors' decisions. While 
useful for those purposes, agency theory provides only limited 
guidance. Supplementing it with the alternatives – stakeholder theory 
and stewardship theory – tends to put directors in conflict with their 
legal obligations to work in the interests of shareholders. This paper 
seeks to reframe the discussion about corporate governance in terms 
of the ethical debate between consequential, teleological approaches 
to ethics and idealist, deontological ones, suggesting that directors 
are – for good reason – more inclined toward utilitarian judgments 
like those underpinning shareholder value. But the problems with 
shareholder value have become so great that a different framework is 
needed: strategic value, with an emphasis on long-term value 
creation judged from a decidedly utilitarian standpoint.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, ethics, utilitarianism, teleology, 
deontology, consequentialism, agency theory, stakeholder theory, 
stewardship theory, shareholder value, strategic value, boards of 
directors, non-executive directors, fiduciary trust, corporate social 
responsibility 
Introduction 
Whenever a board of directors needs to take any action, its individual members 
face a decision: what is the right thing to do? Most of the time, choosing the right 
course is a matter of business judgment on what ethicists call non-moral issues. In a 
few instances, the choice is a narrow, legal one, where compliance with specific statute 
or regulation is at stake. But in some cases – and in particular for major decisions like 
mergers, acquisitions, down-sizing or large investments – neither the law nor business 
judgment may be sufficiently clear. These decisions often involve conflicting versions 
of what's right in a moral sense. Important decision-making in the boardroom is, in 
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short, a matter of ethics. While directors will choose to act on individual decisions from 
different theoretical perspectives, their tough calls are likely to be based on more 
fundamental and often unspoken assumptions about the nature of what is right. The 
lobby for ethical investment brings with it similarly unspoken assumptions about the 
ethical basis on which its recommendations are made. This paper explores how ethical 
frameworks underpin theories of corporate governance to give guidance to directors 
and in particular to those independent, non-executives who increasingly act as the 
moral compass for the enterprise. It suggests, moreover, that the ethical approach that 
sits most comfortably with the purpose of most corporations is one that rejects 
important aspects of both stakeholder theory and shareholder value.  
Concern about corporate governance has developed historically in response to 
major crises of confidence, fraud and market failure, and with it development of 
advances in our thinking about the role that corporations play in the economy and 
society. The 1929 stock market crash formed at least part of the recognition of just how 
different the economic and moral imperatives of large listed companies and 
institutional investors were, compared with the Victorian concept of the company 
(Berle & Means, 1932/1991). The 1930s also saw recognition of the way that the 
corporation could be a vehicle for economizing effort through the reduction of 
transaction costs and freeing resources for productive use elsewhere (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson & Winter, 1993). The focus of what we now call the economics institutions 
of capitalism (Williamson, 1985) lay in showing how capitalism created of social 
wealth, and not merely the exploitative power of the capitalist.  
Another surge of interest came in the early 1990s from what was perhaps a less 
dramatic string of events but ones which reverberate in the news more than 15 years 
later: the near simultaneous collapse of Polly Peck, the Bank of Commerce and Credit 
International and, perhaps most importantly, Robert Maxwell's collection of 
enterprises (see Wearing, 2005 for a detailed discussion). Those events threw into 
doubt the principles-based, self-moderating system of accounting, the gentlemanly 
approach to financial regulation and the cozy, patrician ways in which directors were 
selected and boards did their work. The result was the Cadbury Report (1992) and 
eventually what became the Combined Code of corporate governance, which was then 
emulated in other jurisdictions.  
A third wave came from the excesses of the dot-com era of the late 1990s and the 
subsequent collapse of Enron in 2001, of WorldCom in 2002. There were other cases, 
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too, which might have seemed just as dramatic had they not been preceded by such 
egregious lapses that had rocked the confidence in US financial markets and led to the 
implosion of the global accounting practice of Arthur Andersen.  The by-product was a 
new, stringent law on corporate responsibility commonly known as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (Library of Congress, 2002), which led to a new spurt of legislative, 
regulatory and self-regulatory actions around the world to clean up the mess and 
reduce the risk of a systemic infection.  
The collapse of the German Herstatt Bank in the 1970s, of IBH Holding in the 1980s 
had demonstrated that continental European countries were not immune from the 
problem. Those cases had been dealt with largely by tapping the hidden reserves of the 
German banking system. In Switzerland, Credit Suisse had similarly made its 
governance fiasco known as Chiasso disappear by tapping into shareholder funds it 
had hidden from view. But in the early years of the 21st Century that was harder to do. 
In the 2003 lapses and frauds at the Italian food producer Parmalat and the Dutch 
supermarket group Ahold came reminders that corporate governance was an issue for 
all.  
What lay behind all of these episodes was a sense of moral hazard associated with 
the accumulation of financial resources and power in the hands of corporations and the 
sense that the directors of these corporations, entrusted with society's wealth, were 
unaccountable and open to corruption. While there were issues about the personal 
morality of individuals, these episodes raised questions about the ethics of the 
corporate systems as a whole. These ethical concerns took on four main questions:  
• Were managers in distant corporations draining the resources of shareholders 
for their private use, as Berle and Means had described? 
• Was the private use of corporate wealth actually contributing to broader social 
wealth, as Coase had maintained, or damaging it owing to market failure?  
• What assumptions were the directors of corporations using – consciously or 
unconsciously – when those excesses occurred under their noses?  
• What might they have done differently if they had focused on the examining 
those assumptions?  
These questions lie at the heart of what have become the four main theoretical 
perspectives on the problem of how directors can best control corporate wealth and 
power: agency theory, shareholder value, stakeholder theory and stewardship theory 
and at the heart of the claims that ethical investors are making on directors. This paper 
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argues, however, that there is sixth stance available to the individual board member – 
sometimes confused with the concept of shareholder value – that lies at the heart of the 
work of independent, non-executive directors: decisions based upon perceived 
strategic value.  
Theories of corporate governance 
The workings of the boardroom are, as a matter of necessity, largely hidden from 
view and therefore from detailed examination. From conversations and public 
statements of individual directors we've seen emerge several theories that describe how 
boards operate and seek to prescribe the basis on which directors should make 
decisions.  
Stiles and Taylor (2001) outline six theories of corporate governance, though 
perhaps only three have a useful normative character. First, the legal view is a narrow 
one, which reflects what some directors might see as their role – fulfilling the 
obligations of company law – but which provides little worthwhile guidance for their 
actions. While directors may have de jure responsibility for the company, de facto 
control rests with management. Two other theories – class hegemony and managerial 
hegemony – are almost entirely descriptive, though what they describe provides implicit 
but salutary advice to boards: all too often boards either act to perpetuate a ruling elite 
or exist as a legal fiction disguising the reality of managerial power. More interesting 
from an ethical perspective is the organizational economics approach, which uses agency 
theory to suggest the board's role is to control abuses in managerial power, and 
transaction-cost theory to lead decision-making. A stewardship approach assumes a 
psychological stance: managers, and by extension directors, will be motivated by 
things other than narrow self-interest, to be good stewards, to do a good job. The 
resource-dependence approach sees outside or non-executive directors as having the role 
of facilitating access to funds, people and other resources. This can, of course, be seen 
as a subset of a transaction-cost approach. Having directors with the right contacts 
means cheaper loans, better terms on supply contracts, the first pick of new business 
school graduates.  
The approach of Stiles and Taylor draws on the analysis of Zahra and Pearce 
(1989), who describe four perspectives. They share with Stiles and Taylor legal, resource 
dependence and class hegemony, but Zahra and Pearce focus on agency theory while 
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leaving out direct reference to transaction-cost economics. They do not mention 
stewardship theory at all.  
These surveys of theories of governance, however, leave out perhaps the two most 
important and conflicting ones: the competing cults of stakeholder theory and 
shareholder value. Owing to their prescriptive nature and their influence on decisions 
made by directors, we'll look in greater detail into agency theory, stakeholder theory 
and stewardship theory to see what ethical assumptions lie behind each, and then 
elaborate the virtues and drawbacks of shareholder value.  
Agency theory 
The origins of agency theory in corporate governance are usually traced to the 
groundbreaking work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (1932/1991). Agency theory, 
a term they never used, came to be seen as a way to examine the issue of individual 
greed. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued, putting managers in charge of wealth 
that is not theirs creates, in economic terms, a cost, one they call agency cost. This cost 
doesn't exist in a business owned by its manager, which is why the problems of 
governance in a private company are different from those in public companies. In what 
Berle and Means call the modern corporation, however, the problem cannot be 
eliminated, but it can be controlled. Since this realization, public companies around the 
world have developed incentives that seek to align the interests of managers with those 
of shareholders. Controlling agency costs lay behind the growth of the use of stock 
options and other equity-based pay systems, rather than relying solely on salary and 
bonuses to motivate managers. Rational managers will see that it is not in their 
interests to divert the company's resources to their private use when they have so 
much more to gain from taking actions that benefit shareholders as well as themselves. 
In large public companies, a second layer of potential problems arise. Shareholders 
employ directors to watch over the work of managers, creating a second moral hazard, 
or put another way a second layer of agency costs.  
From an ethical perspective, however, the focus on economics in both instances 
changes the moral choice from one of "right" or "wrong" into one of "better" or "worse". 
Stakeholder theory 
The stakeholder view of corporate governance is often associated with Japanese 
and continental European practice, and perhaps most closely with Germany, where 
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law has required that half the seats on supervisory boards go to representatives of the 
workforce, and where custom has long mandated that a company's bankers and large-
block shareholders have seats as well.  
The term "stakeholder" is recorded as early as 1708, when it meant a neutral party 
holding the stakes of the contestants in a wager. But that's not at all the meaning it has 
developed over the past quarter of a century. "Stakeholder" has deliberate echoes of 
"shareholder" and even more of "stockholder", the more common American term. That 
rhetorical device boosts employees, suppliers, customers and outside interests to a 
linguistic status with something approaching the same claim to rights over a 
company's activities.  
Its origins in the theory of corporate governance are somewhat difficult to trace. R. 
Edward Freeman links it most directly to the Stanford Research Institute in the early 
1960s, though he accepts he couldn't quite pinpoint it (see Freeman, 1984, p. 49, n1). 
Freeman defines stakeholders as "any group or individual who can affect, or is affected 
by, the achievement of a corporation's purpose"  (1984, p. vi). SRI and other strategic 
thinkers used stakeholder concept mainly as a tool for strategic analysis. It was in part 
a result of the growing recognition of the complexity of strategy – that the company 
wasn't simply a production system, where strategy was based primarily on products 
and the means to produce them, as it had been seen for first half of the 20th Century. 
Gradually strategists had come to appreciate that corporations created value through 
the complex interaction of various networks of relationships. Examples of that 
approach range from Igor Ansoff's thinking in the 1960s through to Michael Porter's 
conceptions of industry analysis in the 1980s, the balanced scorecards of the 1990s and 
current work on customer relationships and their lifetime value (see Ansoff, 1987; Bell, 
Deighton, Reinartz, Rust, & Schwartz, 2002; Kaplan & Norton, 1992; Porter, 1980; Rust, 
Lemon, & Zeithaml, 2004). But considering the interests of stakeholders in strategy 
doesn't imply stakeholders should be regarded as the or even a purpose of corporate 
activity. Indeed, Ansoff argued forcefully against the stakeholder approach, drawing a 
distinction between a corporation's "responsibilities" to a wide range of interested 
parties and its "objectives", which guide management to fulfilling the company's 
purpose (Ansoff, 1987, p. 53).  
Strong versions of stakeholder theory challenge the assumption that directors and 
by extension managers have their sole duty to the company's owners. Indeed, Freeman 
even defends exploiting the word "stakeholder" precisely because it sounds like 
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"stockholder". Words, he writes, "make a difference in how we see the world. By using 
'stakeholder' managers and theorists alike will come to see these groups as having a 
'stake'" (1984, p. 45). Stakeholders have legitimacy because they can affect the direction 
of the company; it is legitimate for management to spend time and resources on 
stakeholders, he argues. That is, however, still some way from arguing that these 
people and groups are "ends" of corporate purpose, to which corporate boards owe a 
duty, rather than just "means" to the end of shareholder value.  
The usual argument against the strong versions of stakeholder theory is that 
shareholders have their entire investment at risk, while suppliers, customers and 
employees in general receive benefits from the corporation contemporaneously, and 
enjoy the added protection of prior standing in contract if things go wrong. But 
Freeman, writing with William Evan and using examples based on US law, pointed out 
that shareholders, managers, customers, suppliers and employees all have their 
contractual rights protected by one or another aspect of law. "Another way to look at 
these safeguards is that they force management to balance the interests of stockholders 
and themselves on the one hand with the interests of customers, suppliers and, other 
stakeholders on the other" (Freeman & Evan, 1990, p. 347).  
Can we find guidance in company law? In many jurisdictions the matter is quite 
clear: directors are responsible and accountable to shareholders. But that legal 
accountability is only a narrow sense of the ethical issues directors face, and with 
mounting public pressure – from corporate governance scandals and environmental 
concerns – even the legal context is subject to change. An example was the eight-year 
long debate in the UK over revising company law that finally ended with the law 
reform of 2006. The business lobby beat off attempts from the more leftwing elements 
of the Labour Party to amend the duty-of-care provisions. Business interests even 
successfully lobbied to get government to repeal a requirement for large listed 
companies to provide a detailed narrative account of the business in an Operating and 
Financial Review taking specific heed of employees, suppliers, customers and the 
environment. But the final version of the law nonetheless retained a degree of 
accountability to stakeholders in the Business Review (UK Parliament, 2006) mandated 
under European Union law. Moreover, at about the same time another branch of 
government, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, issued 
guidelines concerning annual disclosure for all substantial businesses – public and 
private – of key performance indicators for environmental affairs (DEFRA, 2006). 
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While not carrying the force of law, these guidelines carry the threat of affecting a 
business's ability to contract with government. A narrow legal definition is, therefore, 
subject to change.  
Most arguments for a stakeholder approach to governance aren't based on a 
narrow legal claim, however, but appeal instead to a larger moral purpose. Freeman 
declared that the ordinary view of corporations – with shareholder value at the center – 
"is or at least should be intellectually dead" (Freeman, 1994, p. 14). That view doesn't go 
undisputed, either in its method of argument (see Child & Marcoux, 1999 for an 
example) or its conclusions about the appropriateness of stakeholder theory. Indeed, 
John Hendry declared that the normative stakeholder theory and Freeman in particular 
had overshot. "To the extent that they have their sights too high they have also 
undermined their own position by sacrificing credibility and introducing major 
problems," he wrote (Hendry, 2001, p. 159). Not only was the emphasis on stakeholder 
rights wrong in theory, they were falling out of practice, he said. Stakeholder concerns 
had "become increasingly marginal to the corporate governance debate" not just in the 
US but also in such "stakeholder oriented societies" as Germany, Japan and South 
Korea (p. 173). Hendry was, of course, writing before the next big crisis in governance 
was to occur – the collapse of Enron, which robbed employees of pension rights and 
led to the biggest changes in public accountability of executive directors since the 
creation of the US Securities and Exchange Commission in the 1930s.  
Stakeholder theorists seem to be representing two different ethical perspectives. 
The Freeman and Evan approach was, in some ways, making the argument on the 
devil's own terms. They said that seeing the corporation as a contracting mechanism, 
as Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985) had done, provided a way of showing the 
stakeholder theory was about tangible costs and benefits, a means of reducing the 
economic burden of the social contract, the weak version of the theory, where the 
ethical determination is based on the consequences of the action. This is far from a 
typical stakeholder argument, which holds that businesses are accountable to larger 
aims than profit maximization (Crowther & Caliyurt, 2004; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Evan & Freeman, 1993). John Hasnas says: "When viewed as a normative theory, the 
stakeholder theory asserts that, regardless of whether stakeholder management leads 
to improved financial performance, managers should manage the business for the 
benefit of all stakeholders" (Hasnas, 1998, p. 26). This is just the type of conclusion that 
is sure to raise the hackles of many business people, and led Milton Friedman to pen 
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his famous retort that the social responsibility of business is to make money (Friedman, 
1970).   
It's not surprising to see how stakeholder theory became conflated with corporate 
social responsibility, though we can argue that there is a difference. Indeed, the devil's 
argument (e.g. Freeman & Evan, 1990) might well be making an argument that treating 
suppliers, customers and employees well reduces transaction costs, thereby 
contributing to profits. But the more common view of stakeholder theory is that 
advanced by these authors and a host of followers that respect for individuals is a 
greater good that businesses cannot ignore (Evan & Freeman, 1993). The discussion of 
an even broader theory of social contract for business (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994) lies 
behind more contemporary notions, including that of the UK think-tank Tomorrow's 
Company: businesses require a "license to operate" from society (Hampson, 2007). This 
approach forms the basis of what we call legitimacy theory (e.g. Deephouse & Carter, 
2005; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Lindblom, 1994).  
Stewardship theory 
As a description of board practice, stewardship theory suggests that directive will 
be motivated by some larger than personal wealth. Drawing on organizational 
psychology, it suggests that self-esteem and fulfillment loom large in their decision-
making, as Abraham Maslow (1943) had suggested in his hierarchy of needs. As a 
prescription, however, it contends that individual directors should look after the 
interests of someone or something larger than their personal self-interest. Some may be 
guided by a code of conduct or statement of corporate purpose, like the charitable aims 
of the foundation that owns 90 percent of the German manufacturing giant Robert 
Bosch GmbH, the Credo of Johnson & Johnson or the trust principles that have 
protected the editorial integrity of the news operations of Reuters Group plc. In other 
cases, a legalistic approach would look at their fiduciary obligations as described by 
company law. But on many decisions, the law is silent and the director needs to look 
elsewhere to find the guiding principle. Some directors see their roles as being 
stewards of a particular interest. When a major shareholder secures a seat on the board, 
its director will understandably be tied to that shareholder's aims, whatever company 
law might say. That's why we saw new emphasis on the role of independent, non-
executive, outside directors in the governance reforms introduced with, say, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, the Higgs Review and subsequent revision of the UK 
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Combined Code in 2003 or the New York Stock Exchange's listing rule changes that 
same year. Independent directors, these reforms hoped, would be stewards of some 
greater good. But what?  
An ethical framework for governance 
These theories of corporate governance encompass what in ethics are known as 
consequential (sometimes called teleological) and idealistic (also called deontological) 
approaches. Deciding the "right" course of action can be based on an assessment of the 
benefits arising from it (morality based on the consequences of the action) or by obeying 
some more general rule or ideal state (some ethical principle) irrespective of the 
outcomes of the action. The former is probably best known in its 18th and 19th Century 
incarnation – utilitarianism, embracing John Stuart Mill's notion of the greatest good 
for the greatest number (Mill, 1863/1991) – which underpinned much of the 
development of the field of economics. But there is another strand of consequential 
thinking that also plays a role in corporate governance, ethical egoism, in which the 
individual decides on the basis of what is best for himself32, irrespective of the 
consequences for others. Among its proponents were Epicurus, Hobbes and Nietzsche, 
philosophers who perhaps no longer have the great fans clubs they once enjoyed, 
except perhaps among CEOs (for a crystalline exposition of ethical theory, including 
the distinctions between act- and rule-utilitarianism, see Frankena, 1963).  
But this thinking – when other actors invoke governance mechanisms like contract 
and the force to law to constraint the actions of the egoists – lies at the heart of the 
assumptions we see at work in agency theory. The CEO, indeed any self-interested 
actor, will seek to maximize personal gains. The role of corporate governance is, 
therefore, to constrain his actions without dampening his drive to succeed. In agency 
theory, the board uses negotiation with the CEO and pay policies for the rest of senior 
management to channel energy toward common outcomes, albeit with different 
specific goals: we assume the CEO will attempt to maximize his wealth. If the way to 
do that also maximizes shareholder wealth, then job well done. This ethical stance 
underpins nearly all the traditional corporate governance literature, as Hendry's 
                                                     
32 For convenience, the masculine form will embrace both genders. The current custom in polite 
English speech of pluralizing to escape gender bias (e.g. "the person themselves") jars especially 
badly here. We are speaking of 1) individual actions and, 2) in the context of corporate 
governance lapses, overwhelming male perpetrators.  
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conclusions infer (Hendry, 2001). Business culture breeds people who seek to 
maximize profits, personal or corporate. If the means to that end differ depending on 
whether we are looking at the personal or corporate, greed is widely thought to take 
precedence over the sense of corporate purpose. Nor is this approach confined to the 
boardroom. Much management literature and the "how-to" approach to organizational 
change are about aligning personal goals and incentives with corporate aims.  
Stakeholder theory, in its strong form, approaches corporate decision-making from 
a deontological perspective. This is especially true among proponents of what we have 
come to call corporate social responsibility, around which we see developing an 
industry of "socially responsible" or "ethical" investors (though one suspects that many 
of the managers of SRI funds take a rather more ethically egoistical approach). There 
have been many attempts to demonstrate that what's good for society (in a 
deontological sense) is also good for financial performance (in a utilitarian sense). The 
evidence to date, however, is less than entirely convincing. This lack of empirical 
support for the (financial) value of corporate social responsibility hasn't silenced its 
proponents, giving greater evidence that their stance is fundamentally deontological 
and idealistic in the philosophical sense.  
Indeed, much of the academic literature in support of stakeholder theory comes 
overtly from this perspective. Donaldson and Preston (1995), for example, see 
stakeholder theorists drawing support mainly from the normative aspects of its ethical 
foundation – a nod, at least, toward deontology. The philosophical tradition for 
stakeholder theory draws most directly from Immanuel Kant (for examples, see 
Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Evan & Freeman, 1993; Hasnas, 1998), whose notion of the 
"categorical imperative" – an a priori obligation – formed the heart of what John Stuart 
Mill, his utilitarian predecessors and his followers set out to dislodge. There is some 
greater good, in Kant's view, that "is not derived from the goodness of the results 
which it produces" (Kant, 1785/1964, p. 17). When extended to embrace an obligation 
upon business owners to respect some larger and largely unwritten contract with 
society for their license to operate, we hear echoes of other philosophical traditions: 
Rousseau's social contract and Marx, which contribute to the skepticism of business 
people, reared in capitalism and steeped in the thinking of Adam Smith, whose 
thinking in part informed Mill's version of utilitarianism.  
Stewardship theory arises as well from deontological roots. Though not nearly so 
well explored in the academic literature, it has an intuitive appeal to many people in 
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business. In the corporate governance literature it's more associated with the 
governance of charities, where by definition actors – in management or among the 
trustees – are presumed not to be seeking to maximize profits but rather working for 
some greater good. But stewardship is not confined to the charities, either. Peter 
Weinberg, a partner at the boutique investment bank Perella Weinberg Partners and 
former Goldman Sachs executive, wrote of what a privilege was to join the board of a 
public company. "Serving on a board is like taking on a position in public service," he 
wrote in the Financial Times. "It is not (and should not be) a wealth creation opportunity 
but a chance to play a role in the proper workings of our marketplace" (Weinberg, 
2006). Boardroom pay has improved markedly since the scandals of 2001 and 2002 and 
the resulting demands for more non-executive directors who must spend more time on 
their mandates. Indeed, it is difficult to see how personal profit maximization would 
lead many of the current crew of serving independent, non-executive directors at 
public companies to take up those roles when there was much better money to be in 
private equity.  
This is not necessarily true for all outside directors of public companies, however. 
Despite the move in recent years away from deep entanglement of German banks with 
the equity of German industry, many bankers still sit on supervisory boards of German 
companies, taking those roles not for personal gain, nor out of a sense of what 
Weinberg (2006) called public service. They are, however, serving at least in part to serve 
a different higher purpose – that of looking after the interests of their bank's loan 
portfolio. Like the lawyers, bankers and accountants who so often populated American 
company boards over decades, this, too, is stewardship, but of a different kind than 
that envisaged in the calls for "independence" of mind and purpose invoked in the 
Higgs review of the role of non-executive directors in the UK (Higgs, 2003), the NYSE 
listing rule changes (New York Stock Exchange, 2003) and the German government-
backed code (Cromme Commission, 2002/2007), among other governance regulation 
and principles. But it is still deontological in nature, as there is a greater good that 
guides those directors' decisions – just not one that Rousseau or Marx might have 
cherished. Nor is stewardship theory limited in use to the boardroom. Muth and 
Donaldson (1998) point out that stewardship, unlike agency theory, recognizes non-
financial motives of managers, for example, the need for advancement and recognition, 
intrinsic job satisfaction, respect for authority and the work ethic. But these three broad 
theories of corporate governance – one rooted in utilitarian ethics, the others in 
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deontological – miss out the key area most on the minds of corporate directors: 
shareholder theory. 
Shareholder value 
The mantra of corporate management at least since the 1980s in what is often called 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism has been "shareholder value". It's a measure of the financial 
rewards delivered to shareholders through the combination of cash (dividends and 
share buy-backs) and the capital gains achieved on public or private equity markets.  
 
Table 12 - theories of governance 
 Personal Corporate 
Consequentialism 
(teleology) 
Agency theory Shareholder value 
Ethical idealism 
(deontology) 
Stewardship theory (in the main) Stakeholder theory (in the main) 
 
Overtly utilitarian, shareholder value guides directors to decide what's in the 
greater interest of the holders of the greatest number of shares outstanding. Mapping 
the ethical approach to the interest served gives us a map of governance theories like 
those in Table 12. With the inclusion of shareholder theory, our faith in the economic 
purpose of the corporation is restored and the sound economist sitting on a board of 
directors has an ethical framework to guide decisions. End of story. 
But not quite.  
The problems with shareholder value 
Discerning what is in the interests of shareholders has never been an easy task. 
Founders and their families have different interests from venture capitalists looking for 
an early exit; both have different interests from the institutional investor who has just 
purchased shares during an initial public offering from either of them. Do you set 
strategy for the investor who holds the shares today, or the one who is likely to hold 
them tomorrow? Or in three years' time?  
In the comparatively relaxed days of the 1980s, when all directors had to worry 
about was corporate raiders and vulture capitalists, delivering shareholder value was a 
pretty safe ethical bet. In Germany, where the tax system, accounting conventions and 
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company law requiring Mitbestimmung (worker-co-determination of corporate policy) 
constrained the efforts of supervisory boards to deliver profits, yes, even in Germany 
shareholder value became the vogue.  
Shareholder-value rules-of-thumb grew from the broad patterns of share 
ownership. In the US, shareholders of large public companies were mainly domestic. 
About half were private individuals, the rest institutional investors of a conventional 
sort. In the UK, ownership was also domestic but perhaps less so than in the US. 
Institutions made up a large majority of the holdings, though they were, again, largely 
of a conventional nature: domestic insurance and pension funds. In continental 
Europe, however, even in the early 1980s, a large proportion of shares – a quarter to 
half, depending on the country – were held by foreign institutions, many of them in the 
UK. The globalization of capital markets, the introduction of new instruments and the 
development of fast, electronic trading platform was about to change all that.  
By the start of the new century, derivative markets, short-selling, hedge funds and 
cross-border trading made the task of understanding the interests of shareholders not 
just  difficult, but impossible and even perverse. Consider the simplest of these 
developments: collective investment tools like mutual funds or what in the European 
Union are fetchingly called as UCITS. Their growth has accelerated the concentration 
of corporate share ownership in the hands of institutional investors. Some are index-
tracking or passively managed funds, where the interests of the fund lay in overall 
performance of the market. The owners' economic interests are, therefore, different 
from those of the company in its competitive marketplace. A case in point is the 
takeover battle between Barclays and a consortium led by Royal Bank of Scotland for 
control of the Dutch bank ABN-Amro. The antagonists shared many of the same 
shareholders, whose greater interests might lie more in preventing bidding war than in 
winning or even losing. Deciding what to do in the interests of shareholders might be 
deciding to do nothing at all, because doing anything might damage a competitor that 
your owners also own.  
Even the managers of active funds, however, can see their economic interests 
diverge from those of their beneficiaries, introducing another level of agency 
relationship, and with it another agency problem.  The competition between them for 
short-term financial performance led to rapid portfolio turnover. Even in 2002, a dull 
year for equity markets, the average duration of an equity investment by a US mutual 
fund was a mere 11 months (see Bogle, 2003), which raises the question of what interest 
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it would have in the long-term performance of the company. Nor was this short-term 
focus merely a US phenomenon. Actively managed UK funds turned over their 
portfolios about every two to three years.  
The pressure to deliver short-term fund performance – and with it the focus on 
delivering share-price appreciation earnings announcements – lies at the heart of what 
a lot of people, including many corporate managers, feel is wrong with the Anglo-
Saxon model of financial markets (Aspen Institute, 2007; CED, 2007; Tonello, 2006).  
But their interests were still easier for a corporate director to discern than those of 
the other players in the equity market. Hedge funds using high-octane, heavily 
leveraged strategies have become a large force, not just in the volume of their trading 
activities but in the absolute numbers of shares they hold. Moreover, many used 
instruments known as "contracts for difference" to create an economic interest in the 
company's performance which don't involve the quaint, old-fashioned notion of 
owning the shares. The UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers modified its disclosure 
requirements to inclusive derivatives (Takeover Panel, 2007) and the London-based 
Investor Relations Society called on the Financial Services Authority to demand daily 
disclosures of such positions as well (Nordberg, 2007a).  
If that weren't enough, hedge-fund activity supercharged the practice of stock-
lending, in which a traditional institutional investor – even a passively managed index-
tracker – might lend shares from their portfolios for a fixed period of time in exchange 
for a payment of interest from the hedge fund. Stock-lending gives the hedge fund 
temporary ownership, creating two types of trading strategies. One involved short-
selling – selling shares today in the expectation of buying them back later at a lower 
price. This means the economic interest of the (temporary) owner of the shares is in 
seeing the company perform badly. In the cases of some small companies, we've even 
seen the short interest – the number of share sold in this fashion – represent a majority 
of the voting stock. For a brief period, therefore, it was, in a utilitarian sense of greater 
value to shareholders for the company to go bust.  
The second trading strategy of hedge funds has been to join the ranks of 
shareholder-activist fund managers. This approach involves taking control of the 
shares for the sake to effecting a change of direction on the company, to pursue a 
particular acquisition or to change the chief executive. The high profile case in 2006 of 
the actions of The Children's Investment Fund and its investment in the German stock 
exchange operator Deutsche Börse AG provoked a political storm that included the 
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German Social Democratic Party chairman Franz Müntefering, then a member of the 
German government, referring to hedge funds as "locusts". Just how profitable of this 
approach can be was demonstrated in a large quantitative study of the shareholder 
activism of the Focus Funds of the UK asset management firm Hermes (Becht, Franks, 
Mayer, & Rossi, 2006).  
Whatever the success of these trading strategies, they complicate massively the 
problems directors have in pursuing an ethical stance based on achieving shareholder 
value. Even more harshly than before, shareholder camps divide along the lines of 
what is in their personal self-interest. The voices from the traditional, long-only asset 
managers, especially those managing pension-fund assets with a long investment 
horizon, argue that directors should act in the interest of long-term investors, not short-
term speculators, a phrase often spat out with the same disgust as Müntefering used 
with "locusts". Some push for governance solutions giving greater voting power to 
long-term holders. Seemingly unaware of the irony, some of these same investors – 
wearing a different hat – argue against the disproportionate voting power afforded to 
a) founding-family shareholders, say, in Belgium, b) the beneficiaries of pyramids 
share structures in Italy, or c) super-voting rights of A-shares in Sweden. It's easy to see 
how these shareholders themselves face conflicts of interest with their narrowly 
personal and utilitarian stance. [It's worth noting, however, that an Oxford Union-style 
debate at the European Corporate Governance Institute in 2007 soundly defeated the 
motion that long-term investors should have double the voting rights. The vote was 13 
in favor to 55 against with three abstentions (ECGI, 2007)]. 
Toward a new ethical stance in governance 
This discussion suggests, from the vantage point of the independent, non-executive 
director, that an ethical system based on shareholder value is unworkable on a practical 
basis as well as having deep theoretical flaws. Stakeholder theory is flawed as well, but 
for different reasons. It fails in theoretical terms because it struggles with determining 
the difference between means and ends. It fails on a practical level because when 
everything is a goal then nothing is. Agency theory helps the director in finding 
solutions to the narrow problems of corporate governance: how to keep managers from 
diverting corporate funds for private purposes. Qualified by reference to transaction-
cost economics, as in the organizational economics theory as outlined by Stiles and 
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Taylor (2001), it can even help directors decide when it is no longer worth trying to 
prevent managers from stealing shareholder funds, indeed why it might help 
shareholders to encourage what the British media like to call fat-cat pay. It was, after 
all, all those very fat-American-cat CEOs who delivered the disproportionately large 
gains in profits, share price appreciation and productivity while taking home large 
sums of cash pay and huge, unrealized gains on stock options.  
Stewardship theory helps explain why people might still want to serve on boards 
of directors of US public companies, despite the risk of federal prosecution under 
Sarbanes-Oxley or shareholder lawsuits so common in litigious America. Stewardship 
will help guide a director's decision when the board faces authorizing a questionable 
transaction or deciding when and how to report bad news. For a summary, see Table 
13.  
What is missing, though, is the big picture, a theory to guide the large, strategic 
decisions, the ones that involve a substantial commitment of shareholder funds or the 
opportunity costs of abandoning one line of business for the sake of entering another. 
 
Table 13 - Perspectives of boards of directors 
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Strategic value 
This framework for the ethics of corporate governance wasn't, perhaps, quite 
complete. Instead of looking "corporate" aims, we might better have formulated the 
notion as serving shareholder interests. The teleological, utilitarian stance remains 
shareholder value, with all the problems that entails, but the deontological focus 
becomes not that of stakeholder theory but of a narrower view: the one of socially 
responsible investors. A third and broader category of aims – collective ones – can be 
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theory and corporate social responsibility, involving the interests of those who aren't 
shareholders. That leaves a gap, in ethical terms utilitarian and in scope collective, 
which we shall call strategic value (See Table 14).  
 
Table 14 - Ethics of governance, expanded 
 Personal Shareholder Enterprise 
Consequentialism 
(teleology) 
Agency theory Shareholder value Strategic value 
Ethical idealism 
(deontology) 





The shareholder perspectives are both problematic. Shareholder value still suffers 
from every director's inability to assess it in a meaningful way. Ethical investing 
operates on the hope that social responsibility will be profitable but on the conviction 
that even if it isn't, it is still the right thing to do. Stakeholder theory – especially in its 
guise as corporate social responsibility – carries over the confusion of means and ends.  
Strategic value, while not easy to determine, asks the director to take actions on the 
basis of what's best in a utilitarian sense for the viability and persistence of the 
enterprise.  
An example: Faced with the decision between a takeover bid at a price than gives 
certainty of a 30 percent gain over a six-month period compared with an uncertain gain 
of 100 percent over a three-year period, how does the director choose? The incumbent 
CEO, conflicted as we know under agency theory, will vote for or against, depending 
on the size his severance package and what his next job outside the company might be 
versus what position and power he'll enjoy in the merged entity. The chairman, when 
it's not the same person, might act in his personal interest (a comfortable retirement, 
perhaps) or out of a sense of stewardship for the narrow interests of his close friends in 
senior management. A non-executive but bound director may feel obliged to vote in 
stewardship of the owners he represents, the founding family, the venture capital fund, 
the activist shareholder. 
Under the governance model that the reforms this decade have promoted, the 
decision rests in the hands of the independent, non-executive, outside directors. They are 
now, supposedly, in a majority. They control all the key board committees. They are 
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able to monitor performance through their control of the audit process, and to 
command the necessary data through their independent staffs. They already possess 
the requisite strategic knowledge through their formal induction to the board and the 
company and their deepening knowledge of the business through the greater 
frequency and length of board meetings. On what basis do they decide?  
They assess what constitutes strategic value. That means judging sources of value – 
particularly the intangible ones – that might be lost in a takeover. If the company itself, 
using its own resources – its people, its customer relationships, its supply chain, its 
research and development – has a pretty good chance of matching the money on offer 
from a bidder, then it's better to stay independent – better, that is, in the sense that 
doing it oneself generates the psychological benefits we valued in aspects of 
stewardship theory as well as creating the options for further value creation through 
having succeeded ourselves. It recognizes that it's better for wealth creation, for 
society, to earn a capital gain rather than just make one. If, on the other hand, the offer is 
clearly much better than what we can manage ourselves, it's better to let someone else 
manage the business.  
Basing decisions on strategic value involved considering the interests of 
stakeholders, yes, but in their strategic sense, for the options they generate in the 
creation of future wealth. The orientation of the independent, non-executive director 
should, therefore, be on the long term, regardless of what shareholders say. Its utility is 
limited by the unpredictability of the future, a shortcoming it shares with all other 
theories. And shareholders may, after all, be merely here today, gone tomorrow. The 
enterprise remains.  
Conclusions 
Boards of directors face a wide variety of decisions that will involve invoking – 
consciously or otherwise – decision framework and ethical perspectives. The dangers 
of executive excess call out for non-executives to look to agenda theory to guard 
against excesses and transaction-cost economics to know when it becomes 
counterproductive to stop here. In most cases they will see shareholder value as the 
governing framework for decisions, and in some instances, especially when the 
companies themselves have adopted sweeping statements of purpose, stewardship 
theory comes into play. Given the economic purpose of most corporations, however, it 
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is not terribly surprising that directors might draw more on utilitarian ethics, using the 
expected consequences of their decisions as the basis for determined their "rightness", 
than on deontological calls for a higher authority of an imperative beyond what is 
prescribed in law. As such, when crucial decisions arise, directors can be guided by 
their determination of what is likely to create strategic value, where the goods of 
stakeholder like employees, customers and suppliers may well be taken into 
consideration, but as means to purpose of wealth creation over the long term. 
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7. Rules of the Game (accepted by BEER) 
Status: Accepted September 2011 by Business Ethics: A European 
Review (Wiley), following a revision and resubmission process earlier 
in the year.  
An institutional view of 'Rules of the game' 
This paper discusses a case in which the rules of the game change, following a 
financial crisis at an unusually public version of a private company: Liverpool Football 
Club. Its argument is presented in mainstream ethical terms, though the background of 
the case might as easily have been described through institutional theory. It is in part a 
matter of director duties in law, and in part a matter of the personal conviction of the 
directors who voted by a majority to disenfranchise the owners and sell the club 
against their express wishes – the agents had defied the principals in an extreme form. 
That is concerns a prominent and famous football club meant that the deliberations 
were conducted in an unusually public way. That it is a private company with just two 
individuals as owners eliminates the ambiguity over the nature of shareholder value 
(as discussed above in the chapter "The politics of shareholder activism").  
The case can also be seen in institutional terms, where the failure of club, 
financially and on the pitch, unsettled accepted logic of the rights of owners when it 
came into sharp conflict with a fan-oriented logic. Unsettling the institutional 
arrangements opens the way to radical change. In terms used by Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996), the institutional context, with its conflicting logics, came to be out of 
line with the values of the non-shareholder directors, who also saw power 
dependencies shift as the deadline for loan repayment approached.  
Where this remains an ethical case is that the taken-for-granted "rules of the game" 
are broken and the basis for decision, absent clear advice from case law, forces 
directors to reconsider their values. Its resolution, which can be interpreted as decision 
based on a pragmatic view of ethics, leaves the door open for a new logic to take hold, 
or for the old one to reassert itself. 
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Rules of the game: Whose value is served when the 
board fires the owners?  
(2011) 
Abstract: How does a board of directors decide what is right? The 
contest over this question is frequently framed as a debate between 
shareholder value and stakeholder rights, between a utilitarian view 
of the ethics of corporate governance and a deontological one. This 
paper uses a case study with special circumstances that allow us to 
examine in an unusually clear way the conflict between shareholder 
value and other bases on which a board can act. In the autumn of 
2010 the board of Liverpool Football Club sold the company to 
another investing group against the explicit wishes of the owners. 
The peculiar circumstances of this case provide insight into the 
conflict between ethical approaches to board decisions, allowing us to 
see certain issues more clearly than we can in listed corporations with 
many shareholders. What the analysis suggests is that the board saw 
more than one type of utility on which to base its ethical decision, 
and that one version resonated with perceived duties to stakeholders. 
This alignment of outcomes of strategic value with duties contrasted 
with the utility of shareholder value. While there are reasons to be 
cautious in generalizing, the case further suggests reasons why 
boards may reject shareholder value, in opposition to mainstream 
notions of corporate governance, without rejecting utility as a base of 
their decisions. Further the partial alignment of duty and utility 
facilitates a pragmatic decision, rather than one based on a priori 
claims.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, boards, ethics, pragmatism, 
shareholder value, Liverpool FC 
Introduction 
In 2010 a strange event occurred in a corner of the world of corporate governance: 
The board of directors of a sizeable enterprise in the UK fired the owners. The event 
attracted wide coverage in the news media, providing a rare public glimpse into 
corporate governance operating in the raw. What the incident revealed made 
intriguing reading for sports fans around the world, throwing up a cast of characters 
with heroes and villains, a real-life boardroom soap opera, the modern-day equivalent 
of a morality play. But the lessons we can draw from it, about the ethics of corporate 
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governance and the role of company directors are larger and more nuanced. Liverpool 
Football Club got new owners and hope for salvation from a forced descent from the 
English Premier League. In the press and on television the club's directors were hailed 
as courageous and virtuous as they evicted the greedy merchants from the temple of 
Anfield.  
Away from the hype of the headlines, a more mundane set of concerns arise: The 
incident suggests that directors do not, in practice, or at least in this case, put their 
allegiance to shareholders above all. The case raises questions about the nature of 
shareholder value, which lies at the heart of much of the academic literature and 
public-policy debate over corporate governance around the world during the past 
several decades. It offers a rare chance to examine a key issue, how in practice directors 
see their governance role in quite a pure form, without much of the messy complexity 
of public corporations and various categories of institutional investors and focuses 
attention instead on the relationship between boards and owners. At work in this case 
is a different logic, a different ethic, than the one prescribed in much of the literature on 
corporate governance, one with implications for how business people use ethics to 
inform their judgements.  
In this essay, we consider first the background of the case and the corporate 
governance issues it raises and then review what the literature tells us about the role of 
boards and owners, both under the law and independently of it. We then consider how 
longstanding debates in ethics give shape to the work of boards of directors – 
independently of law and regulation – and how in particular utilitarian approaches to 
board ethics have clashed with duty-based perspectives. The evaluation of the case 
suggests that in practice the board of this company chose what it felt was the "right 
thing to do" once the duty and utility became aligned in purpose, a purpose that 
remained at variance with notions of shareholder value that lie at the heart of many 
normative views of corporate governance. We conclude with observations about the 
limitations of generalizing from this case to the wider world of corporations, but also 
with reasons why this pure case resembles closely the model of corporate governance 
that the mainstream literature describes. It suggests that pragmatic decisions arise 
when some forms of utility align with perceived a priori duty.  
Donald Nordberg  Page 173 
'You'll Never Walk Alone' 
Liverpool FC is a proud club. As it entered the 2010-11 season, it could claim 18 
championships in the top English football league – tied with its arch rival Manchester 
United for the lead. It had not won the league, though, in the last 20 years, despite 
regularly finishing in the top four and competing in the top European club 
competition. From the stands at its stadium at Anfield, supporters sing out their 
anthem at the end of every match (from Rodgers and Hammerstein, via Gerry and the 
Pacemakers), with an appeal to an unnamed "other" person, spirit or force:  
Walk on, walk on, with hope in your heart  
and you'll never walk alone.  
You'll never walk alone. 
The background to the case was widely chronicled in the UK press and in 
statements from the club itself (e.g. Eaton, 2010a, 2010b; Gibson, 2010; Liverpool FC, 
2010; R. Smith, 2010; S. Smith, 2010). In February 2007, the club came under the 
ownership of two American investors, Tom Hicks and George Gillett in a deal that 
valued the club at £219 million. Hicks, a venture capitalist, had experience of sports 
franchises, having bought the Texas Rangers baseball team he had acquired in 1998 
from George W. Bush, who used the proceeds to finance his successful campaign to 
become President of the United States. Hicks teamed up with Gillett, who owned the 
Montreal Canadiens hockey team, promising to revive Liverpool FC with investment 
in a new stadium and in players to secure its place at the very top of English football. 
The financing method they adopted was similar to their experience in managing other 
sports franchises: borrow money on the promise of future revenue streams and 
maximize the yield to shareholders by keeping equity investment to a minimum. Royal 
Bank of Scotland made the loans to finance the deal.  
The two owners soon fell out with each other, leaving the club without direction or 
the planned further investment, just as the global financial crisis swept RBS into its 
maelstrom. Performance on the pitch was good but not great, and the club found it 
difficult to compete for new talent against rivals like Chelsea, Real Madrid and latterly 
Manchester City, with seemingly unlimited funds available from wealthy owners who 
cared little if not at all about the cost. By the autumn of 2010, with the loans coming 
due for repayment and RBS unwilling, perhaps even unable to extend the term, the 
club teetered on the brink of slipping into administration, a form of insolvency. The 
board tried to negotiate the sale of the club to a series of other investors, without 
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success. The turmoil unsettled the team. Seven games into the new season, Liverpool 
sank to near the bottom of the Premier League, having won only one match and gained 
only six points. Under league rules, Liverpool FC would have nine points deducted if it 
went into administration. That would give it a total for the season to-date of minus 
three, making the threat of relegation next season to the second tier of teams palpable. 
If that happened, the club would lose tens of millions of pounds in television revenues; 
key players seemed certain to leave even before that. This path would clearly be bad 
for the club, bad for the supporters, and probably bad for football. Fans assailed the 
owners for their actions and inactions, for betraying the proud traditions of the club – 
their club, the fans' club. 
The board felt urgent action was needed. After various suitors pulled out of 
proposed deals, the board was left with a decision: the most viable alternative to 
administration was to sell the club to another American sports investor, John Henry, 
through his company, New England Sports Ventures. But there was a catch: Henry's 
offer, worth about £300 million, was sufficient only to pay off the debt and accrued 
interest on the loans to RBS. Hicks and Gillett would receive next to nothing. By a vote 
of 3-2 the board approved the sale of the club to Henry. The dissenting votes were from 
Hicks and Gillett.  
Hicks and Gillett then sought to have two board members removed and replaced 
with their own associates. [An overview of the board and governance arrangements is 
provided in Appendix 1.33] The chairman Martin Broughton, who was also chairman of 
a major listed company, argued that he had joined the Liverpool FC board on explicit 
written agreement that he should try to find a buyer. Christian Purslow, who had 
worked in senior managerial roles at a major listed company, became managing 
director and joined the board to put the club's finances in order. Moreover, Broughton 
insisted that he and only he could remove members of the board. Hicks and Gillett 
took their case to court. They lost in a ruling by the High Court in London, which ruled 
that the board did have the right to sell the club. They then sought and gained an 
injunction to block the sale from a court in Dallas, Texas, with tenuous jurisdictional 
grounds, before losing again in London before the Dallas court backed down. The deal 
was forced through over the continuing objection of the owners. Henry took control of 
the club, though Hicks and Gillett immediately threatened to sue the other three 
                                                     
33 NB: The appendix is not part of the paper accepted for publication. 
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directors personally for breach of trust. Still, the fans won, and arguably football won. 
Hicks and Gillett had lost.  
The courts no doubt considered the finer points in property rights and contract law 
in reaching their conclusions, and what company law says about the obligations of 
directors, under the newly revised Companies Act (UK Parliament, 2006), to which we 
return shortly. The board no doubt took legal advice before voting to disenfranchise 
the owners, for the sake of minimizing the danger that another court might find the 
directors in wilful disregard of the law. But law is only an approximation of ethics, the 
attempt by society to settle what is right with a degree of fairness to all. The decision to 
go against the express wishes of the owners they were meant to serve raises issues of 
ethics that underpin, often in an unspoken way, the field of corporate governance. 
What does it mean for corporate governance when the board fires the owners?  
Corporate governance, in theory and practice 
Much of the literature on corporate governance has taken the view that the 
purpose of boards is to ensure the company strives to achieve shareholder value. 
Under agency theory, managers, the "agents", are assumed to act in their own interest, 
which may diverge substantially from those of shareholders, the "principals" 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983a). This theoretical approach views 
the board of directors as the shareholders' intermediary. Shareholders elect boards to 
monitor the performance of managers at closer hand than shareholders could do on 
their own. In this view, boards may represent another level of agency relationship to 
their principals, but one, if properly structured, that is less likely to show conflicts of 
interest with the principals, and thus help to overcome the agency problem that arises 
from the separation of ownership and control in corporations (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). The ethical assumption is this: Agents should act in accordance with the interests 
of owners, so the corporate governance imperative is to align the utility of boards and 
owners. In practice boards' primary roles are 1) to structure pay for managers that 
align their interests with those of shareholders and then 2) to monitor performance 
against targets. Discussions of the agency problem are often couched in terms of 
behavioural economics: They assume that "economic man", as non-ethical actors, will 
respond to incentives in a self-interested way. This line of theory led to the growth of 
pay-for-performance and stock options in public companies. While they represent an 
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"agency cost" to shareholders, that cost is worth incurring if performance enhances 
shareholder value even more. With growing theoretical justification (e.g. Rappaport, 
1986), striving for shareholder value became the main goal of enterprises and the 
defining purpose of boards.  
Agency theory may dominate the literature on corporate governance, but it has its 
critics as well, who give voice to alternative interpretations of the role of boards. 
Challenges come from the idea that directors have greater duties that monitoring 
managers and controlling their behaviour. Empirical studies suggest that boards have 
input to the strategy of enterprises (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Pugliese et al., 2009; 
Pye & Pettigrew, 2006), even if their contribution is modest (Stiles, 2001). Directors also 
facilitate access to scarce external resources (A. J. Hillman et al., 2000). These 
contributions sit uncomfortably in corporate governance models where the board's role 
is performance monitoring and control (Roberts et al., 2005). Blair and Stout (1999) 
argue that boards serve as a mediating hierarchy to resolve the contesting claims on a 
company's resources. Still others see in the behaviour of directors and senior corporate 
officers a commitment to doing a good job, an area known as stewardship theory (J. H. 
Davis et al., 1997; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). Its conclusions share with agency theory a 
focus on value creation, often for shareholders, but like resource-dependency 
approaches they reach conclusions about the "right thing to do" that are at odds with 
an agency-based approach.  
Other doubts about the adequacy of agency theory have emerged as well. Most of 
the corporate governance literature focuses on relationships on larger listed companies, 
with a large number of dispersed shareholders, where the agency problem is seen as 
most acute. Berle and Means (1932/1991), arguing in the context of a collapse in 
confidence in corporations in the wake of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, described the 
issues raised by the separation of ownership from control, setting the stage for much of 
the debate over corporate governance since then. But the agency problem is not just a 
matter of remote and powerless principals unable to control agents. A second stream of 
the literature concerns large owners who abuse their comparative power and 
expropriate corporate resources for their own purposes at an agency cost to minority 
shareholders, a stream of argument often focused on continental European companies, 
so many of which have controlling "blockholders" (Enriques & Volpin, 2007; Laeven & 
Levine, 2008; Roe, 2003). Another stream looks at governance in private companies 
(e.g. Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006; Ng & Roberts, 2007), but that often focuses on 
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issues of succession planning in family businesses, rather than shareholder value 
(Hillier & McColgan, 2009; Scholes, Wright, Westhead, & Bruining, 2010). That 
literature, however, raises issues that go to the heart of this case, and by reflection 
those of large listed companies as well: What happens when shareholders interests are 
out of line with the interests of the business itself?  
Perhaps the loudest challenge to agency theory comes from proponents of 
stakeholder theory (e.g. Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman & Philips, 2002), who see 
boards as having duties that go beyond satisfying shareholders. This position holds 
that directors should look after all those who have a legitimate interest in the 
enterprise, including suppliers, customers, employees and others. In this view, the 
duty of directors is to assess the salience of stakeholder interests (Suchman, 1995). 
Stakeholder theory can be seen as taking two forms. In a weak form, boards should 
promote those stakeholder claims that also contribute to the value of the enterprise, 
what Jensen (2001) calls enlightened value maximization. A strong form of stakeholder 
theory, however, ascribes rights to stakeholders, placing their interests on a par or even 
ahead of shareholder interests (Crowther & Caliyurt, 2004). Freeman, whose early 
invocation of the term stakeholder (1984) launched this stream of discussion, has since 
sought to reconcile what he called the instrumental and normative forms of 
stakeholder theory (Freeman & Philips, 2002).  
In the UK, the nature of stakeholder rights was hotly debated during an eight-year 
process that began shortly after a Labour government came to power in 1997. Some 
political actors on the left urged the adoption of worker representation on boards, 
using Germany's longstanding principle of "co-determination" as a base. Others 
pressed for explicit duties of directors towards employees, customers and suppliers, 
citing Dutch law among others as a model. More conservative voices, including much 
of the asset management industry, argued for shareholder primacy. When the reform 
of company law eventually passed, it specified, for the first time, the "general duties" of 
directors as being "to the company" (UK Parliament, 2006, Section 170). Section 172 
then specifies how directors are to interpret that obligation. Directors must have "due 
regard to" the interests of a variety of stakeholders, but that phrase as a sub-point of 
the main statement: "A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good 
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole" (Section 172.1); case law shows that by "members" the law means 
shareholders. While advocates of normative forms of stakeholder theory claimed 
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progress, supporters of shareholder interests asserted that the "benefit of members" 
had maintained precedence (Mullerat, 2010). Ministers in the Labour government at 
the time spoke of the Act as embodying "enlightened shareholder interest" (UK 
Government, 2007), partially echoing the attempt by Jensen (2001) to reconcile 
shareholder and stakeholder perspectives. Those words do not, however, figure in the 
legislation, and other actors made different interpretations. The GC100, an association 
of general counsel for the largest 100 companies on the London Stock Exchange, says 
directors should act in "the interests of the Company and its shareholders, both current 
and future, as a whole" (GC100, 2007, p. 1). This may well prevail for large, listed 
companies with a dispersed and fluid shareholder base; whether it applies where 
shareholders are clearly identified is less clear. The Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales gives a yet another view: The law gives directors a "single duty 
to work for the benefit of shareholders"; moreover, those same ministers "consistently 
tried to provide comfort to directors on the impact of the provisions" (ICAEW, 2011). 
But the accountants' institute notes that until case law develops we cannot be sure. The 
case of Liverpool FC might become one, but in the meantime, how does a director 
decide?  
When the legal ground is new, ambiguous and untested, and when current theory 
of corporate governance that informs the training of company directors pulls boards in 
at least three different directions, the choice becomes an ethical stance. We turn now to 
a discussion of the ethical principles that underlie these contesting approaches to 
corporate governance.  
Ethics in corporate governance 
Virtually every decision a board could make has ethical dimensions: Their choices 
almost always involve spending someone else's money. A substantial literature sees 
corporate governance as a practical example of ethics in action (Brickley, Smith, & 
Zimmerman, 2003; Martynov, 2009; McCall, 2002; Roberts, 2005, 2009; Rodriguez-
Dominguez, Gallego-Alvarez, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2009; Wieland, 2001; Zetzsche, 2007). 
The starting point is often that the agreement to create a corporation is a decision based 
on perceived utility for the participants, so utilitarian ethics hold sway. Echoing 
Bentham (1789/1904) and Mill (1863/1991), this approach sees the greater good for the 
greatest number of shareholders as its central principle. Agency theory, sometimes 
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seen as taking an amoral stance, can be viewed as being based on ethical egoism 
(Frankena, 1963), moderated through the moral force of the invisible hand of markets 
(Zak, 2008). This view has resonances in company law and theories of the firm as a 
nexus of contracts with the aim of minimizing transaction costs (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1988).  
This view sits unhappily with many scholars of ethics, as a shortcoming of 
utilitarianism and other consequentialist approaches yield problematic responses to 
many of the moral questions that businesses face. Much of stakeholder theory, 
particularly of the strong variety, is built on deontological assumptions of a priori 
duties of boards to consider the broader impact of corporate decisions (Bowie, 1999; 
Evan & Freeman, 1993; Freeman & Evan, 1990), rather than just the fabled "bottom 
line".  
Various scholars have attempted to bridge the divide between duty-based and 
consequentialist approaches. Hasnas (1998) argues for a consent-based view of 
corporate governance, as it represent the common ground between shareholder- and 
stakeholder-based approach as well as with a social contract theory of the firm. This, 
too, is unsatisfactory as the basis for the difficult decisions, however, when the interests 
of shareholders and stakeholders polarize sharply, which is when boards need to turn 
to ethics for guidance, cases where both law and codes of conduct tend to be silent. 
Hendry (2001, p. 173) argues that business ethics scholars have failed to make the case 
for a realistic version of stakeholder theory that would provide a practical alternative 
to the shareholder perspective, concluding that "despite all the talk of stakeholders, 
they have become increasingly marginal to the corporate governance debate".  
The divide is apparent when setting out the ethical approach that underpins the 
main theories of corporate governance. Nordberg (2008a) makes the case that another 
consequentialist approach is possible, changing the frame of reference away from 
stakeholder versus shareholder notions of the firm. He proposes a concept called 
"strategic value", in which directors may adopt a utility-based approach, calculating 
the value of the outcomes of their decisions, though not with shareholder value or even 
an instrumental notion of stakeholder theory as its focal point. In this ethical frame, 
directors focus on the consequences of decisions to the value of the business, 
irrespective of the outcome for any stance any group of shareholders might take. This 
is not quite what the UK law identifies as the responsibility of directors, as it puts 
greater emphasis on the descriptive first part – to "promote the success of the 
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company" – than on the normative second part – "for the benefit of its members as a 
whole" (UK Parliament, 2006, Section 172).  
Still, shareholder value is a problematic notion, despite the mathematical 
formulation advanced by Rappaport (1986) with its calculation of a return on capital 
largely divorced from the interests of the people who provide it, locating the decisions 
of boards as rational, economic ones, while ignoring the bounded nature of the 
rationality that leads to them (Simon, 1955). This approach to  value calculation stands 
accused by think-tanks (e.g. Aspen Institute, 2009; Tonello, 2006), policy-makers (e.g. 
Walker, 2009b) and academics (e.g. Bebchuk, 2005) of fostering a short-term approach 
to business decisions. The metric of "total shareholder return", the sum of dividends 
and capital gains, seems simple enough to calculate until one recognizes shareholders 
lack a common time horizon for their interests, even if those interests were common 
(Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans & Manso, 2009; Nordberg, 2010). 
Another approach draws upon the philosophical tradition of pragmatism to 
reconcile competing claims of duty and utility. Hendry (2004) argues the case for a 
bimoral approach to move beyond the shareholder-stakeholder views with their 
utilitarian and deontological underpinnings. Hendry draws the view from Rorty (1989) 
that behind American pragmatism sits an optimistic view that people "will use their 
freedom not only to advance their self-interest but also to protect the common interest" 
(Hendry, 2004, pp. 149-150). Here the moral choice involves living with and reconciling 
tensions between obligations and self-interest. Singer (2010) shares the view that 
shareholder and stakeholder orientations split along deontological and 
consequentialist grounds with a utility-based view for more instrumental approaches 
to stakeholders in the middle. He sees in the American pragmatist tradition of James, 
Dewey and Peirce a way to reconcile the dilemma and work through the dialectic of 
contesting ethical norms. He notes that Margolis (1998) called for pragmatic solutions 
when empirical ambiguities arise. Margolis and Walsh (2003) see ambiguity as the 
starting point of many strategic decisions, pointing towards a pragmatic basis for 
decision-making weighing the balance of contending ethical frames.  
With this frame of reference in mind we return to the case of Liverpool FC as its 
directors voted to ignore the expressed wishes of the owners and sold the club out 
from under them. What was the ethical basis for their decision, and what implications 
might it have more generally for the work of corporate boards?  
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Ethics at Liverpool FC 
The exact nature of the deliberations of the Liverpool FC board cannot be known in 
detail. Even if the individuals would agree to discuss them, the contentious nature of 
the events and the litigation that ensued suggest they might at best offer redacted 
views of the events or engage in reinterpretation of meanings after the event. The event 
itself was reported in news media, which took an uncommon interest in issues of 
corporate governance because of the uncommon celebrity of the company and the 
uncommon passion of one set of stakeholders, the fans. Liverpool FC makes good 
headlines even without a boardroom bust-up.  
To those interested in corporate governance, this case is uncommon for another 
reason. It presents a remarkably simple example of the issues that arise between 
owners and boards. First, it is a private company, required under law to report only 
summary annual financial statements to the authorities and only many months in 
arrears. It faces no obligation for continuous disclosure of material information. 
However, in keeping with the practice of several large football clubs in the UK, many 
of which were once listed on public equity markets, Liverpool FC has been more 
forthcoming with disclosures than the law requires. Second, when the case began, and 
stripping away the formalities of the corporate entities that acted as intermediaries, 
there were only two shareholding individuals, so discussions of its corporate 
governance need not deal with the complexity of how board could discern where the 
interests of shareholders lie. Third, both shareholders were members of the board of 
directors, with direct access to all the information relevant to the board's decision. 
Neither the separation of ownership and control nor the information asymmetries that 
complicate analysis of corporate governance concerns in public companies apply.  
The board voted by 3 to 2 to sell the club to New England Sport Ventures. Despite 
their disagreements over seemingly everything else to do with the club, Hicks and 
Gillett were united in their view that selling the club was a bad idea. The agency 
problem described by many scholars of corporate governance (Fama, 1980; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983a; Kumar & Sivaramakrishnan, 2008) took on a rather different light. 
Viewing the board and senior management of the club as agents of the owners, the 
agency problem swells to extreme proportions: not only has the board appropriated 
resources of the owners, they have taken control of the company away its owners and 
given it to another party.  
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The proposed price, from New England Sports Ventures or the other would-be 
suitors, was insufficient to give the owners much if any return on their investment. The 
alternative – Hicks and Gillett remaining as owners while the club enter a court-
ordered administration – included the risk that key players would see to leave the club 
at the next available time in January 2011. The consequences included possible 
relegation next season, with lower revenues from television rights, but with the 
possibility that the owners could still recover some value at some time in the future. 
Whether that would be the case is a business judgement, and opinion on the board 
might well have been divided. Even so, the interests of the shareholders were clear: 
They had expressed them in no uncertain terms.  
The case raises legal questions concerning the boundaries of property rights and 
the nature of the contracts under which the chairman and the managing director joined 
the board. As noted above, it seems likely that the board took legal advice before acting 
against the instruction of the owners, but earlier they faced what was essentially a 
question of ethics in corporate governance. Narrow self-interest, what Frankena (1963) 
calls ethical egoism, seemed not to play a role in the board's decision. A threat of 
litigation hung over the case, and the board members who voted against the owners 
had little personally to gain other than the peace and freedom of leaving the board 
with the job of selling it done. They may have calculated, more or perhaps rather less 
formally, the utility of the transaction, but clearly the owners' perception of utility was 
very different. And if the board's fiduciary duty is to the owners, as one reading of 
Section 172.1 of the Act has it, then a legal interpretation of utility would have led the 
board to a different conclusion. This was not, then, a simple, utilitarian view based on 
shareholder value.  
An analysis under stakeholder theory suggests a different interpretation of the 
rationale for the board's decision. The chairman and managing director were both 
avowed supporters of the club. Much of the interest among news organizations and 
reporting on the club's website focused on fan reaction. New management would end 
the boardroom feuding and let the players concentrate on on-the-pitch performance. 
Fewer players would demand to have their contract sold to other clubs in the next 
transfer period in January. New owners would proceed with rebuilding the stadium to 
increase its capacity and create improved amenities for fans. Most importantly, new 
owners would give the club a fighting chance to revive its performance enough to 
escape relegation, a humiliation that fans could scarcely contemplate. Moreover, as a 
Donald Nordberg  Page 183 
sports enterprise, Liverpool FC has commitments to its competitors. Unlike a normal 
business, the presence of competitors is fundamental to the product. Horizontal 
growth by acquisition has no meaning. And the nature of competition-as-product gives 
a requirement from greater regulatory intervention and an ethical obligation towards 
other clubs. Football league rules are set to facilitate the failure of clubs, though the 
demise or even just the demotion of one of the biggest clubs would cause both financial 
and reputational damage to others. This alters the stakeholder map, making competitor 
claims more salient (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999) and justifying a level of 
regulation that further constrains the action of managers and owners and the discretion 
that boards have in choosing a course of action.  
But was this an invocation of stakeholder rights over shareholder rights? Was this 
a decision based on a sense of duty to a larger purpose? As the case reached its 
conclusion, Broughton spoke of his allegiance to the fans and the club's "wonderful 
history, a wonderful tradition", adding:  
I said "keep the faith". I had the faith. I was quite clear in my mind 
that we were doing the right thing, and I was quite clear that justice 
was on our side and that we would work our way through it…. I 
want to thank the fans as well. This has been as stressful for them as 
it has been for us. I fully sympathise with their anxieties and the 
nerve-wracking nature of that. I thank them for keeping the faith 
(Eaton, 2010b). 
This statement, cast in moral and even religious language, suggests that the board 
held, at least to an extent, to a notion of duty from the perspective of stakeholder 
theory, and that a deontological rather than strictly utilitarian view led to the board's 
decision to cast shareholder value to the side. Yet both anecdotal evidence from 
executives in other enterprises and the academic literature on corporate governance 
and social responsibility (e.g. Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Hawkins, 2006; Lea, 2004) have 
many examples of considerable scepticism of directors towards any notion a priori 
rights of stakeholders. 
"Keeping the faith" involved another set of stakeholders, without whom the 
enterprise would fail: the players, supported by owners who would take an approach 
seeking the common good, the good of the fans. Broughton's interview continued:  
"We have had an incredible team and they've all done a great job…. 
We have owners now who understand about winning, are dedicated 
to winning, have put the club on a sound financial footing, are 
willing to back the club to get back to being one of the, preferably 
THE, top teams…. NESV bring the passion, the experience, the 
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understanding of sport and the passion of fans and the need to think 
about how the fans as stakeholders fit into the whole thing. It is a 
business but it's not just a business and they understand that the 
emotional side of the fans and that's what sets them apart" (Eaton, 
2010b).  
"It's a business but not just a business": In this case, we see a determination by the 
board in which stakeholder interests, in particular those of the fans but also those of 
players, took priority over shareholder interests. In this way, the role of the board 
emerges not as the monitor for shareholders but as a mediating hierarchy (Blair & 
Stout, 1999) to settle competing claims. That is, however, only one part of the board's 
calculus.  
The consequences of a decision in favour of the owners' interest would have 
damaged, perhaps very badly, the business of the football club. The fact that a 
perceived duty to fans coincided with one utilitarian judgement (strategic value) at 
odds with another (shareholder value) gives the decision of the board greater impetus 
to decide against the interest of the owners and against shareholder value. What 
remained for the courts to decide were the narrow legal matters of property rights and 
contract, not the moral principles that underpin the board's decision. In the face of 
ambiguity, the board adopted a pragmatic approach, suggesting that pragmatic 
decisions arise more easily when consequential and deontological interpretations of 
what is right coincide, even if they coincide imperfectly. In this case, one version of 
utility trumped another. In different circumstances, a different interpretation might 
arise from the same set of considerations.  
Conclusions and observations  
This case differs from the mainstream corporate governance literature in several 
ways that may limit applicability of its conclusions. It involves a private company, not 
a modern public corporation of the type described in the seminal works on corporate 
governance and agency theory (Berle & Means, 1932/1991; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Unlike other private companies, it is one unusually in the public eye. These 
observations must, therefore, remain very tentative. To generalize would require 
research that goes beyond an inquiry into one decision by one board of one company 
operating under one country's law and regulation.  
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That said, the peculiarities of the case also allow a particularly clear view of the 
issue issues and ambiguities surrounding the concept of shareholder value and how 
they affect the ethical choices a board faces. By eliminating the ambiguity over where 
shareholder interests lie, the ambiguities over ethical choices are laid bare. By 
examining a private company that adopts an unusually public stance because of a 
perceived obligation to stakeholders for transparency, the case affords unusual access 
to board deliberations.  
The picture that emerges is one of a contest between differing goods and rights 
that illustrate the value and shortcomings of taking a strong view of stakeholder 
theory, with its roots in duty ethics, and those of shareholder theory, with its basis in a 
narrow view of utility. This special case shows that appeals to shareholder value 
involve appeal to a different special case, that of the public company with dispersed 
shareholders, where that narrow view of utility often approximates the wider view of 
the strategic value of the business.  
In this case, deontological and utilitarian views differ on what is right; but when 
aspects of those views approximate each other the door opens for a pragmatic choice. 
In public companies these views are blurred by the uncertainties over whether the 
concept of shareholder value pertains to current shareholders, future shareholders or 
market participants as a whole. Those uncertainties give boards latitude to justify 
decisions to themselves without having to choose between utility and duty when 
rejecting at least a narrow definition of shareholder value. The analysis suggests 
further that the term shareholder value can be used as a substitute for strategic value 
when needed to resolve an ethical dilemma and used with a different meaning when 
discussing specific decisions with special shareholders.  
You'll never walk alone: The fans make this point at every game, and in this case 
the board paid considerable heed to their arguments, a stakeholder view. The rules of 
this game can be derived from the actions of the board as moral agents, if not exactly as 
agents of shareholders. The fact that the board agreed with fans and not owners does 
not mean that the board had abandoned utility, merely that it had abandoned a narrow 
view of it, the view of shareholder value. Different circumstances might well lead to a 
different conclusion, as pragmatism suggests.  
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Appendix 1: Liverpool FC governance arrangements 2010 
According to records at Companies House, in the summer and autumn of 2010 
Liverpool FC, legally known as Liverpool Football Club & Athletic Grounds Ltd., was 
the principal operating unit of Kop Football (Holdings) Ltd., itself a subsidiary of Kop 
Football (Cayman) Ltd., whose ultimate owners were Thomas O. Hicks and George N. 
Gillett Jr. The tables below give an overview of the corporate governance 
arrangements. Kop Football (Holdings) sold Liverpool FC to New England Sports 
Ventures in October 2010. 
Table 15 - Board 
Board roles Kop Football (Holdings) Ltd., October 2010 
Chairman Martin Broughton (appointed 8 June 2010; resigned 15 October 
2010) 
Managing Director Christian Purslow (appointed 25 June 2010; resigned 15 
October 2010) 
Director Ian Ayre (commercial director of Liverpool FC; appointed to 
Kop board 18 December 2009; resigned 15 October 2010; then 
named managing director of Liverpool FC on 22 March 2011, 
following asset sale); he was, thus, an executive director but 
having been appointed before the then chairman and 
managing director his position was in a sense independent of 
them 
Director/shareholder Thomas Hicks (Ultimate owner) 
Director/shareholder George Gillett Jr. (Ultimate owner) 
Company Secretary Philip Nash (appointed 28 April 2010; resigned 23 November 
2010) 
 
Table 16 - Governance arrangements 
Provision Combined Code recommendation Kop Football (Holdings) Ltd. 
Chairman-CEO Separate roles Separate: Broughton, Purslow 
Board 
independence 
At least half the board, 
excluding chairman, 
independent of management 
and major shareholders 
Two of five independent of 
management; three of five 
independent of shareholders; 
none independent of both 
Chairman 
independence 
Chairman should be 
independent at time of 
appointment  
Broughton was independent, 
having been recruited for his 
major company experience to 
organize sale of the club 
Audit Committee made up of 
independent non-executive 
directors 
No evidence of committee 
Remuneration Committee made up of 
independent non-executive 
directors 
No evidence of committee 
Nomination Committee made up of majority No evidence of committee 
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independent directors 
 
NB: The provision of independence from shareholders in the code is designed to 
offset the so-called principal-principal conflict, that is, when a major shareholder might 
abuse rights of minority shareholders. The descriptive and normative literature on 
small company governance suggests that different norms apply family- or individual-
owned businesses to those at the listed companies (Brenes, Madrigal, & Requena, 2011; 
Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; S. Lane, Astrachan, Keyt, & McMillan, 2006; D. 
Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Ng & Roberts, 2007). Absence of committees is not 
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8. News and corporate governance 
(Journalism) 
Status: Published in December 2007 in Journalism: Theory, Practice and 
Criticism (Sage Publications). 
This essay was written after I had been accepted to study at the 
University of Liverpool in 2007 but before I had formally enrolled in 
September. The occasion arose when two cases raising corporate 
governance issues presented themselves almost simultaneously in an 
industry I knew well – news. The paper was drafted that summer and 
was accepted quickly by the editors of the target journal, Journalism: 
Theory, Practice and Criticism, owing to its topical content and 
published in the December 2007 issue.  
An institutional view of corporate governance in news 
organizations 
This essay is rather different in character from the others in the collection. One 
reason is chronological: This was the first of the papers I researched and drafted after 
taking up doctoral studies. It was also written for a different audience, for academic 
journalists, and aimed at a media studies journal. More importantly, however, the 
difference in approach comes from my personal engagement with this topic and these 
cases. This chapter concerns an issue I have lived with for almost all my professional 
life. It deals with specific issues that stimulated my general interest in the field of 
corporate governance and the desire to pursue it as a research agenda. In a sense, 
therefore, it also provides a bridge between more mainstream corporate governance 
theory and practice in Chapters 1-7 and the reflections about the forces driving my 
research in Chapter 9.  
News gathering and governance 
My career in journalism – including 18 years at one of the companies in this 
analysis and strategy consulting work I later did for the other – provided almost daily 
reminders of the tensions that exist between a) the commercial goals of the 
corporations, their managers and shareholders, and b) the imperatives of news 
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coverage. The former involves the well known desire for profits, dividends and capital 
gains. The latter often involves expenditures on news gathering with little promise of a 
return. Those expenditures are not merely financial. Two vignettes, very different in 
character, illustrate the point.  
The first is an incident involving a senior commercial manager at Reuters, who had 
come from the accounting side before being put in charge of a large profit-and-loss 
centre and then development of information products for investment banks. One day 
he read a first-hand account of journalists who had been captured by rebels in west 
Africa and threatened, at gunpoint, with execution if Reuters did not publish news 
favourable to the rebels' cause. The journalists refused, and after some time and much 
distress the rebels relented. This manager sent a copy of the story to all his staff with a 
note saying how proud it made him feel to work for this organization. He was not a 
sentimentalist about news, but he saw in this episode that value involves more than 
market capitalization and that costs involve more than money. Since those days, and 
especially during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past decade, news 
gathering has become a very costly business.  
The second is the observation of the famous American jurist Louis Brandeis that 
sunlight is the best of disinfectants (Brandeis, 1913-14). That saying has become part of 
the canon of corporate governance and disclosure. A colleague at Reuters used to say 
that the purpose of a news organization was to shed light on dark places. The 
similarity of those sentences highlights the role of news organizations in the system of 
corporate as well as political governance, a topic with a small but growing literature 
(Marron, Sarabia-Panol, Sison, Rao, & Niekamp, 2010; G. S. Miller, 2006; Schudson, 
2002; Tambini, 2010; Thompson, 2009; Westphal & Deephouse, 2011). The published 
version of this chapter contributed a bit to it. I felt honoured when the Global 
Corporate Governance Forum of the World Bank Group asked to republish it for 
Forum members and followers. The paper had found a route from media studies 
academics to the wider corporate governance community. 
News and institutional theory 
Often called the Fourth Estate (Fengler & Russ-Mohl, 2008; Sherman, 2002), the 
press is a social institution. The Leveson Inquiry into the media and society, underway 
in the UK at this writing, is investigating the behaviour of news organizations and in 
particular News Corporation, a company that figures centrally in the discussion in this 
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chapter. While his findings will not be known for some time, Lord Justice Leveson has 
heard a variety of arguments why journalists might usefully stand outside conventional 
institutional arrangements to which other corporations and individuals are subject. 
Walter Williams, who founded the first academic school of journalism more than a 
century ago,34 explained those reasons by describing the news a "public trust" 
(Williams, 1908/2005). Its mission was to hold the other institutions of society to 
account. His "Journalist's Creed" includes a rather quaintly worded exhortation that 
journalists should be wary of those with money, including the proprietors of their own 
newspapers. In what might be seen as a precautionary warning for the events now 
unfolding, he wrote that "bribery by one's own pocketbook is as much to be avoided as 
bribery by the pocketbook of another; that individual responsibility may not be 
escaped by pleading another's instructions or another's dividends".  
The two cases described in this essay may not involve "bribery" in any literal sense, 
but they take an ethical look at the corporate governance arrangements put in place at 
two news organizations to prevent the pursuit of money from influencing news 
judgement. As such this dual-case study also presents an ethical dilemma for directors: 
Should they pursue shareholder interests, as law (to some extent) and custom and 
practice dictate, or protect editorial integrity?  
For the larger purposes of this thesis, these cases can be viewed as conflicting 
institutional logics at work. The cases have close analogies to the one of higher 
education textbooks discussed in Thornton and Ocasio (1999), where an emerging 
commercial logic, provoked by shifting market conditions, came into conflict with the 
established editorial logic that had previously been taken for granted in the 
organizational field they studied. In the twin cases here, both Dow Jones and Reuters 
had adopted corporate governance mechanisms frowned upon by investors but which 
protected the editorial operations of the companies from ill-effects of takeover bids. 
The editorial logic here was even stronger than that described by Thornton and Ocasio, 
as these two organizations sought explicitly to protect the integrity of the news 
gathering and thus prevent any commercial interest from using control of the company 
as a means of achieving favourable news coverage, or – especially importantly for 
Reuters – preventing any sovereign investor seeking to prevent news coverage of 
events in their countries. In both cases, therefore, the logic was based on deeply held 
beliefs.  
                                                     
34 At the University of Missouri, in Columbia 
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In keeping with agency theory in corporate governance, however, these 
mechanisms also protected management from the full force of market dissatisfaction 
when their commercial performance faltered. The cases described here involve a 
conflict of ethical stances that may as easily be viewed as a conflict of institutional 
logics. What they show is how in this industry, with these imperatives, the tensions 
between the editorial and commercial logics – between the stewardship towards the 
news and the pursuit of economic utility – cannot easily be resolved. As in the case of 
Liverpool FC and in much of the behavioural literature on corporate governance, this 
paper suggests that when ethical frames of reference and institutional imperatives 
collide, the role of the directors is to make difficult choices.  Ideas for further research 
emerging from this thesis include revisiting the two cases to explore how the ethics – 
and the institutional logics – have developed in the years since 2008, when both 
transactions closed and control changed hands. 
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News and corporate governance: What Dow Jones 
and Reuters teach us about stewardship  
(2007) 
Abstract: The outcomes of near simultaneous bids for the news 
organizations Reuters Group plc and Dow Jones & Co. Inc. in 2007 
hinged on mechanisms of corporate governance put in place at each 
company to protect the integrity and independence of the editorial 
operations. Neither company is particularly a model of good 
governance, since the restrictions – super-voting shares at DJ, veto-
power by the trustees of the Founders Share Company at Reuters – 
almost completely rule out an open market for corporate control. This 
paper looks at Reuters – and in even greater detail at Dow Jones, 
where the private actions of the board and shareholders came into 
rare public view. It suggests that stewardship theory plays a large 
role in protecting a perceived social value of the integrity of the news, 
figuring more heavily in crucial board decision-making than 
shareholder value. But the outcome of both cases means that the 
tension between the two is not easily resolved.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, stewardship theory, stakeholder 
theory, mergers, takeovers, Reuters, Dow Jones, newspapers, news 
industry, financial information, journalism, case study 
The resignation 
Dieter von Holtzbrinck had done what he could. The deal wasn't concluded – the 
deal he had opposed – not by some distance, only the shareholders themselves could 
decide that. But the board of directors of Dow Jones & Co. Inc., publishers of The Wall 
Street Journal and purveyors of the most famous stock market index in the world, had 
decided to recommend a bid from the Rupert Murdoch's News Corp. to buy the 
company for $5 billion. It was – every expert on Wall Street had said so – an excellent 
price. But not to Holtzbrinck, scion of a famous German family and publishing 
company that publishes Handelsblatt, Germany's venerable business newspaper, who 
had been invited to join the Dow Jones board when the two companies bought shares 
in each other in 2005. 
"Although I'm convinced that News Corp. offer is very generous in financial terms, 
I'm very worried that Dow Jones unique journalistic values will long-term strongly 
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suffer after the proposed sale," he wrote to his fellow directors the next day, July 19, 
2007. "Listening to our lawyers, one has to vote for a deal which is in the best 
(financial) interest for the shareholders, except if one can prove that such deal bears 
risks for the company that overcompensate the financial profits. I cannot prove that my 
worries are right. I can only refer to News Corp. business practices in the past, can only 
refer to Jim Ottaway's article in the Journal, etc. I do not believe that the 'Special 
Committee' can finally prevent Murdoch from doing what he wants to do, from acting 
his way" (von Holtzbrinck, 2007).  
Ottaway, another DJ director, had written: "I defend Rupert Murdoch's rights of 
free speech and press freedom. But I also defend the Dow Jones and American 
journalistic tradition of a strict separation wall between political opinions expressed 
vigorously on editorial pages, and news reported with as much factual objectivity as 
humanly possible" (Ottaway, 2007b). As well as intervening with his editors, some 
years ago, Murdoch's News Corp. had been widely reported as caving into pressure 
from Beijing government to drop news channels, including the British Broadcasting 
Corp., from transmissions into China. Murdoch has repeatedly denied that political 
pressure led to the decision.  
Holtzbrinck resigned from his position on the board.  
The story so far… 
News is a strange business. For decades it hasn't worked in any rational sense like 
a business at all. Newspapers tended to be owned by people who were already rich. A 
bit like sports teams, they weren't there to make money. Their corporate purpose, if one 
dares put a label like that on it, was to let the proprietor have fun. Some rich people 
enjoy watching sports and inviting their friends and business associates down on the 
field to meet the players. Business is – or was – incidental. News was a little different. 
Proprietors owned newspapers for the glory, yes, for the "esteem" and "self-
actualization" we learned about from Abraham Maslow (1943) in business school. But 
they often – perhaps mainly – wanted the opportunity to shape the thinking – or 
frighten the pants off – of the politicians and policy-makers around them. Think of the 
big names in the old world of the newspaper: Ochs of The New York Times, Bagehot of 
The Economist, Beaverbrook at The Express, Katherine Graham's Washington Post,
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Chandlers' Los Angeles Times, McCormick's Tribune, Pulitzer's World and Post-Dispatch 
(see Edwards, 1988 for a broad look at the British press).  
Nor was it just the British and American newspapers. Le Monde, for example, has 
run as a collective more reminiscent of the Paris Commune of 1871. The Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung has always been more of a license to burn than to print money. The founders 
and even the current owners of Die Zeit, the Frankfurter Allgemeine and the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung all approached their mission in post-Hitler Germany with a selflessness that no 
doubt contributed greatly to their lack of drive for what business-folk call profit 
maximization. Even Axel Springer, the most zealously profit-minded of the German 
proprietors since the Second World War, saw Die Welt more as a way of making 
Germany safe for democracy and capitalism than as a means of making money. Money 
is what Bild was for.  
Nor was it just newspapers. Bill Paley's CBS News, with Murrow, Cronkite and 
company, was the justification for getting his license to print money with the non-news 
airtime in the 1950s and 1960s. CNN never made any serious money for Ted Turner, 
either, though he was painted as a money-grubbing right-winger when he deigned to 
try to buy the post-Paley CBS. The BBC's often excellent news is detached from a profit 
motive thanks to a statutory right to print money in the form of an annual tax on 
television sets (see Halberstam, 1979 for an overview of newspaper and television in 
the US).  
Nor was it just these daily doses of news. The news weeklies include Luce's Time 
made money, but that wasn't its purpose and it didn't maximize the Luce family 
fortune. The Economist, post-Bagehot, still claims to be a newspaper though it isn't, 
really. Its profits now are the envy of the business. But they weren't for many years and 
profit is not its purpose.  
The same larger purpose applied to the news-folk who supplied them. The 
Associated Press, Agence France Press, Deutsche Presse Agentur and their like operate 
either as cooperatives of newspapers they serve or with the help of government money 
that keep the people informed about the world. United Press International wasn't like 
that. Formed in a rescue of the old United Press and International News Service, 
United Press International had ties to the Scripps newspaper chain, but it was at best 
their supplier of news and never made money. It doesn't survive (see Boyd-Barrett, 
1980 for a history). 
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Reuters and Dow Jones 
News operations that make money do so because they capture a valuable market. 
Charles Dow and Edward Jones saw money to be made from Wall Street, and so 
transformed a small gossipy afternoon newsletter into the Wall Street Journal in 1889 to 
print the stock exchange quotes his little wire service transmitted as well as news. It 
was seen from the beginning as a way to make money by making news – the news that 
could make Wall Street traders money (Wendt, 1982). But Dow Jones & Co. did so well 
with the old technology of newsprint and ink that it almost missed out on how the old 
ticker tapes from the 1920s became the electronic world of news that took hold in the 
1970s and 1980s. It did get into the game, first through a joint venture with the 
Associated Press called AP-Dow Jones, then on its own by buying a company called 
Telerate that sold financial data to banks and brokers on dedicated computer terminals. 
But it never made it big, eventually selling off Telerate and buying the AP out of the 
Dow Jones Newswires business, which without Telerate's terminals had no real home. 
The world of fast financial information had almost entirely passed Dow Jones by.  
For twenty years, that world was dominated by Reuters. The London-based global 
news agency had been a bit like Dow Jones in New York, carrying stock and 
commodity prices over telegraph cables. Knowing the news moved stock and bond 
prices, Julius Reuter started transmitting news, too. But rather than print it on paper 
and walk it around to brokers, he transmitted words as well as numbers on his 
telegraph. It worked well, for a while. But then the Depression hit in the 1930s. As a 
private company without either government aid (except, perhaps, surreptitiously 
during the Second World War) or a sustaining cooperative to keep it alive, it struggled 
to survive. For the global traders in London, foreign political news drove prices and 
collecting foreign political news was a lot more expensive than the task facing Dow 
Jones, which only really needed to get domestic company news when most big 
companies kept their headquarters in New York. Reuters found a way to turn the 
copper wires of its telecommunications network (subsidized by governments around 
the world) into gold again in the 1970s by transmitting gold prices, stock prices, bond 
prices and foreign exchange prices alongside its news (see Read, 1992 for an authorized 
but largely uncensored history). It was a business model that would propel the 
struggling news organization into stock market superstardom, the hottest of hot stocks 
of the mid-1980s.  
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Dow Jones & Co. remained largely a family-run business even after it floated on 
the stock market itself. As ownership passed through daughters, the name of the 
controlling family became the Bancrofts. They needed capital to expand the newspaper 
and raised it, as many had before, with an issue of shares to the market. But unlike 
most companies – most in the US and UK, that is – they did so while retaining a special 
class of shares for the family. Even in 2007, after the expansion of the company into a 
global media business, the Bancroft family and their close friends the Ottaways, whose 
family newspaper chain DJ acquired in the 1970s, they still controlled nearly 64.2 
percent of the votes upon which the company's future depended, even though they 
held just 24.7 percent of the stock.  
Reuters needed capital, too, to expand the development of its electronic data 
services for financial markets. It saw a dramatic reversal of its fortunes with the launch 
starting in 1973 of the Reuters Monitor. Monitor, a crude online service by today's 
standards, was revolutionary at the time, putting traders around the world in instant 
contact with each other. It laid the groundwork for acceleration of trading in all 
financial markets that followed. But keeping up with demand – and the need for 
further technology development – required more funds than the company was 
generating in profits. After a long and difficult internal debate about the effect outside 
capital would have on the independence and integrity of the news services, the 
company floated on the London Stock Exchange in 1984 (Lawrenson & Barber, 1985 
wrote a glowing account of those who won and lost out on the money). The float came 
after a decade of stagflation in the western world and the accumulation of wealth in 
oil-producing countries in the Middle East. Many Reuters managers feared that oil 
wealth would acquire the company, with the risk that the tradition of independence 
and objectivity of its news coverage would suffer.  So rather than permit that it, like 
Dow Jones, adopted a capital structure that prevented outsiders seizing control. At the 
time, since it was rescued from near bankruptcy in the middle of the century, Reuters 
was owned by mainly its customers, the Fleet Street newspapers – the main national 
dailies – and the Press Association, a collective of regional UK papers. Struggling with 
antiquated technology and restrictive trade union practices, the newspapers saw 
selling shares as a way to generate the cash to fund their own modernization. But the 
still wanted their news supplied in the same reliable, truthful way. So they devised a 
structure to cash out without losing what they valued. The Reuters Trust Principles 
(Reuters, 2007 update) restricted the rights of shareholders: no one party could control 
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more than 15 percent of the stock. And the trustees of the Reuters Founders Share 
Company, a panel of eminent individuals drawn mainly from the newspaper industry, 
would be able to veto any action that the board or shareholders might take that they 
thought might endanger the news service.  
Editorial integrity is key 
In doing so, both Dow Jones and Reuters embedded editorial integrity in the heart 
of their corporate structures, with different governance mechanisms but with the same 
effect. Both companies – like the New York Times Co., the Washington Post Co., like 
Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, too, which had both The Times and The Sunday 
Times in London, the New York Post and various television stations and satellite 
networks around the world – created shareholding structures that would prevent them 
ever being taken over, unless the families or foundations that controlled these 
mechanisms agreed.  
News organizations aren't the only companies that chose to take this approach. It 
is, in fact, the preferred form that companies around continental Europe took when 
they needed to raise outside capital. But it's quite uncommon in the United States and 
almost unheard of in Britain, the world's two largest and most sophisticated capital 
markets. The large investment institutions that provide capital in these markets – 
insurance companies, mutual funds and pension systems – don't like the idea of 
buying stock that has fewer rights. Protecting a company from a takeover is preventing 
an investor from realizing a capital gain. And that means the shares should always 
trade at a lower level than the economics of the business would justify.  
The journalists and their supporters among the customers of Dow Jones and 
Reuters might well think that editorial integrity was worth the cost – the cost, that is, of 
having investors forego a bit of profit. Looked at another way, it was also the cost of 
having, as the accountants would say, a higher cost of capital than competing 
businesses that didn't restrict voting rights. And having a higher cost of capital will, 
over time, mean you lose out in the competition for tomorrow's customers.   
The model breaks down at Dow Jones and Reuters  
In May 2007, within two weeks of each other, the boards of Dow Jones & Co. Inc. 
and Reuters Group plc faced decisions that would transform their businesses and 
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challenge the assumptions that lie behind the protections for editorial integrity that 
both companies had in place.  
Dow Jones had largely missed the transition to electronic financial information, 
and its attempts to get into the market were certainly too little if not entirely too late. 
Profitability of the Journal suffered in the wake of the dot-com bust in 2000. The value 
of Dow Jones stock languished through good times and bad (see Figure 4).  































































































Figure 4 - Share prices of Dow Jones and Reuters in US dollars  
 
The dominant position of Reuters, though, would come under assault from a 
complete newcomer in the business. A former Salomon Brothers trader, Michael 
Bloomberg, saw the need for news from the user's point of view. With funding from 
Merrill Lynch, he built a new type of financial information platform in the late 1980s 
that would integrate data, making it much more useful to financiers trying to gather 
disparate data to decide on an investment. "The Bloomberg" became the hottest 
terminal on Wall Street, and then around the world. Bloomberg stored financial data 
and news for years, making them instantly accessible on his terminals. The systems 
developed by Reuters and Dow Jones-Telerate, by contrast, were dominantly "real-
time" information systems, which through away information almost as soon as it was 
created.  A few years later Bloomberg would add a news services, hiring the Wall Street 
Journal reporter Matthew Winkler to build a new type of real-time news service. 
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Bloomberg News became Bloomberg Magazine and Bloomberg Radio and Bloomberg 
Television, too. Dow Jones Newswires got pushed off more and more desks of the 
financial traders. Reuters and DJ eventually learned lessons and Reuters built systems 
that worked more like Bloomberg's, while DJ withdrew from the race. The Reuters 
market share had suffered, though, and in the years between 2000 and 2003 saw its 
share price collapse from more than £16 to less than £1 (former Reuters journalists-
turned-business-executives Mooney & Simpson, 2003 give an account of the malaise at 
the company). Both DJ and Reuters learned, though, to store their news for retrieval 
from the archives, and for several years shared a joint venture to do so in Factiva. 
Reuters share price would recover, but by early 2007 it had only managed to get back 
to around £4 a share. That came with thousands of job losses – though a 
disproportionately small number came from among the journalists. There were job 
transfers, too. Some of the work that Reuters journalists had done in New York and 
London moved to Bangalore in India (Reuters, 2004), a decision that led directly to the 
departure of one of the top editors after a heated debate (Nordberg, 2005c). It is, of 
course, to be expected that the decision to treat editorial jobs less harshly in the 
cutbacks came from understandable strategic reasons in the content business like 
Reuters, even more than concern about offending sensitivities of company culture or 
the Reuters Trust Principles. 
Thomson bids for Reuters 
For more than a year senior management at Reuters had held discussions with 
Thomson Corp. of Canada about a merger valuing Reuters at about £6.50 a share. The 
Thomson family still owned about three-quarters of Thomson Corp. stock. The group 
published databases of business information, textbooks and, like Reuters only much 
smaller, financial information. They were also newspaper proprietors. Rupert Murdoch 
bought The Times and The Sunday Times from Thomson in 1981s. But the family wasn't 
bailing out of anything except the morass that was Fleet Street at the end of the 1970s. 
Thomson was instead, concentrating its efforts, having bought Canada's leading 
serious newspaper, The Globe and Mail in Toronto a year before. It has since disposed of 
it.  
The fit with Reuters was pretty good. Both had financial businesses where overlaps 
could be eliminated to save money and differences could be exploited for new sales. 
Because of Reuters' size in that market, and the highly regulated nature of the financial 
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markets both companies served, the deal would have to overcome competition and 
regulatory hurdles. Other aspects seemed straightforward.  Thomson's legal and health 
information businesses provided steady cash, and the textbook business could be sold 
to help pay for the acquisition of Reuters. Textbook publishers had been sold at record 
prices over the past two years, so it seemed a very good time to sell. The chief 
executive of Thomson was willing to stand down in favor of the Reuters CEO. After a 
cash-and-shares deal, the Thomson family would control 53 percent of the stock. And 
that would violate the provisions of the Reuters Trust Principles.  
The first port of call, then, wasn't the regulators or the competition authorities; it 
was the trustees of the Reuters Founders Share Company. When first created, the 
Founders Share Company was chaired by Katherine Graham, majority owner of The 
Washington Post. But that was 1984, and by 2007 many of the trustees, including its 
chairman, Pehr Gyllenhammar, were business people. Gyllenhammar had a long 
association with Reuters, having joined the main board when it floated on the stock 
market in 1984. Then he was CEO of the car- and truck-maker Volvo. He had gone on 
to become chairman of a major UK insurance company. To no one's surprise, 
Gyllenhammar and the other trustees decided that the Thomson deal was fine. And the 
Thomson family, through their family trust, promised to respect the Reuters Trust 
Principles.  
Murdoch bids for Dow Jones 
News of the Reuters-Thomson tie-up slipped out into the market on Friday, May 4, 
2007, but it wasn't until the following Tuesday that either of these news companies 
could manage to bring themselves to make an official disclosure. The leak was 
probably prompted by news on May 1 that News Corp., the Australian-turned-
American publisher and broadcasting company controlled by the Australian-turned-
American Rupert Murdoch, wanted to acquire Dow Jones & Co. for a staggering 55 
percent premium over its recent share price. The bid valued Dow Jones at $5 billion. It 
had been trading a level worth $3.5 billion before the news. Wall Street analysts had 
been saying for years that management of Dow Jones, headed by former journalists, 
simply lacked the business acumen to run a company with two of the best known 
brands in the world. The share price, which had moved in a tight range over many 
years, seemed to reflect that. The financial community, not least the hedge funds that 
had come to dominate stock-market trading in recent years, saw an opportunity in 
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Murdoch's bid to make some quick money, and soon much of the non-family stock had 
passed into their hands.  
It's useful to recall how Murdoch achieved his position. He inherited a small chain 
of newspapers in Australia, and managed in increase circulation, revenues and profits. 
He bought television stations and used the cash flow to buy newspapers in Britain, 
including The Times and The Sunday Times from Kenneth Thomson, but also some 
downmarket tabloid papers, including the country's largest selling daily, The Sun, and 
largest selling Sunday paper, The News of the World. All four were shareholders of 
Reuters before it went public.  
Though it's never been officially confirmed, many executives at Reuters have said 
over the years that Murdoch is the shareholder who pushed through the decision to 
have Reuters float. The managing director at the time was Gerald Long. With a crew 
haircut and a military bearing, Long wanted nothing to do with selling shares to the 
financial markets. What happened next was this: Long was offered the job of chief 
executive of News International, the holding company for Murdoch's newspapers in 
Britain, including The Times and The Sunday Times. Long jumped at the chance. His role 
at Reuters, now upgraded to chief executive, went to Glen Renfrew, a long-serving 
Reuters executive who had started his career as a newspaper reporter in Australia. 
Renfrew was a strong supporter of the idea to float. When Reuters became a public 
company, Murdoch's News Corp. had an asset that was to become worth hundreds of 
millions of pounds sterling. Murdoch used those shares as collateral to raise loans 
before eventually selling them to outside investors. The proceeds were the money he 
used to buy newspapers, television stations and the Fox movie studios in America as 
well as start a satellite television company in Britain we now know as BSkyB.  
But buying Dow Jones and its prize asset and brand The Wall Street Journal meant 
winning over the Bancroft family and their concern about editorial integrity. 
Murdoch's UK papers were right-wing in their politics, so not dissimilar to the opinion 
pages of the WSJ. But Murdoch had a public reputation of intervening in news 
coverage, too, calling editors and even reporters and telling them what angle to take. 
The Fox interests in the US had spawned a Fox News Network, decided conservative 
in its viewpoint aimed at giving a counterpoint to what he perceived now as the left-
wing orientation of CNN, the news service, you'll recall, that was so right-wing before. 
This raised alarm bells among the crusaders for editorial integrity at the Journal, 
including the recently retired CEO Peter Kann, and his wife Karen Elliot House. She 
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had been reporter and then publisher of the WSJ, and he had been a reporter and 
editor before his move into management.  
Which way would the Dow Jones board vote? Which way would the Bancroft 
family vote? On what basis would they make their decisions? And what of the outside 
shareholders – who held a clear majority of the stock but a clear minority of the votes? 
What rights did they have? For the answers to those questions we need to consider the 
purpose and practice of corporate governance.  
Corporate governance in the news 
The restrictive voting rights at both Reuters and Dow Jones run afoul of what 
many institutional investors consider appropriate practice for listed companies. Why at 
Dow Jones should the Bancroft family and friends retain a 64 percent share of the vote 
when they had less  half that share of the capital at risk? Why at Reuters should the 
trustees of the Founders Share Company have veto power when it had no capital at all 
in the business and it represented, in the final analysis, the interest of customers – and 
only a small portion of the customers at that?  
Company law in both the UK and the United States says that boards of directors 
should work in the sole interest of their shareholders.35 Holtzbrinck's resignation letter 
from the Dow Jones board, however, suggested that there were other issues at stake, 
ones he regarded as bigger than securing the best deal for shareholders. The Founders 
Share Company at Reuters made explicit that there was more to the purpose of this 
company than maximizing the return to shareholders.  
Corporate governance – how the activities of a company are monitored and 
controlled – has become a major topic of concern for corporate executive and 
government policy-makers alike. Concern about the field had tended to emerge from 
the shadows in the wake of crises. The first surge of interest in the field started after the 
Great Crash of 1929 on Wall Street and the global economic depression that followed in 
its wake. It became a hot topic in the UK in the early 1990s following a rash of 
corporate failures. The worst of these was that of the newspaper proprietor Robert 
Maxwell, who had, among other offences, appropriated the pension funds of staff at 
Mirror Group Newspapers in the UK and The New York Daily News to prop up his 
                                                     
35 In the US, company law is a matter for individual states. In practice most states follow the 
lead of Delaware, where about half of US public companies have their legal seat, Dow Jones 
among them.  
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failing finances. Complacent boards of directors at the companies throughout his 
empire, made up of cronies and "yes-men", had acquiesced to it. Maxwell disappeared 
while at sea on his yacht, never to be seen (Wearing, 2005 gives a good account of the 
case).  
Corporate governance came to the fore in the US in 2001 and 2002 following the 
collapse of the energy trading company Enron Corp. and of the telecommunications 
giant WorldCom Inc. just a few months later. Part of the response was legislative. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Library of Congress, 2002) put severe new constraints and 
obligations on directors of US companies. A reform of company law in Britain, 
underway before Enron, took new directions before its final adoption in 2006 (UK 
Parliament, 2006). The European Union took an interest and countries around the 
world either passed laws (e.g. Germany, Australia) or adopted new private-sector 
codes of conduct (e.g. Britain, France and many others).  
Theories of corporate governance 
Central to the governance debate has been the issue of how to prevent executives 
like Maxwell or Jeffrey Skilling at Enron and Bernie Ebbers at WorldCom from using 
company money as if it were their own. These directors are, after all, fiduciary agents of 
shareholders, the principals behind the business. Boards of directors are there in part as 
watchdogs over management. It wasn't always this way. Many businesses start out 
with the sole owner as manager of the business. But listing on stock exchanges means 
invited outsiders to participate in ownership, and it becomes their money that's at 
stake. In the 1930s when surveying the wreckage of the Great Crash, Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means (1932/1991) identified this change as having an impact in how 
companies were managed, and to what purpose. The term "agency theory" came to be 
used to describe the problem. Having a strong the board of directors and strong 
shareholder rights were seen as the solution (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
But agency theory hasn't been sufficient to describe what actually takes place in 
boards of directors, nor to prescribe how directors should act. Most directors, in line 
with company law, see their duty as being to promote shareholder value, either in how 
they allocate strategic resources (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Stiles, 2001) or through 
their contribution to reducing the cost of doing business from the contacts or the 
credibility they lend to the company (Williamson, 1988). But others argue that directors 
have other duties that go beyond maximizing wealth for shareholders. "Stakeholder" 
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theory, a deliberate play on the American word "stockholder", asserts that directors 
have obligations to people other than shareholders – suppliers, customers, and 
especially employees and the broader society (Crowther & Caliyurt, 2004; Evan & 
Freeman, 1993; Freeman & Evan, 1990). It's a view not widely accepted in corporate 
boardrooms, even among directors who view good relationships with these interest 
groups as essential to the long-term profitability of the enterprise.  
The journalists at Reuters and Dow Jones – whose interests the restricted voting 
rights protect – have clearly been grateful for the support. There was scarcely a 
murmur from those at Reuters at the thought of a merger with Thomson. Indeed, the 
concern about editorial integrity was probably greater during the second half of the 
1980s, when both Rupert Murdoch and Robert Maxwell – fierce personal as well as 
business rivals – both sat on the Reuters boards of directors.  
Not so at Dow Jones. The shape of decision-making in corporate boardroom is 
normally very sensitive and confidentiality precludes outsiders from ever analysing 
how the decisions were made. Even at Dow Jones, however, which is in the business of 
making corporate reporting transparent, the transparency that accompanied this deal 
was extraordinary.  
Journalists decried the News Corp. bid, fearing Murdoch's reputation for 
intervening in editorial decisions at the newspapers News Corp. owned. Murdoch 
agreed various measures to safeguard editorial integrity (Dow Jones & Co., 2007), but 
for many, that didn't seem enough. "The staff, from top to bottom, opposes a Rupert 
Murdoch takeover of Dow Jones & Co. Since the early part of the 20th century, the 
Bancroft family has stood up for the independence and quality of The Wall Street 
Journal and has built it into one of the world's great newspapers," a statement from 
Independent Association of Publishers' Employees, the journalists' main trade union, 
said shortly after the bid announcement. "Mr. Murdoch has shown a willingness to 
crush quality and independence, and there is no reason to think he would handle Dow 
Jones or The Journal any differently" (IAPE 2007).  
Moreover, it didn't seem enough to James Ottaway, a Dow Jones director and head 
of the Ottaway family trust, which had seven percent of the votes. "It's a bad thing for 
Dow Jones and American journalism that the Bancroft Family could not resist Rupert 
Murdoch's generous offer," he said in a statement issued on July 31, once it became 
clear that News Corp.'s offer had found sufficient support to prevail. "It is ironic 
indeed for the Bancroft family to have to pay 30 shekels of silver to their investment 
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bankers, and 30 shekels of gold to their corporate lawyers, for scaring some of them 
into betraying their 105-year family loyalty to Dow Jones independence" (Ottaway, 
2007a).  
The phrase "scaring some of them" is telling, and reminiscent of Holtzbrinck's 
démarche of two weeks earlier. Holtzbrinck said: "Listening to our lawyers, one has to 
vote for a deal which is in the best (financial) interest for the shareholders, except …" 
(von Holtzbrinck, 2007). These two directors felt there ought to have been an 
"exception" to the rule of shareholder value. It wasn't, however, because the journalists 
as employees deserved special consideration. The basis of their concern lies more in 
what we know as "stewardship" theory.  
Stewardship at Dow Jones 
Stewardship theory draws on organizational psychology and suggests that self-
esteem and fulfillment loom large in their decision-making, as Maslow (1943) had 
suggested in his hierarchy of needs. As a prescription, however, the stewardship 
approach contends that individual directors should look after the interests of someone 
or something larger than personal or corporate self-interest. Some may be guided by a 
code of conduct or statement of corporate purpose, bearing a responsibility that 
supersedes mere shareholder value considerations (see Muth & Donaldson, 1998 for a 
discussion). There are suggestions of this in Holtzbrinck's quote with its "except …" 
The matter at stake in his and Ottaway's minds wasn't the rights of the journalists as 
employees, but the more abstract and even moral good of journalistic integrity. The Wall 
Street Journal was something akin to a sacred trust held through generations by the 
Bancroft family. These non-Bancrofts weren't alone in having doubts about the deal. 
The Bancroft family, whose members weren't of a single mind about the offer, issued a 
statement saying: "Accordingly, the Family has advised the Company's Board that it 
intends to meet with News Corporation to determine whether, in the context of the 
current or any modified News Corporation proposal, it will be possible to ensure the 
level of commitment to editorial independence, integrity and journalistic freedom that 
is the hallmark of Dow Jones" (Bancroft Family, 2007). The family also indicated it was 
open to other options that might achieve value Murdoch offered with stronger 
promises on editorial independence. The talks with others, including Pearson plc, 
publishers of the Financial Times, and the US television network NBC, came to nothing, 
and the vote to go with News Corp. left the family narrowly divided.  
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Along the way, though, one family member issued a public rebuke to himself and 
his kinfolk for the poor quality of stewardship of they had made – but stewardship of 
business, the brands and, by implication, the financial assets that other investors had 
entrusted to the Bancrofts by buying shares that left the family in control. Crawford 
Hill, a cousin of the Bancrofts and a holder of super-voting DJ shares, bemoaned the 
missed opportunities of recent years, when the family didn't act as owners should, but 
instead were passive and quiescent as the franchise stumbled through the Telerate 
debacle. He cited the legendary investor Warren Buffett saying DJ might have become 
a business worth $50 billion, not $5 billion, and he wrote: "So, we never really figured 
out how to be owners when we needed to most" (Hill, 2007). But Leslie Hill, a family 
member who opposed the deal, resigned as a Dow Jones director when the deal was 
announced. She acknowledged in a letter to the board that the deal was good in 
financial terms, but it failed to outweigh "the loss of an independent global news 
organization with unmatched credibility and integrity" (Ellison & Karnitschnig, 2007). 
For Leslie Hill, as for Ottaway and Holtzbrinck – and we can guess the rest of the 
Bancroft family – stewardship of the family's legacy of strong journalistic integrity 
involved a moral choice that involved an appeal to a higher, a priori good, not a 
utilitarian decision based on shareholder value alone (Nordberg, 2007b). Crawford 
Hill's ethical choice, though, was for active participation by the family during the past 
25 years of strategic drift to create strategic value, a utilitarian concept, alongside the a 
priori end of journalistic integrity. The failure to do so meant, perhaps, that it was time 
for someone else – even Rupert Murdoch – to assume stewardship, if perhaps for 
ethical aims somewhat different from what the Bancrofts had embraced.  
The absence of financial performance and the missed opportunities that Crawford 
Hill bemoaned may have been mismanagement. But one can't help but wonder 
whether the root of the problem lay in a corporate purpose and a flawed governance 
structure that protected it from a hostile takeover, that is, from the full rigors of a 
market for corporate control. Boards of directors are, after all, at best the second line of 
defense in corporate governance. The first is the force of a competitive market.  
Stewardship at Reuters 
The Reuters merger with Thomson, while still facing regulatory scrutiny, was a 
much quieter affair. The Thomson family had long taken a stewardship approach to 
their businesses, at least until the point when they faced the decision to exit a business. 
Page 208  University of Liverpool 
Editorial independence was apparent at The Times and The Sunday Times during 
Kenneth (later, Lord) Thomson's ownership. But the sale of the titles to Murdoch in 
1981 came amid frustration over what were called at the time the "Spanish practices" of 
Fleet Street trade unions that prevented the introduction of labor-saving technologies 
at the newspapers. Murdoch acquired them and promptly launched the opening salvo 
in what came to be called in competing newspapers the "Battle of Wapping". Murdoch 
moved the papers away from Fleet Street into a rundown neighborhood to the east of 
London's financial district, using the wealth from his stake in Reuters he acquired with 
the newspapers to engineer a modernization that transformed the industry as a whole.  
The revival of Reuters after 2003 came in part despite a governance structure that 
protected it, too, from hostile bidders and the rigors of a market for corporate control. 
But its board and management were less passive than those at Dow Jones, less steeped 
in the traditions and rituals of the stewardship elements of their roles. But they were 
also subject to a pretty harsh competitive environment, where the onslaught from 
Bloomberg made manifest the consequences of further inaction. The market worked 
where a stewardship-led culture of corporate governance had failed.  
The new Thomson-Reuters will use the Reuters name and reputation – its brand in 
the language of marketing – for the news and financial information businesses. The 
word "Reuters" may be the name of the German-turned-Englishman who founded the 
company, but as Lawrenson and Barber (1985) recall, it sounds a lot like the Chinese 
word for "truth".  
Conclusions 
For many of the people at Dow Jones, though not for a majority of votes on the 
day, journalistic integrity was an end in itself, not a means to the end of greater profit 
and increased market share. Fairly steady cash flow and a bullet-proof shareholder 
structure seemed to prevent it from the most punishing effects of a free market for 
corporate control, but not from falling behind its industry and missing opportunities 
for the growth that might have enhanced it broader social role that the stewardship 
model of corporate governance was meant to promote.  
For many people at Reuters, journalistic integrity is the basis on which it conducts 
the entire business. If the news is true (as it can be) and free from bias (as it can be), 
then clients can trust the financial data and transactions services to have integrity, too. 
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But there's no doubt that a complacency fostered by a dominant market position and a 
bullet-proof governance structure based on the stewardship model prevented it – for a 
while – from experiencing the full rigors of the market, including the market for 
corporate control.  
It is too early to say how these cases will develop. But let's reflect for a moment 
how two such closely linked companies – often competitors, sometimes collaborators – 
from two different countries both relied upon a heresy in corporate governance: that 
shareholder value and shareholder rights were not supreme. This model of corporate 
purpose and the structures of corporate governance that sustain it seem to underpin a 
lot of news organizations. We know that financial markets strive on having news that 
is independent, and as free as possible from bias. Corporate governance itself works in 
the main through the transparency of corporate reporting. Indeed, Sir David Walker, in 
promoting guidelines for disclosure by the UK private equity industry, thought that 
the news media would, in part, be guarantors of governance. "I'm a great fan of the 
media," he told the Financial Times. "I think the media will do a very good job of 
identifying X who is not conforming to the standards" (Arnold, 2007).  
Perhaps news – on political matters, too, including the news the Rupert Murdoch's 
News Corp. may have suppressed from reaching his Chinese television viewers – is 
something that is more important than shareholder value, even in a public company 
made up private sector shareholders. We see protections for editorial integrity in place 
at many of the most distinguished news organizations in the world – The New York 
Times Co., for example. Outside shareholders buy into these companies knowing that 
their voice – their votes at the annual meeting – won't count for very much. Caveat 
emptor – let the buyer of such shares beware. Some buy them precisely because they see 
a social value in the purpose of free and independent news. But similar structures are 
used to prop up the corporate control of business people whose purpose may be rather 
less worthy of a sense of stewardship from their directors. William Randolph Hearst is 
widely credited – or discredited – for having used the newspapers he owned to start a 
war. But at least he owned them outright. Silvio Berlusconi, who controlled a media 
empire through a pyramid structure that gives him effective control well beyond his 
share of the equity, used his newspapers and television stations to propel him into the 
prime minister's job in Italy and keep him there when others would have failed.  
And what of Rupert Murdoch? He has run News Corp. in many ways as though it 
was his personal property, yet he owned less than a third of its shares. Dow Jones – its 
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journalists and the readers of its newspapers and newswires will be wondering about 
his commitment to the stewardship model of governance. Evidence to-date is that 
outside shareholders might be more concerned that the he will use these companies he 
only partly controls for his own purpose – the "agency problem" in corporate 
governance – than that he will let sentimental stewardship prevent a focus on strategic 
value. 
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Part 5: Corporate governance as an 
institutionalized system 
This part, a single reflective chapter, summarizes the individual 
papers and links them in a tentative framework, as well as exploring 
avenues for future research.  
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9.  A system of corporate governance? 
Introduction 
Corporate governance is a field without clear boundaries (Ahrens, Filatotchev, & 
Thomsen, 2011), intellectually or in practice. Scholars and practitioners across a wide 
range of disciplines lay claim to it, among them law, finance, economics, financial 
economics, accountancy, organizations studies, political science, strategic management 
and applied ethics. The papers collected in this thesis reflect some of that diversity of 
theoretical perspective and address concerns of several of the practical implications of 
work in the field. In this concluding chapter, I review the contributions of the 
individual chapters, consider the contribution of the thesis as a whole, and then 
examine how these ideas point to an agenda for future research. Building on these, and 
extending in an even more personal way the themes of Chapter 8, this chapter then 
concludes with broader discussion of research philosophy through the vehicle of a 
reflection on journalism and social science.  
Contributions 
The core of the thesis (Parts 2, 3 and 4) sketches a system of corporate governance 
and a view as to how institutionalization arises. Part 2 examines codification, tracing 
the development, institutionalization and evolution of a code of conduct, that is, the 
creation and maintenance of a body of decision norms. Part 3 considers corporate 
governance in political terms, as a contest between different interests and ideologies, 
while Part 4 brings the discussion to the level of individuals and boards. These 
elements together suggest a system of corporate governance and institutionalization.  
Chapter contributions to corporate governance 
The individual chapters make their own several contributions, which I summarize 
in slightly different terms here. Chapter 2 provides an example of how the text of codes 
can give shape to the discourse in a field. The codes frame the landscape, directing our 
attention to parts of the field and obscuring the view of other parts. The literature on 
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discourse analysis and framing reviewed in the course of this programme of study 
does not speak of framing in quite these terms. But the metaphor of frames is apposite. 
The picture it surrounds is a limited view and a constructed one (Berger & Luckmann, 
1967), rather than a direct reflection of a more realist conception (Bhaskar, 1978).  
Moreover, the codes are a social creation, the product of the interaction of actors 
with a surprising commitment to the field, even though that field is ill-defined. 
Chapter 3 has shown some of the ways that actors interact to frame the landscape, 
ruling in and out some possible views, views in the sense of interpretations of the texts. 
Translation (Czarniawska, 2007) and bricolage (Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2005) are 
useful metaphors for the metaphor of framing as the codes take shape.  
The chapters in Part 3 of the thesis start from a different premise but head off in the 
same direction. The creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Chapter 4) represented an 
attempt to change the behaviour of US boards of directors by ordering them to perform 
certain activities. Specified actors (CEOs and CFOs) faced imprisonment if they actions 
were found wanting. This is certainly as close to coercive isomorphism as we have seen 
in the corporate governance debate, and the intensity of objections to Sarbox reflects 
the strength of opposition. To little avail. It also reflected the perception, particularly 
widespread in American corporate governance, that the problem is one of agency and 
the solution lies not in behavioural governance, as the Association of British Insurers 
conceived it in its submission to the 2010 UK code debate. The Sarbox solution might 
be called behaviourist governance, in the mode of B.F. Skinner's famous experiments 
with animals and humans in the 1950s, relying on incentives, rather than one relying 
on trust and collegiality, or even one arising from the study of what directors do at 
work. Much of the discussion of corporate governance, in particular studies seeking to 
establish relationships between mechanisms and outcomes, is based on the 
presumption of shareholder primacy, with an implicit view of what interests 
shareholders have.  
Part 4 brings us back to ethics. One stream of the corporate governance literature 
views the field as if it were simply a branch of applied ethics. Chapter 6 has attempted 
to construct a view that aligns the mainstream versions of corporate governance theory 
with mainstream accounts of ethics, with the consequence (for consequentialists) that 
many people may well be acting from an ethical frame of mind when they decide 
issues taking routes that more normative critics would reject. There is more to explore 
in this grid, not least how ethical views outside those covered in the paper line up with 
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decision-making in corporate governance. Long ago and with mildly socialist leanings, 
I approached one of my earliest encounters with a senior corporate executive expecting 
to meet a villain. I came away with the conviction I had been in the company of a 
virtuous man. Virtue ethics is rather underrepresented in this collection.  
Chapters 7 and 8 take us in many ways back to the beginning by posing standard 
corporate governance questions to companies in non-standard circumstances. What 
then is the right thing to do? Neither paper decides, but each shows that the decision 
isn't easy. All the more reason to continue the quest for the virtuous man: Institutional 
guidance is not enough; we are not excused from needing to choose.  
Thesis contribution to institutional theory 
The contributions of the individual papers in the collection point towards a system 
in which structures in the form of laws, codes and practices inform – that is, enable and 
constrain – strategic choice. When pushed to its limits, the system breaks down, and 
different ways of deciding arise. Individuals face ethical choices when the guideposts 
of code or law are uninformative, when they do not enable yet perhaps still constrain. 
The ethical choice is often disrupted by those with different values or interests, setting 
off a conflict that leads (or does not) to a course of action (or inaction), and that may 
lead to a new set of rules, of code or law, to guide future decisions. 
Early in the process of studying for this degree, I envisaged a picture that captured 
many of these elements. It was a simple model, too simple to reflect the complexity, but 
it has stuck in my mind, with refinements as I learned more, and still seems worth 
giving an airing here, albeit tentatively.  I alluded to it in the opening problem 
statement, and it is reflected, in reverse order, in the structure of the thesis.  
Let us imagine for the moment that a veil of ignorance, as the philosopher John 
Rawls (1999) conceived it, could fall on the field of corporate governance, enveloping 
all its actors. Directors of corporations would have no preconceived ideas of what they 
should do, how they should behave, in making the decisions that managers of the 
corporation brought to them. In such a circumstance, they would call upon some 
notion of ethics, of justice, to guide their choices. They might well start, in words Rawls 
used in a discussion with the economist Ken Binmore (2005, p. vii), by 
"operationalizing Kant". Many of the directors I have met would probably have sought 
to operationalize Bentham instead, but the starting point is the same: directors – at least 
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of listed enterprises – face ethical choices virtually all the time, because the decisions 
they make affect somebody else's money (see Chapters 6-8).  
Individual ethical decisions in a boardroom require more than a simple choice. 
Collective decision-making involves negotiating an understanding and outcome, a 
social construction involving the use of power. Project those decisions to a large stage – 
for example, the relations between boards and shareholders; boards and regulators; 
regulators and shareholders; boards, regulators and equity capital markets; or boards, 
shareholders and creditors – and the process becomes political, even without invoking 
the dominant concerns of critical management scholars. Corporate governance 
concerns the exercise of power (Chapter 5).  
Negotiating decisions is a difficult process. When the negotiators – directors – are 
professional elites, wilful and opinionated, brought together only episodically (Forbes 
& Milliken, 1999) and therefore subject to process losses, the transaction costs rise, 
which scholars of the new institutional economics persuasion (e.g. Williamson, 1988) 
see as requiring non-market procedures, that is, ones that avoid the need to negotiate 
every time. Although this thesis has drawn most heavily on the sociological version of 
institutional theory, the two perspectives intersect here. The standard operating 
procedures of new institutional economics share with the rituals and routines of the 
new institutionalism the characteristics of getting busy people to a decision more 
quickly, and in a way that is more (that is, "boundedly") or less ("taken-for-granted") 
rational.  
Such pressures no doubt lead the social groups we know as boards to look for 
recipes about how to do their messy jobs. One set of recipes comes in law and 
regulation (Chapter 4), blunt instruments of policy, or as more flexible codes of 
conduct (Chapters 2-3). These mechanisms of governance reduce the range of matters 
to be negotiated (transactions costs lower), while giving actors who adopt them easy 
access to public acceptance (legitimacy). According to the picture I have held in mind, 
these recipes, routine and rituals, these standard operating procedures, carve out a 
body of decisions that no longer require cognitive effort in the boardroom, where time 
constraints and task complexity make cognition a scarce resource. It is a resource to be 
protected for the sake of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991) and to ease issues of 
dependency (A. J. Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These institutions 
create, in effect, what I call an ersatz ethic, a rule, the legitimacy of which provides 
quasi-a priori standing that takes the place of an ethical decision.  
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Through its iterations, this cycle of choice, conflict and rules suggests that 
principles become rules and codes grow increasingly articulated until they become too 
costly, leading to interest dissatisfaction, or offend against other value commitments, as 
the model proposed by Greenwood and Hinings (1996) theorizes. That is, over time 
their non- or irrationality becomes apparent, or their legitimacy comes into doubt. A 
practical example might help: Empirical studies may give ambiguous results on 
whether splitting the role of chairman and CEO improves firm performance (Carapeto 
et al., 2005; Dahya & Travlos, 2000), but if splitting the roles will keep shareholders 
quiet, what's the harm? The initial (utilitarian) ethical issue becomes a (deontological) 
non-ethical non-issue. Simple.  
Too simple. I have slowly come to see that the Rawlsian veil of ignorance is not 
really part of the system of corporate governance I have observed in practice or see 
described in the literature. Binmore (2005), wearing an economist's hat at a 
philosopher's party, argues the case that ethics can be viewed as the outcome of an 
indefinitely repeated game with learning internalized across generations. That's not 
quite the same as – but not all that different from – a view that sees institutional 
arrangements embedded at birth (or before) and adjusted every so often when 
evidence accumulates of the less-than-optimal results that Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
said would arise from institutionalization. It also suggests another mechanism to 
resolve the paradox of embedded agency (Seo & Creed, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) 
through organizational learning, though it's a concept, I confess, that has long given 
me problems. Actors learn in fits and starts, often needing that precipitating jolt 
(Greenwood et al., 2002) to set the change in motion. 
These reflections point to a contribution to the theory of the complex fields of 
corporate governance and institutional theory, which I will somewhat tentatively 
advance.  
My model is not quite what I initially conceived. Ethics does not give way to 
politics and politics to institutions, which supersede certain ethical stances. Rather, 
within institutionalized settings – those in which families and societies not to mention 
corporations operate – parts of one set of institutional arrangements are thrown into 
question when a problem offends against its logic and for which a means to resolution 
is not immediately obvious. Those issues open the debate, which then goes into 
negotiation, a costly, messy affair, as Chapters 7 and 8 document in somewhat different 
terms. If it happens often enough the ethic/institution comes into question. 
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Deinstitutionalization occurs (Oliver, 1992) and with it the search for a (time- and cost-
saving) replacement. What emerges is a proto-institution (Lawrence et al., 2002; 
Zietsma & McKnight, 2009) – in the terms of this thesis a code, something that may 
require considerable negotiation, drawing on the time and cognitive capacity of elites, 
that is, on scarce resources, but to a valuable end. It creates a new decision-rule – an 
institution – that saves time and cognition in the future, one that provides the basis for 
normative isomorphism and through its legitimacy reduces noise in the (corporate) 
communications channels. But this does not happen smoothly or completely, as legacy 
logics persist through sedimentation (Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996) or 
blending (Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005), as individuals adopt incompletely the identities 
appropriate to the logic (Creed et al., 2010).  
If the processes of code-writing are open, participative, if they are led by a trusted 
figure, if they are iterative, and if they offer an escape clause to give those elites the 
possibility of agency, then, as the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest, there's a chance 
they will gain acceptance and persist over time, irrespective of whether their 
arrangements lead to more nearly optimal outcomes. In corporate governance, at least, 
we have the reminder of a code that didn't institutionalize, didn't inform the decisions 
of an elite. It's the joke known on the internet as Enron Ethics (2000).  
Moreover, corporate governance is not one institution but many, some formal, 
made up of laws and rules of one country that collide with those of others, and with 
the informal institutions that develop within and among the increasingly global 
businesses listed on stock exchanges and those that make up the investment supply 
chain. That is, formal institutions based on one logic, in one jurisdiction, face continual 
challenge to their legitimacy from the logics of pre-legitimated institutions from other 
jurisdictions and from logics that govern the informal institutions that arise within 
industry or market peer groups. While a choice between sets of formal institutions may 
not be easy, it is not impossible. In corporate governance it may be as simple as the 
decision on where to site the corporate headquarters.  
What emerges, therefore, is a regulative system in which formal institutions are 
moderated by other formal institutions and by informal ones, both inside and outside 
the organizational field. As a result, for institutional practices to gain acceptance and 
diffuse – and in this case, where actors are especially wilful and powerful – 
arrangements may come to include an internalized mechanism for bricolage. This 
practice institutionalizes experimentation with the institution itself, putting in place a 
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pre-condition for institutional entrepreneurship. The presence of such a mechanism 
may ironically reduce the demand from entrepreneurs to use it. In the UK and 
jurisdictions that have copied its practice, that mechanism is known as "comply-or-
explain". Perhaps it is a testimony to the power of institutional forces that many 
companies choose to comply rather than explain. Perhaps it is also a testimony to the 
limitations of those institutions to affect the behaviour – to constrain the agency – of 
wilful and powerful actors that companies comply formally while finding ways to 
work around the institutional constraints.  
Implications and future research 
These reflections on contributions suggest several avenues for further exploration. 
One of the two mentioned at the end of Chapter 2 is the subject, at least in part of 
Chapter 3. But that chapter raised rather more questions than it answered. As 
promised in its final pages, what follows are some preliminary thoughts about the 
direction those inquiries could take.  
Authorship: One of the hallmarks of the UK codes of corporate governance is how 
entrenched their concepts have become. That is due in part to the person of Sir Adrian 
Cadbury, and to a number of the individuals who served or served on his committee. 
His position in a family of industrialists with a long history of what we now call 
corporate social responsibility may have dissipated potential opposition among actors 
who wanted radical reform as well as those who objected to any outside interference 
with the affairs of private companies. The records in the Cadbury Archive suggest the 
committee staff and Sir Adrian himself gave such radical ideas a serious hearing before 
settling on a more modest set of changes. Even as they criticized Derek Higgs's specific 
code recommendations, contributors to the "fatal flaws only" review of his draft code 
praised his insights into the work of non-executive directors. That raises the question 
about whether a fuller consultation process, perhaps with Higgs himself in the lead, 
might have resolved the tensions more successfully.  
During the process leading to the 2010 code, the only named person in the public 
discourse was Sir David Walker, who did not directly participate in its drafting. The 
code was largely written by Sir Christopher Hogg, chairman of the FRC.36 Sir 
Christopher was deeply steeped in the folklore of corporate governance, having 
                                                     
36 Based of a personal communication. 
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advised the Cadbury Committee after a protracted effort by Sir Adrian and the 
committee staff to get him to take part (see CAD-01181 for details). As we have seen, 
Baroness Hogg (no relation), who succeeded Sir Christopher as FRC chairman, was a 
contributor to the 2003 debate in her role as chairman of 3i Holdings, a company that 
straddles the investor-corporate divide. Stephen Haddrill, who was director-general of 
the ABI when the consultation processes started for the 2010 code, had become chief 
executive of the FRC by the time they ended. Peter Montagnon, who edited the Lex 
column of the Financial Times newspaper around the time of the Cadbury Report, went 
on to become director of investment affairs at the ABI and joined Hadrill at the FRC as 
the 2010 was undergoing final adjustments. It may be worth noting that Lok (2010) 
uses data from the FT Lex column to develop his version of the competing logics in 
identity construction in corporate governance without recognizing the identity of the 
column's editor during part of the time. The movements of individual voices suggest 
that in the small world of corporate governance codes may have a biography as well as 
a history. But the codes also grew more anonymous over time, suggesting that growing 
institutionalization dilutes the need for personality in achieving legitimacy.  
Absent voices: A remarkable feature of the data used in this study in Chapter 3 is 
the lack of contribution from classes of actors with a vested interest in the outcome. 
Politicians were mainly on the sidelines. Marjorie Mowlam, a front-bench member of 
the Labour Party, then in opposition, met Sir Adrian at an early stage in his 
committee's work, promising (or perhaps threatening depending on the listener's 
orientation), to legislate more radical change to company law if Labour won the 
election due in 1992 (it lost). A backbench Labour MP submitted position papers and 
published articles with academics urging more radical action as well. The smaller 
Liberal Democrat Party contributed to the Cadbury Committee and also urged more 
radical changes. These interventions may have influenced the committee's approach to 
the breadth of opinion considered. The Higgs Review was instigated by government 
after Labour had come to power in 1997. But otherwise we see little in the archives of 
all three consultations to suggest formal political pressure. Further research might 
unearth other evidence to explain what other roles politicians played in the process 
and how more generally political forces affect codification and institutionalization.  
Of interest to market-oriented observers is the nearly complete absence in the 
records of two large classes of investors. First are foreign investors, whose influence 
was growing throughout the period. According to the Office of National Statistics, 
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foreign share ownership in the UK was about 13 per cent at the time of the Cadbury 
Report. By the end of 2008 it had risen to 42 per cent, at the expense of traditional 
institutions to which the codes' authors paid such heed.37  What effect the absence of 
foreign investors from the process of code development has on its perceived legitimacy 
in the future will interest corporate governance scholars and practitioners alike. Second 
are the hedge funds, whose holdings of equities are not as large but whose impact on 
share trading and therefore price discovery is very considerable indeed. With the 
growth of activism in some quarters of the hedge fund community (Becht, Franks, & 
Grant, 2010; Brav et al., 2006; Brav & Mathews, 2011), the implications for corporate 
governance are in flux (see Nordberg, 2010, which is also Chapter 5 of this thesis). 
Logics: One of the suggestions from this study concerns the role of competing and 
conflicting logics on institutional change (Purdy & Gray, 2009; Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008). When actors advocate importing institutional arrangements from other countries 
– in this case, Germany and the United States – they invoke measures already 
legitimated by similar actors in an adjacent organizational field. The degree of 
communication between those fields, in this case the growing presence of the same 
actors in different countries, suggests that legitimacy of alien ideas may be easier to 
achieve and institutional change more likely. We have not seen that in this case; on the 
contrary, the continuity of the code is more obvious in these regards than the change. 
But the dividing lines between fields are becoming blurred, evidenced by the energetic 
debate in the literature over the relative persistence or convergence of corporate 
governance standards (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Chizema & Kim, 2010; 
Goergen et al., 2008; Gordon & Roe, 2004). 
This case further suggests that these various logics – Lok (2010) identifies two; 
Westphal and Zajac (1998) discuss only one – interact with each other. The study 
provides indications that they draw their legitimacy in part from the spoken and 
unspoken adherence of their advocates to differing theoretical perspectives (agency 
theory, stewardship, resource dependency, etc.) common in the corporate governance 
literature, related at one level or another to what this thesis describes as the 
overarching logic of accountability.  
Fields: Those ideas lead to a more general point about the nature of fields, where 
the remarks here are expressed even more tentatively than the others in this section. 
                                                     
37 ONS data retrieved October 15, 2011, from 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/share0110.pdf.  
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The theoretical and empirical literature makes reference to both organizational and 
institutional fields. Davis and Marquis (2005) consider the two terms to be 
interchangeable. Hardy and Maguire (2010) agree, but go on to cite Wooten and 
Hoffman (2008) as arguing that "organizational field" has replaced the term 
"institutional field". Hardy and Maguire then list a variety of authors, including Glynn 
(2008); Greenwood, et al. (2002); Oakes, Townley and Cooper (1998), as using the term 
institutional rather than organizational field. These may be examples of a merely 
semantic discussion, of little interest to theory itself. But this case shows evidence of 
adjacent organizational fields (e.g. Germany, US, UK; large listed companies, small 
listed companies; mainstream institutional investors, foreign shareholders, hedge 
funds and others) with shared interests, some common values and a common 
vocabulary,38 which can mask differences in meaning.  
Moreover, corporate governance is a field of many different institutions. Codes 
may be institutions, but so too are boards. Corporations operate within frameworks of 
law and regulation, often operating in more than one country's version of them. 
Institutional investors engage in ritualized, routine behaviour, often (but not always) 
predicated on a logic of shareholder value that can differ from that used by corporate 
boards. The contributions to post-Higgs consultation contain several examples of 
scepticism among company chairmen towards the idea of shareholder primacy, which 
we see echoed in differing ways in the academic literature (Armour et al., 2003; 
O'Kelley, 2011; Stout, 2011). The chairmen's views occasionally resonate with what 
Bainbridge (2010) terms director primacy or how Blair and Stout (1999) see the board 
as a mediating hierarchy. 
These considerations lead me to speculate that there may be a useful theoretical 
distinction to draw between, on the one hand, a field of organizations operating under 
one or a few institutional logics, and, on the other, a field of institutions, with 
overlapping meanings for similar words and habituated actions, crossing the blurred 
boundaries of adjacent fields of organizations. In the case explored in Chapter 3, 
overlapping logics and blurred field boundaries seem not to have stimulated on their 
own significant institutional change. The work of actors who sought to import such 
logics may have not engaged sufficiently well in "translation" or "bricolage", two forms 
of institutional work that Battilana and D'Aunno (2009) describe as examples of 
                                                     
38 NB: The word in the German language for corporate governance is "corporate governance". 
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"creating" through practical-evaluative agency. Was insufficient "translation" seen as 
disrupting and an attack on legitimacy?  
Power: Finally, we come to what some see as the elephant in the room of 
institutional theory. As noted early in Chapter 3, some scholars have doubts about the 
concept of institutional work (Clegg, 2010; Kraatz, 2011); critical management scholars 
criticize institutional theory as well as management (Cooper et al., 2008; Khan, Munir, 
& Willmott, 2007; Lok & Willmott, 2006; Willmott, 2011). This study has used a model 
of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992) and yet not exploited it for its potential 
to examine the hidden relationships of power critical theorists see as underpinning 
human and organizational interaction. In describing how the codes came about and 
even in the present section in the list of voice absent from the debate, little has emerged 
about the impact of corporate governance on the impoverished pensioners of the 
Maxwell enterprises, the victims of Enron, the taxpayers who paid for the bank 
collapses and even the governments that fell in Greece, Ireland, Italy and elsewhere, in 
part because to the losses incurred in rescuing the financial system. Surely, there is a lot 
to be critical about.  
Those near the centre of the field of UK corporate governance shaped the debate in 
ways that other actors did not, perpetuating their influence over the way corporations 
operate as the code was first written and then revised over time. The language of 
corporate governance, shaped in agency theory with its emphasis on shareholder value 
maximization, has institutionalized ways of (not) thinking about the organization of 
economic affairs. The data used in this study preclude detailed analysis of the type 
needed to determine, for example, the degree to which company chairmen are self-
disciplining, in the sense Foucault (1979) meant, trapped in a certain mentality of 
governance (2002) despite their lofty positions. But irritation over being ignored, 
evident in the contribution of Fair Pensions during the third consultation for the 2010 
code, suggests that even people directly involved in the investment supply chain can 
feel disenfranchised by the institutional juggernaut of the UK corporate governance 
community.  
These are matters that some of the other papers in this collection touch upon, 
though in different terms. The creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was an enactment of 
power relationships (Nordberg, 2008b; also Chapter 4). The coalitions of interests 
arising from the model of the shareholder stance (Nordberg, 2010; also Chapter 5) 
suggest ways of addressing how power plays out in the contest over corporate 
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governance. A detailed analysis of its role in the formation and development of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code will need to wait, however, for another paper.  
Methods of research  
This programme of study and the papers that comprise it arose out of a long 
reflection on the field that stemmed from my work as a business and financial 
journalist. My journalistic career was spent in the employment of news organizations 
that took great pains to avoid snap decisions about the meaning of complex events. 
One of the senior editors at Reuters, where I worked for 18 years, used to say: "Make 
your story as simple as possible, and no simpler." A version of that quote is widely 
attributed to Einstein, but after several years of looking for the source I found 
something rather close that Einstein did say (see Einstein, 1934), but it wasn't quite so 
simple. Still, it struck me then, as now, as a good maxim for the work I do and have 
done, as a journalist and as a social scientist.  
If journalism is the first draft of history, then perhaps social science is the second. 
This reflection came about shortly after I had started to study research methodologies 
in the first year of PhD studies. I was teaching postgraduate students about one version 
of it (marketing research) at the same time I sought to start my own research studies. It 
was a good excuse to go back to the books on philosophy that had lain closed on my 
shelves for a couple of decades, and to plug the gaps with more contemporary writing. 
Early on I read Glaser and Strauss (1967) on grounded theory. I felt affinities between 
Strauss's (1987) view and the practices I was asked to conduct as a serious journalist 
working for serious publications written for serious readers.  
Sometimes journalism was a venture into the unknown, much as the way even the 
purist view of grounded theory describes. I would be asked by my editors – and later 
as an editor I would ask my correspondents – to write a story about something that 
I/they had never heard of. Frequently, I/they had to conduct interviews without any 
background knowledge, piece together the essential information, get a sense of what 
was changing, and follow those leads wherever they headed. When I/they stopped 
hearing anything new from the sources I/they would contact, then the search would 
shut down and I/they would write what we had learned. Deadlines provided focus 
but made the observations all the more tentative.  
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Of course, those circumstances were few and far between. Once I/they had 
covered that subject matter before, even written an incomplete or frustratingly simple 
story, I/they would know something about it, have reference points, background. 
I/they would be faster at flushing out of sources what had changed. I/they would be 
less likely to make certain mistakes (of commission) but more likely to make others (of 
omission) and more susceptible to "capture". You will recall that word from the rebuke 
the Association of British Insurers used the Chapter 3 to describe the work of risk 
"experts", like the specialists among its members. Knowing something may taint work 
based on grounded theory, but it is also inevitable among intelligent people. The skill, 
discipline, trick (if you will) is to develop the ability to stand back from the inquiry, 
stand back from the emergent conclusions, and think again about what I/they had 
seen. In journalism, in the places I practiced it, we tried to turn the stone over and look 
at the underside, adopt the stance (as best we could) of someone involved in the story 
but with a very different background from our own. What would they see and write? 
What evidence is there, in the interview notes, the statistics, the body language of the 
speakers and the reactions of the audience, that might lead someone to take a different 
view from the emergent one? Then we would write what we saw. The story would be 
as simple as possible, but no simpler.  
Social science research, I have found, has many parallels with this type of 
journalism, but with differences of some significance. The mode of operation expressed 
by scholars writing about research methods involves an ideal of distance and calm 
reflection in place of the excitement of the chase in journalism. That idealism seems to 
exist among researchers who eschew idealism as a philosophical stance, as evidenced 
in a recent exchange over critical theory and business schools in the literature (Ford, 
Harding, & Learmonth, 2010, 2011; Tatli, 2011) that spilled over into the Academy of 
Management listservs. That idealism captures a spirit of science, of discipline and 
patience in pursuit of truth, a spirit that the journalist, with deadlines pressing, can 
rarely afford. Moreover, the journalist probably wouldn't want either discipline or 
patience, such are the institutionalized values of the trade. The journalist knows, after 
all, that tomorrow is another day, the chance for another story with a different set of 
presumptions, a chance to achieve balance and completeness through a body of work, 
not a single piece. 
But scholars have deadlines, too, just rather longer ones. The pressures for getting 
into print inherent in the publish-or-perish mentality in US universities and its 
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analogues elsewhere in academia push the social scientist towards impatience, 
threatening discipline. Those pressures arise in part, too, from the pursuit of relevance 
(RAE 2008) and impact (REF 2014), which are more easily accommodated when the 
social scientist adopts – at least in part – the mantle of the journalist, seeing the 
significance of a phenomenon – at least in part – through the eyes of someone outside 
the peer group, among users of the research findings. Three of the pieces in this 
collection reflect that approach (Chapters 5, 7-8); two others share its urge but have 
resisted, I hope, its temptations (Chapters 2-3). Each was inspired by events in the 
"real" world that demanded explanation for a broader public than academic peers, and 
not just for the sake of their contribution to a league table of research-active staff.  
There is room and a need in academic social science for faster scholarship. 
Traditional research might then be the third rather than second draft of history, 
making space for a second draft with greater immediacy than academic publishing 
permits, with greater discipline than journalism but sharing some of its impatience. 
Such work is evident in corporate governance, where the urgency of the public policy 
debate has prompted scholars to exploit with relish the vehicle of working papers to 
disseminate ideas in advance of journal publication. It is no surprise that Social Science 
Research Network was founded by one of the most famous names in corporate 
governance scholarship. Something similar is afoot in the journals themselves. The 
move by publishers (e.g. Sage, Wiley) to online-first publication – sometimes in 
manuscript form (e.g. Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal) – 
responds to that sense of urgency. Two of the pieces in this collection (Chapters 5, 7) 
stimulated the editors to push these papers to the front of the queue to ensure they 
promptly came into print.  
Such scholarship might not stand the test of time, of course. The movement in 
journalism from daily newspapers to websites and from the evening news bulletin to 
24-hour news channels has increased the immediacy and impact of news, not always to 
beneficial effect. Some scholarship requires longer gestation, sober reflection, 
theoretical contribution, not just relevance and impact. Research needs theory-
building, not just its application, even if the rush to publish pushes scholars towards 
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the empirical and would-be scholars towards PhDs by published work (A. Hillman, 
2011).39  
But content as well as timeliness might benefit from greater experimentation. 
Journals like ephemera and the Journal of Management Inquiry push at those boundaries. 
These reflections suggest greater variegation in social science, more publication 
models, and greater willingness to discard institutionalized approaches to academic 
writing in favour of the joint aims of relevance, impact, and – most of all – insight. 
Conclusions and directions 
This collection of essays contributes in several ways to our understanding of 
corporate governance and perhaps even on a theoretical level to how larger 
phenomena of codification and institutionalization take place. But I am aware of some 
large holes in the work, as a rather long programme for further research makes plain. 
And there is more. 
Returning after a long gap to university studies has been a delightful if frustrating 
opportunity to catch up on thinking in fields ranging from philosophy and sociology, 
to literature and science, and sensing again the links between them. Reengaging with 
some of it (Foucault) and coming new to others (Giddens) has been a pleasure. Even if 
only little of their work is reflected directly in this collection, their views are reflected 
through some of the many people who cite their work.40 I have, however, made 
reference in passing to some writing from that direction that seemed germane, even 
inescapable: Rorty, Toulmin. Others from different directions have slipped into the 
reflective comments in this final chapter: Bhaskar, Rawls, Binmore. I have avoided 
others (Kahneman, Checkland) even when they impress me as offering rich seams of 
explanation for the phenomena and concepts this collection explores. They beg more 
questions than I can answer here, or yet.  
Corporate governance and the processes of studying it have complexities that this 
study has not captured. The story presented here is as simple as it could be, but it is 
still too simple. There is more work to do.   
                                                     
39 The drive behind this collection, I would like to think, involves more than the "growing 
popularity of 'three-paper' dissertations in lieu of one large project" that Hillman (2011, p. 607) 
regrets. 
40 Cooper et al. (2008) cite a book I have yet to locate (Posner's Public Intellectuals of 2001, 
Harvard) saying that Foucault has been the most cited author in sociology, with double the 
citations of his nearest rival in 1995-2000. Giddens cannot be far down the list. 
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